SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000955 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005 REF: A. SANAA 912 ¶B. SANAA 896 ¶C. SANAA 895 ¶D. SANAA 891 ¶E. SANAA 883 ¶F. SANAA 882 ¶G. SANAA 876 ¶H. SANAA 875 ¶I. SANAA 863 ¶J. SANAA 860 ¶K. SANAA 836 Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting on April 13, 2005, to review the current threat, ongoing security measures and approve reverse trip wires. President Saleh informed the Ambassador that Kanaan had been captured along with several of his top associates and Yemen forces have made significant progress in the fighting in the Saada area. The EAC agreed that, although current threat indicators point to a relatively safer environment, embassy employees and the greater American community should continue security measures recommended previously to avoid the large crowds, tourist areas and downtown Sanaa. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, DATT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS,OMC, RSO, CONS, PD and USAID. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) Per Department guidance , the EAC discussed and adopted the following &Reverse Trip-Wires8 as a tool to gauge future recommendations for cessation or continuation of &Authorized Departure8: a. Decrease in terrorist threats against Americans in Yemen, combined with security environment characterized by no credible, specific information or non-counterable terrorist threats or plans for attack against Americans or other Western citizens or interests, to include international schools. b. Host nation responsiveness, resources and capabilities are assessed as adequate to protect American personel and assets from terrorist threats and political violence. c. EAC, RSO, and MOI concur that travel within Sanaa and designated areas of Yemen, including selected major cities, is safer under the restrictions and guidelines in place prior to the approval of authorized departure status. d. EAC agreement that acts of violence resulting from spillover from the Saada fighting or any other transnational or indigenous group does not pose a significant risk for the American community in Sanaa, or major Yemen cities that are authorized for Embassy travel by post management. ¶3. (S/NF) The Ambassador advised the EAC that President Saleh had called on the evening of April 12 to inform him that Kanaan, the person believed to have been planning an attack against American and Jewish leaders (reported in reftels),and some of his close associates had been captured. President Saleh assured the Ambassador of Yemen,s continuing efforts to capture any and all other associates of Kanaan. President Saleh also asserted that the Al-Hoothi fighters in Saada have been significantly reduced and are on the run. ¶4. (S/NF) RMAS had nothing to add. ¶5. (SBU) The Management Officer briefed the EAC on how authorized departure status had affected the embassy staff. The Management Officer praised the support Post has received from Washington. He specifically mentioned the responsiveness of Post,s contacts in obtaining clearances on all of the documents needed to assist Post,s dependents. Initially only one person requested orders to depart; however, two others have since indicated that they wished to depart under authorized departure. A cable went out yesterday requesting permission to use Israel and Ethiopia as alternate safe havens. The officers and the spouses were advised of the possibility of not being able to return to post until AD is lifted. The Management Officer advised that at large posts the EAC decides each request for authorized departure. The EAC agreed that the front office was in a better position to decide on those requests. ¶6. (S/NF) The EAC discussed whether or not to continue the security measures currently in place. The Ambassador pointed out that even though the arrest of Kanaan, who represented the most serious and immediate threat against the embassy, has been reduced, the political violence in Saada which spilled over into Sanaa in the form of several grenade attacks and the threat of violence from other groups could affect our security. The EAC discussed the viability of the security measures and how closely people were following them. The Management Officer advised that the shuttle schedule had been expanded to encompass more varied times for entry and egress; however, the result was that almost no one chose to ride the shuttle. The concept of a four-hour window for employees to come and go from the embassy also caused some difficulties for employees to comply with. The EAC agreed to continue the security measures of restricting travel to the downtown area, avoiding large clusters of officers and/or foreigners and to continue to vary times and routines, not just travel but all other activities. The EAC agreed to meet on Sunday to discuss whether or not to change that posture. The EAC agreed to allow each office supervisor to monitor the arrival and departure times of their employees. The EAC agreed to discuss at its next meeting whether or not to send out a warden message to the American community and what to advise them. ¶7. (SBU) The Management Officer was directed to send a Management Notice reiterating to Embassy staff the restrictions on travel and to continue varying times and routes. The Shuttle schedule, however, will return to its previous variations of six different routes and times. ¶8. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene immediately following the Country Team Meeting at 1430 hours on Sunday, April 17, 2005, to review the security situation and discuss need for updating Warden messages.. Krajeski