SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000912 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005 REF: A. SANAA 896 ¶B. SANAA 895 ¶C. SANAA 891 ¶D. SANAA 883 ¶E. SANAA 882 ¶F. SANAA 876 ¶G. SANAA 875 ¶H. SANAA 863 ¶I. SANAA 860 ¶J. SANAA 836 Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: Ambassador convened an EAC meeting on April 11, 2005, to review the current threat, ongoing security measures and to discuss reverse trip wires. The EAC agreed that current threat indicators continue to point to a mid to long term threat for the community. The Ambassador noted that the Embassy re-opened today, Monday 11 April 2005, with no incidents per request REFTEL A. EAC members agreed to continue security measures recommended during previous EAC meetings to include restrictions on non-essential travel throughout Yemen with emphasis on avoiding downtown Sanaa. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, PD, and USAID. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) Per Department guidance, the EAC discussed "Reverse Trip-Wires" as a tool to gauge any future recommendation for cessation of "Authorized Departure." The EAC agreed to meet again on April 13, 2005, to approve changes to the Reverse Trip-Wires" recommended by the EAC. For now EAC members agreed that it was prudent to continue with measures delineated in REFTELS B and C, including the need for supervisors to actively manage their staffs' work schedules thereby ensuring prudent changes in arrival and departure times. ¶3. (SBU) The EAC was also briefed by the Management Officer regarding particulars of the current Authorized Departure (AD),and the Ambassador re-emphasized the necessity of following AD policies closely regarding the return or arrival of personnel out of country or traveling on a TDY basis. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador advised the EAC that he had met with the Director of the Political Security Office and had requested the Director's support in getting permission to bring in and set-up transmitters to enhance our Emergency and Evacuation radio network as well as the local guard force network. EAC members noted that it is difficult to determine if the PSO Director will support and move this important project forward after years of preventing progress on radio upgrades. ¶5. (S/NF) RMAS had no new threat information for review by the EAC. ¶6. (C/NF) The RSO briefed EAC members that no indications of pre-attack planning were detected by RSO surveillance detection teams or guard force assets. However, the EAC was informed about a phone call threat to the Yemen American Language Institute (YALI) at 1325 hours, 11 April 2005, when an unidentified male stated in Arabic that YALI should "Watch out after 1300 hours." The YALI director chose not to evacuate his facility but instead coordinated additional security with MOI through the RSO, alerted his neighbors to the potential threat while assisting Embassy guards in conducting an inspection for suspicious packages. The YALI Director speculated that someone aware of YALI's closure the previous two days was making crank calls. RSO reported no additional information regarding the source of the threat and recommended to the YALI director an ID Caller system to assist in future investigations of phone threats. ¶7. (SBU) The EAC was briefed by the RSO about a report that another grenade attack took place in Sanaa, against a military vehicle near the Ministry of Fisheries in Hadda. Additionally, the RSO advised that a second report was sent to him regarding a grenade that was reported to have been thrown at an unspecified target, near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RSO notes that this may be circular reporting and as of this report is unable to confirm either attack. ¶8. (S/NF) The DATT informed EAC members that contacts within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated that the fighting in Saada had lessened and that the situation was now under control. ¶9. (U) The Public Diplomacy Officer was directed by the Ambassador to provide press guidance on the insurrection in Saada and the closing of the Embassy on April 9 and 10, as well as the Embassy's re-opening on April 11th. ¶10. (U) The Ambassador announced that a Town Hall meeting would be held for the Embassy community at 0900 a.m., 12 April, on the patio of the EMR. ¶11. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene at 1430 hours on Wednesday, 13 April 2005, to review updates on Embassy security and decide on reverse trip-wires. Krajeski