GENERAL ABIZAID MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000099

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
ALAIWA

REF: SANAA 36

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. General Abizaid met with Minister of Defense
Alaiwa and Chief of Staff Qassemi on January 4. Abizaid
briefed Alaiwa on current USG priorities in the region: The
political transition in Iraq, continued worldwide pressure on
al-Qaida, and resumption of the Peace Process. Alaiwa raised
pending Yemeni purchases of F-5, C-130, Bell-Agusta
Helicopter, and other spare parts, U.S. training and
assistance for the Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF),
and asked for U.S. help in soliciting increased Saudi
security and development assistance for Yemen. End Summary.

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Abizaid on Regional Priorities
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2. (C) General Abizaid briefed Alaiwa on the USG's top three
priorities for the region in 2005. He said he was hopeful
the new year would bring a resumption of the Peace Process
and that following the Palestinian Authority Elections to
expect the Administration to take an important positive
initiative. Abizaid told Alaiwa that stabilization of Iraq
and moving forward with the political transition was another
top priority. The mission of the USG, he said, was to assist
stability by building Iraqi security forces, on the upcoming
election, Abizaid continued, we expect to face continued
difficulties with the insurgency in Iraq but the vast
majority of Iraqis want to vote and desire a stable situation
in their country. Continued worldwide pressure on al-Qaida,
particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a top
priority as well, said Abizaid, expressing his desire for
continued and increased US - Yemen cooperation in fighting
the GWOT.


3. (C) Defense Minister Alaiwa told Abizaid that he was
generally satisfied with US security cooperation and
assistance to Yemen, but asked for his personal intervention
on a number of FMF issues. Alaiwa complained that he
continues to wait for six million USD in spare parts for the
air force namely parts for C-130s, F-5s, and four Bell-Agusta
helicopters currently grounded. Chief of Staff Qassemi added
that the ROYG had learned from the al-Houthi rebellion that
special forces require special training and equipment and
repeated requests for USG assistance to train and equip three
YSOF Units.

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Yemen is a Time Bomb -- Need Saudi Assistance
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4. (C) Alaiwa reported that Saudi-Yemeni relations have
improved since reaching a border agreement, but that the KSA
was not doing enough to assist Yemen in controlling its
border, or for that matter, in assisting Yemeni development
in general. "There is a great discrepancy in wealth between
us and our Saudi neighbors," said the Defense Minister,
complaining that Saudi only does the minimal and should do
more including providing jobs for Yemenis, allowing more
guest laborers, and investing in Yemen's economy. Alaiwa
described Yemen's underdevelopment, poverty, and population
growth as a "time bomb" that threatens the entire region,
implying that the KSA has a responsibility and an interest in
helping defuse it. Following a recent trend of senior ROYG
leaders appealing to visiting senior USG official to weigh in
with Saudi Arabia, Alaiwa asked Abizaid to "tell our Gulf
friends," to give more assistance to Yemen.

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CT Cooperation Should be a Two-Way Street
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5. (S) Abizaid raised current AQ threats against maritime
targets and oil infrastructures in the Gulf region, saying
that he trusted the ROYG was exchanging information and
cooperating closely with the USG on this matter. Alaiwa
replied that such threats were indeed out there and that "we
need your information on this." (Comment: Alaiwa's response
illustrates current USG frustration with the ROYG on
intelligence sharing which can often be a one-way street.
During his visit Abizaid pressed officials, including the
President, for more complete information sharing on the part
of the ROYG. End Comment).


6. (S) Abizaid pointed to USG attempts last fall to fulfill
Saleh's request for US reconnaissance overflights of areas
where al-Houthi forces were thought to be operating. We
remain ready to provide such assistance Abizaid told Abizaid
and Qassemi. (Note: When the USG was ready to conduct such
operations, the ROYG turned down the offer having already put
down the rebellion. End Note). Chief of Staff Qassemi told
Abizaid that they still required photography as well as
mapping assistance for several parts of the country,
including the Sa'da, Marib and Shebwa regions. Abizaid
replied that the USG remains ready to assist with overflights.


7. (S) Alaiwa said he was satisfied with ROYG progress in
fighting and routing out AQ cells in Yemen. He said that
there have been important successes and that the population
was on the side of the government in this fight, but added
the caveat "we are dealing with al-Qaida after all."


8. (C) Comment: The MOD and ROYG military staff are likely
frustrated that the most successful USG security assistance
programs fall under purview of the Ministry of Interior --
the Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit and the
Yemeni Coast Guard. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC)
at Post reports extensive difficulties in working with MOD
officials, who complain to every visiting US official about
parts and other acquisitions they need, while failing to file
the necessary DOD paperwork to receive the materiel. In a
positive step, Alaiwa has recently acknowledged the
ministry's lack of ability to work with the FMS/FMF system.
To address this problem, Sanaa OMC is funding travel and
training for MOD officials to the US for training on how to
navigate the U.S. defense acquisitions and assistance
environment. The first group of Yemeni military officers
will travel to the U.S. in February to begin this training.
End Comment
KRAJESKI