SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002971 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KTFN ETTC ECON SN SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON REF: A. SINGAPORE 2155 ¶B. SINGAPORE 1706 Classified By: DCM Judith R. Fergin, Reasons 1.4(b)(c)(d) ¶1. (C) We look forward to your visit to Singapore from October 19-20. This will be an excellent opportunity to thank Singapore for its close counterterrorism cooperation and identify ways in which we can expand the relationship. Sense of Vulnerability -------------- ¶2. (C) Singapore has an acute sense of its vulnerability to a terrorist attack and the severe damage one could cause to its society and economy. While Singapore has not yet experienced an attack, the GOS uncovered a plot in December 2001 by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to set off a series of truck bombs against western targets here, including the U.S. Embassy. Under the broad powers of the Internal Security Act (ISA), the GOS has detained the plot members and required them to undergo a program of religious counseling designed to encourage cooperation and eventual rehabilitation. Several of the detainees have proven difficult to "bring around." GOS officials view a terrorist attack as inevitable and see an externally planned and launched attack as the most likely threat scenario. It maintains a high degree of readiness, including by deploying armed soldiers in the subway system and in major shopping areas and regularly launching civic awareness campaigns. ¶3. (S/NF) The GOS senior leadership is concerned about the ability and will of Indonesia to combat terrorism. Singapore's intelligence services -- small but highly professional -- closely monitor the situation there. The GOS remains concerned with the training and operational experience being gained by terrorists in the southern Philippines and is increasingly concerned that external forces could radicalize the conflict in southern Thailand. Singapore's security forces work well with their Malaysian counterparts and believe they have the situation there in hand. The GOS tracks developments in Singapore's ethnic Malay/Muslim minority community and monitors the activities of certain foreigners in the country. A Strong Partner -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Singapore has been a reliable and highly capable partner in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to providing support in Iraq and Afghanistan, the GOS participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, Megaports and several other counterterrorism and border security programs. ¶5. (C) Counterterrorism intelligence cooperation has been close; sharing of information gleaned from respective detainees has led to further capture of terrorist suspects around the region. The GOS, however, is loathe to allow such information to be used in legal proceedings. Terrorism Finance -------------- ¶6. (C) Singapore is a regional financial center and therefore an important participant in the effort to stop terrorist financing in Southeast Asia, although it has yet to identify and freeze any terrorist assets. It is in the process of revising its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing (AML-CTF) regulations for banks and other financial and non-financial institutions to conform to FATF recommendations (Ref B.) We are working to address shortcomings in Singapore's terrorist finance controls. For example, Singapore's bank secrecy laws, its Financial Intelligence Unit's inadequately small database of names (Ref A),and lack of routine currency reporting requirements could be exploited. Message for GOS -------------- ¶7. (U) Your interlocutors will be eager to share perspectives on regional terrorism developments. In addition, you should stress that: (S) -- We appreciate Singapore's close counterterrorism cooperation and productive intelligence exchanges. (S) -- (With ISD) We welcome the opportunity to share the knowledge and expertise Singapore has gained in its successful efforts against regional terrorist groups -- especially Jemaah Islamiyah -- and look forward to building a closer, operational relationship with you. (U) -- Singapore should strengthen its terrorist finance controls. In particular, Singapore should adopt a declaration system for cross-border transportation of currency to enable law enforcement to monitor movements of cash. (U) -- Singapore's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) should expand its database to capture more Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR's) and better track terrorist financial flows. By comparison, Hong Kong's FIU gathered more than eight times as many STR's in 2004 than Singapore. (Singapore had 1,760 in 2004 while Hong Kong had 12,006 in the first ten months of 2004.) LAVIN