SINGAPORE CITES OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED FINANCIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002155

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TREASURY FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY GLASER
AND AJOVES
FINCEN FOR RMILLER AND WBAITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015
TAGS: ETTC KTFN KCRM EFIN PTER SNAR SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE CITES OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED FINANCIAL
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU) COOPERATION

REF: SINGAPORE 1706

Classified By: Acting Economic and Political Counselor
Paul Horowitz, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Singapore's Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIU),the Suspicious Transaction Reports Office (STRO),
told its U.S. FinCEN FIU counterpart that it was willing to
share financial crimes-related information, but that it
would be unable to do so unless such information were
traceable to the limited number of names (about 10,000)
available in its database of suspicious transaction reports
(STRs). STRO agreed to explore ways to improve FIU-to-FIU
cooperation based on the recently concluded Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). It noted, however, that it would be
difficult to broaden cooperation given that, with the
exception of cases involving drug trafficking and terrorism
finance, Singapore's bank secrecy laws prohibited financial
institutions from divulging account holder information
unless an STR had been filed. STRO suggested that FinCEN
and U.S. law enforcement agencies provide more detailed
information in their suspicious transaction requests in
order to facilitate STR database searches. In response to
USG law enforcement's frustration with the low level of
positive responses to information requests, STRO asked FinCEN
for a list of pending cases and offered to provide relevant
updates, including explanations for any processing delays.
See para 7 for a list of follow-up action items. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Rena Miller, FinCEN Regional Specialist (East
Asia and Europe),met June 3 with Mr. PEH Chin Wah, Head,
Suspicious Transaction Reports Office (STRO),Singapore
Police Commercial Affairs Division (CAD),and Mr. GOH Tee
Jong, CAD Deputy Superintendent of Police, to discuss ways
to begin cooperation under the FIU MOU signed by FinCEN and
STRO in December 2004.

Limits to Singapore,s Assistance
--------------


3. (C) Peh stressed that STRO was willing to share
available information with FinCEN and, with the FIU MOU in
place, to make the necessary disclosures on an FIU-to-FIU
basis using the Egmont Secure Web system. He cautioned,
however, that a number of procedural and legal restrictions
impeded its ability to extend its cooperation, in
particular:

-- STRO can potentially access a broad range of databases to
process requests from U.S. law enforcement, but only if a
"hit" is first generated in the STR database. The STR
database is small, containing no more than 5,000 - 6,000
suspicious transaction reports and approximately 10,000
names. Once a "hit" has been identified, STRO can then
access several other databases, including those used for
criminal records; the Registry of Companies and Businesses;
the Registry of Marriages, Births and Deaths (including
information for suspects' immediate relatives); residential
addresses; vehicle registries; and telephone directories.
The Singapore Police's investigations database can confirm
whether an investigation is pending or has been conducted
previously, even in the absence of any subsequent formal
court proceedings. Peh noted, however, that any information
related to the investigation beyond confirmation of its
undertaking would not be made available to us. (Note:
STRO's current practice when conducting an STR database
search is to provide a "negative response to our queries that
yield more than one possible name. End note.)

Goh said that STRO began collecting STRs only in 2000
following its establishment as Singapore's FIU; it processed
1,760 STRs in 2004. Peh estimated that roughly three to five
percent of STRs investigated resulted in
prosecutions. STRO received roughly 150 STRs each month, Peh
said, and investigated most of them, usually by checking bank
account information that included ownership details and
transaction history.

-- Singapore's bank secrecy laws limit STRO to providing
account information only for those individuals whose names
appear in the STR database. Under the Banking Act (Chapter
19, Section 47),a financial institution cannot share a
customer's account information without a court order --
unless the suspected offense involves drug trafficking or
financing of terrorism. Goh explained that a court order was
relatively easy to obtain so long as "reasonable grounds" for
suspicion could be established.

(Note: Even with access to account information, the quality
and breadth of data is limited by the fact that the Singapore
government relies on only one type of report -- the STR.
Singapore does not collect currency transaction reports,
which monitor high-value cash transactions, or currency and
monetary instrument reports, which monitor cross-border
currency movements -- all of which, along with a number of
other reports, are compiled in the United States. Banks and
other financial institutions themselves have record-keeping
requirements related to customer due diligence and customer
transactions, for example, but again, we do not have access
to this information without an STR "hit." End note.)

STRO Suggests Ways to Improve Cooperation
--------------


4. (C) Assuming individuals were subjects of an STR "hit,"
Peh emphasized that, if FinCEN wanted detailed information
about them, it should indicate this on the investigations
request form, i.e., note what specific databases it would
like searched. He asked that, where possible, FinCEN note
whether the suspect was a Singapore citizen or permanent
resident (the STR database is divided into these two
categories),and whether FinCEN lacked certain information
such as a name, passport number or an address in an effort
to avoid processing delays.


5. (C) In response to Miller's query about whether STRO
used a networking system similar to FinCEN's, whereby a
requesting law enforcement agency could be put in direct
contact with the receiving law enforcement agency, Goh said
that it did not, but that STRO could instruct the relevant
agency to engage directly with its counterparts in the
United States. Goh admitted, however, that such
instructions from STRO were rare, and that the common
practice among Singapore law enforcement agencies was to
submit a request through Interpol in Washington, where it
would be transferred to the appropriate U.S. agency. Goh
said that the STRO would be interested in participating in
FinCEN's networking system.


6. (C) Miller noted that U.S. law enforcement agencies
were frustrated by difficulties in obtaining responses from
STRO, even when requests for information had been channeled
through FinCEN. Peh replied that these delays were most
likely due to a lack of basic information or incorrect
information such as a misspelled name. Goh noted that STRO
had worked with Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs and
Border Protection representatives in the past, but that in
some cases it was impossible to provide the requested
information. This was especially true of cases involving
individuals resident in Indonesia, he said, since Singapore
and Indonesia lacked any agreement to facilitate this type
of law enforcement cooperation. He suggested that both the
FIU MOU and the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) were good
channels by which to facilitate investigations opened in
the United States.

Follow Up Action Items
--------------


7. (C) In an effort to expand bilateral FIU cooperation,
FinCEN and STRO agreed to the following action items:

-- FinCEN will provide STRO with a list of any pending
requests so that STRO can respond with the information and
any relevant explanations for processing delays.

-- Both sides will explore ways to improve information
sharing, including the possibility of participating in an
international analyst exchange in which designated FinCEN
and STRO staff would be given access to their respective
counterpart's databases to research specific cases of
interest.

-- With FinCEN's assistance, U.S. law enforcement agencies
will endeavor to facilitate better database search results
by providing STRO with more detailed information requests.
-- In cases where database searches generate a number of
possible matches, STRO will try to provide, upon request from
FinCEN, a list of these names, up to between 10 and 30 total.
End note.)

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The FIU MOU was a first step, but much work remains
to be done. With few names in its database of STRs,
especially relative to Singapore's size as a financial
center, and
no authorization in most cases to reach beyond that
database, STRO possesses limited ability to provide
investigative assistance to U.S. law enforcement entities.
Our past record of cooperation is weak, and STRO has rarely
availed itself of FinCEN's services, having submitted
relatively few requests since it began operations in 2000.
Even with the Drug Designation Agreement in place,
cooperation on this front has been spotty at best. In
conjunction with FinCEN and other USG agencies, we will
continue to push the GOS to increase its responsiveness.


9. (C) In our broader discussions on law enforcement issues,
GOS officials typically convey a conviction that cooperation,
where available, is excellent. They have, however, begun
signaling that there has been a change in mindset internally
to do more with us in areas where cooperation heretofore has
been limited or nonexistent (e.g., mutual legal assistance,
tax fraud, etc.). We are vigorously pursuing this purported
willingness to change across the spectrum of law enforcement
activity here.


10. (U) Rena Miller cleared this cable.
FERGIN