SAADA-RELATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000935 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO NEA ALAN MISENHEIMER, NSC FRANCIS TOWNSEND AND ELLIOT ABRAMS, DOD ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINR YM COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: SAADA-RELATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES CT UNIT Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: PRESIDENT SALIH URGENTLY REQUESTS MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FOR HIS SECURITY FORCES CURRENTLY ENGAGED WITH AL-HOUTHI INSURGENTS. THE LIST OF REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED BY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MAJOR GENERAL ALIMI (SEPTEL) ON 9 APRIL 05 SHOULD BECOME THE STARTING POINT FOR YEMEN ASSISTANCE DISCUSSIONS BY INTER-AGENCY OFFICIALS MEETING IN WASHINGTON D.C., U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, AND CJTF-HOA . EMBASSY SANA'A COUNTRY TEAM HAS ASSESSED AND PRIORITIZED ALIMI'S REQUESTED ITEMS, AND NOW REQUESTS POLICY GUIDANCE AND EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING BY ALL CONCERNED. MEDICAL SUPPLIES, 2-3 ARMORED HMMWVS, AND NIGHT VISION DEVICES SHOULD BE PROVIDED IMMEDIATELY IF POSSIBLE. ¶2. (S/NF) MEDICAL SUPPLIES: MEDICAL SUPPLIES SHOULD BE FIRST PRIORITY DELIVERABLES TO YEMEN SECURITY FORCES. RAPID DELIVERY OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES DEMONSTRATES U.S. COMMITMENT AND CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION FACING PRESIDENT SALIH IN THIS EMERGENCY. ¶3. (S/NF) ARMORED HIGH MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLES (ARMORED HMMWVS): CENTRAL SECURITY FORCE COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT (CSF-CTU) URGENTLY REQUESTS WHEELED ARMORED VEHICLES WITH WEAPON MOUNTS IN ORDER TO ENGAGE AL-HOUTHI INSURGENTS IN VICINITY OF SAADA WHERE YEMENI ARMORED VEHICLES HAVE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME OPERATING IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. CSF-CTU CURRENTLY HAS TWENTY (20) M-1025/1026 ARMORED HMMWVS ON ORDER THROUGH PSEUDO FMF CASE S4-B-AUA. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND EXPEDITING THE ACQUISITION AND SHIPMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF IN-THEATER STOCK OF TWO TO FOUR OF THESE HMMWVS TO FILL THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT. ADDITIONALLY, YEMEN GOVERNMENT IS REQUESTING ONE COMMAND/OPERATIONS VEHICLE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL. AS WITH THE ARMORED HMMWVS TWO COMMAND AND CONTROL CONFIGURED AMBULANCE HMMWVS ARE ON ORDER THROUGH THE PSEUDO CASE. RECOMMEND EXPEDITING ACQUISITION AND SHIPMENT OF ONE OF THESE VEHICLES FOR THE REQUIREMENT. ¶4. (S/NF) NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVDS): THIRD PRIORITY ARE THERMAL SIGHTS (AN/PVS-13) FOR NIGHT TIME SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE OF INSURGENT POSITIONS AND TWELVE NIGHT VISION SCOPES (AN/PVS-10) FOR SNIPER RIFLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF TARGET INTERDICTION. CURRENTLY YEMENI SECURITY FORCES HAVE NO LONG RANGE NIGHT TIME SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY HINDERING THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT AT NIGHT AND ALLOWING INSURGENT FORCES TO EVADE GOVERNMENT FORCES. ¶5. (S/NF) WEAPONS: (A) TWELVE EACH M-24 SNIPER SYSTEMS FOR TARGET INTERDICTION. WE ARE CURRENTLY LOOKING AT TRANSFER OF AR-10T SNIPER SYSTEMS GRANTED UNDER ATA PROGRAM FROM *** FORCE TO CSF-CTU HOWEVER THIS IS ONLY AN INTERIM FIX. (B) ANY QUANTITY OF GRENADE LAUNCHERS WITH COMPATIBLE AMMUNITION FOR USE AGAINST INSURGENT FORCES IN CAVES AND ON MOUNTAIN/HILLTOPS. RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FOR RAIL COMPATIBLE M-203 SYSTEMS WITH HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE) AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE DUAL PURPOSE ROUNDS. (C) ANY QUANTITY OF M-240 MACHINE GUNS WITH COMPATIBLE AMMUNITION. RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FOR AT LEAST TWO TO FOUR OF THESE MACHINE GUNS COME WITH VEHICLE MOUNTS. M-60 MACHINE GUNS FROM EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES (EDA) WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE. THESE ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT AND SUPPRESSIVE FIRE IN SUPPORT OF CSF-CTU DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS. (D) ONE MAN-PORTABLE ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS SYSTEM WITH ONE KILOMETER STAND OFF TO DESTROY BUNKERS AND HARDENED POSITIONS. RECOMMEND RECOILLESS RIFLE TYPE SYSTEM LIKE CARL GUSTAV WITH ANTI-ARMOR, HIGH EXPLOSIVES, AND ANTI-PERSONNEL ROUNDS. ¶6. (S/NF) NON-LETHAL RIOT CONTROL GAS CANISTERS AND LAUNCHERS. THESE ITEMS WOULD BE USED TO FLUSH INSURGENTS OUT OF BUILDINGS AND CAVES. RECOMMENDATION THAT THESE ITEMS IF AVAILABLE AND APPROVED, BE PROVIDED UNDER STATE DEPARTMENT ATA PROGRAM. ¶7. (S/NF) ARMORED VEHICLES: (A) THIRTY ONE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (M-113); WE ARE RECOMMENDING THAT THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT TRANSFER EXISTING M-113'S AND/OR BTR-60'S FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. IF WE WERE TO TRANSFER U.S. M-113'S, WE WOULD NEED EXPEDITED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT. WE SHOULD THEREFORE INVESTIGATE AN EXPEDITED FMF CASE FOR SPARE PARTS. COUNTRY TEAM IS PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THAT THESE VEHICLES ARE NOT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, AND ARE LONG LEAD-TIME ITEMS AND THAT SUBSTITUTION/CROSS-LEVELLING WITHIN YEMEN SECURITY FORCES IS THE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION. (B) ONE ARMORED RECOVERY VEHICLE: AS WITH APC's WE ARE RECOMMENDING TRANSFER OF EXISTING VEHICLES FROM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. (C) ONE ARMORED MOBILE OPERATIONS CENTER: RECOMMEND USING EXISTING M-113 OR BTR-60 AND ASSISTING YEMENI GOVERNMENT IN CONVERSION FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL. ¶8. (S/NF) CAMERA CAPABLE OF TRANSMITTING LIVE DIGITAL FEED VIA SATELLITE OR RADIO TO HEADQUARTERS OR BASE STATION. RECOMMEND THAT WE ENCOURAGE YEMEN SECURITY FORCES MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THEIR ON-HAND VIDEO RECORDING EQUIPMENT, AND HELICOPTER COURIER IN ORDER TO FULFILL THIS REQUIREMENT. KRAJESKI