PRESIDENT LAGOS ASKS U.S AND CHILE TO EXPEDITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 002573 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015 TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PGOV CI SUBJECT: PRESIDENT LAGOS ASKS U.S AND CHILE TO EXPEDITE SOLUTION TO AVOID AID CUTOFF UPON ICC RATIFICATION REF: A) SANTIAGO 02544 B) SANTIAGO 02469 Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly. Reasons: 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 12. ¶2. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Walker conveyed to the Ambassador on December 23 President Lagos' desire for the U.S. and Chile to find a satisfactory solution that would avoid a cut-off of aid under ASPA when Chile ratifies the ICC. Walker said Lagos wants a resolution before the end of his administration in March. He said it would be a disaster for the bilateral relationship if Chile were to ratify the ICC and the U.S. were to respond by cutting off military assistance. He argued that a strong relationship was more important now than ever, given recent troubling developments in the region (i.e. Morales' election in Bolivia, Chavez-Morales axis). Walker proposed that USG and GOC officials find an acceptable formula before the January 25-26 Defense Consultative Committee (DCC) meeting in Santiago. He suggested that U.S. and Chilean officials meet during the first week of January to begin detailed discussions. End summary. ¶3. (C) Foreign Minister Walker called in the Ambassador on December 23 to convey President Lagos' desire to find a satisfactory solution before the end of his administration in March to avoid a cut-off of aid under ASPA when Chile ratifies the International Criminal Court (ICC). Foreign Ministry Director General for External Relations Carlos Portales (the MFA's number 3) accompanied Walker. Poloff accompanied the Ambassador. POTUS-Lagos Meeting in Mar del Plata -------------- ¶4. (C) Walker opened the discussion by recounting President Lagos' satisfaction with his meeting with POTUS in Mar del Plata in November during the Summit of the Americas. Walker commented that the two Presidents had developed an excellent relationship during the past six years. Walker, who attended the Mar del Plata meeting, said the Presidents' relaxed and comfortable exchange of views was evidence of their closeness and the importance they attach to a strong bilateral relationship. Walker said that during the meeting, President Lagos told the President Chile would eventually ratify the ICC and that he understood the USG's obligations under U.S. law (e.g. ASPA). Walker added that the two Presidents agreed on the importance of finding a satisfactory way to resolve the consequences of ratification to keep relations on track. Following the meeting in Mar del Plata, President Lagos instructed the Foreign and Defense Ministries to carry out President Lagos' commitment, Walker added. Solution to ICC Ratification: Sense of Urgency -------------- - ¶5. (C) Turning to the present, Walker said that he, Minister of Defense Ravinet, and President Lagos had had a lengthy discussion the day before (December 22) on the issue. The three acknowledged that Chile ultimately would ratify the ICC, but agreed that ratification would be put off until the next administration (post-March 11). Walker said the three also acknowledged that the Lagos Administration was under considerable domestic pressure from members of Congress to make progress towards ICC ratification during the remainder of its tenure. Therefore, Walker noted, it is likely the Senate will approve constitutional amendments necessary for congressional ratification of the ICC during the next administration. Walker said that President Lagos stressed repeatedly during the December 22 meeting his interest in finding a solution, and had instructed him (Walker) to find a solution soon. ¶6. (C) Walker said preserving the strong U.S.-Chile relationship is more important now than ever, given the recent troubling developments in the region. Specifically, Walker cited Evo Morales' recent election in Bolivia, the Chavez-Morales axis, and increasing ties between Venezuela and Argentina as reasons why "like-minded countries" like the U.S. and Chile need to remain close. In reference to the Chile-Mexico strategic partnership that will be signed during President Fox's visit to Santiago in January (ref B),Walker said Chile's concerns about growing instability in the region was a driving force behind the Lagos-Fox agreement in New York in September to conclude a Chile-Mexico strategic partnership agreement. Given the current troubling situation in the region, Walker argued the U.S. and Chile needed to ensure there were no divisions between the two that could be exploited by others. Switching to English, Walker said "it is urgent that we (the U.S. and Chile) reach a similar agreement." ¶7. (C) To fulfill President Lagos' desire and to follow through on the spirit of the two Presidents' commitments in Mar del Plata, Walker proposed the U.S. and Chile conclude a mutually satisfactory agreement before the U.S.-Chile Defense Consultative Committee (DCC) meting in Santiago on January 25-26. Acknowledging the challenges posed by the holiday season and the New Year, Walker suggested that U.S. and Chilean officials meet during the first week of January to begin discussing details. Walker said the Foreign Ministry would be in charge of the discussions, but that the MFA would work in close consultation with the Ministry of Defense. Turning to Director General Portales, Walker said "he will be in charge of this for us." Ambassador Sends Cautionary Note -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador responded that a strong U.S.-Chile relationship was also very important for Washington, and acknowledged the close working relationship between the two Presidents. The Ambassador indicated said the USG also wanted to avoid a cut-off of assistance and that Washington, like Santiago, was exploring options. However, the Ambassador cautioned Walker against believing that an exception to ASPA for Chile would be easy if Chile were to ratify the ICC and not conclude an Article 98-type agreement. The Ambassador made clear that if Chile were to ratify the ICC and not enter into an Article 98 agreement with the U.S., the USG must uphold the law (i.e. ASPA). Walker said that President Lagos understood that ratification would trigger ASPA sanctions. While noting that ASPA legislation allowed for certain types of waivers, the Ambassador counseled Walker against believing that a waiver would be easily doable in the absence of an Article 98 agreement. The Ambassador reiterated that an Article 98 agreement remained the most effective way to avoid a cut-off of military assistance. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked Walker if Chile could simultaneously ratify the ICC and conclude an Article 98-type agreement. Like MOD U/S of War Gaspar (ref. A),Walker and Portales said "no." The Ambassador then asked Walker if the GOC could conclude an Article 98 "executive" agreement that did not require congressional approval. Both Walker and Portales said "no," since ratifying the ICC involved changing Chilean law and changes to Chilean law directly involved Congress. Portales added that given the degree of congressional interest in the ICC, concluding any sort of executive agreement related to the ICC would not be politically possible. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador sought clarification on what the GOC had in mind in terms of an agreement to avoid, noting that MOD U/S of War Gaspar had talked about an agreement that could include both SOFA and Article 98-related components. Walker noted the details had not been ironed out, and stressed it was important for the two sides to begin discussions soon. Portales interjected to stress that it was important to distinguish between SOFA-like and Article 98-type agreements. Noting he had spoken with Gaspar following the latter's meeting with the Ambassador, Portales said he (Gaspar) was referring to "a SOFA-like agreement, not an Article 98-type agreement." The Ambassador said Gaspar also had indicated the MOD was considering a general immunities agreement with a number of countries, including the U.S.. Walker said he believed a series of bilateral agreements was better, and encouraged the U.S. and Chile to pursue a bilateral agreement. ¶11. (C) Walker closed by encouraging the USG and the GOC to fulfill the two Presidents' desires as conveyed at Mar del Plata, and conclude soon an agreement that would avoid a strain in the bilateral relationship at this very important time. The Ambassador assured Walker he would convey the FM's request to Washington and seek guidance. ¶12. (C) Action Request: FM Walker is the third senior GOC official this week to convey the GOC's desire to find a way to avoid a cut-off in aid under ASPA once Chile ratifies the ICC. Post believes it is in our interest to begin more detailed discussions with the GOC and to take a stab at a mutually satisfactory agreement before the end of the Lagos Administration. It is possible that President Lagos, who enjoys high popularity, may be willing to use some capital on this before he leaves office. It is worth a try. We therefore recommend that we initiate discussions with the Chileans here in Santiago at the Ambassador-Portales level and request guidance. KELLY