SANAA EAC MEETING 04/10/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000895 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2015 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/10/2005 REF: A. SANAA 891 ¶B. SANAA 883 ¶C. SANAA 882 ¶D. SANAA 876 ¶E. SANAA 875 ¶F. SANAA 863 ¶G. SANAA 860 ¶H. SANAA 836 Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC meeting on April 10, 2005, to review the current threat and security measures in light of that threat. The EAC agreed that current threat indicators now point to a mid to long term, not imminent, threat and recommendation of opening the Embassy is at this time warranted. With the exception of a recommendation to open the Embassy, EAC members agreed that continuation of security measures delineated in REFTEL A, to include continuation of a restriction on non-essential travel throughout Yemen with emphasis on avoiding downtown Sanaa. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, USAID. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs who noted the serious nature of fighting between ROYG forces and supporters of an insurrection in the Saada region. The Ambassador asked key officers to provide input clarifying current operational concerns and imperatives resulting in the following discussion points: - The majority of EAC members expressed the view that the threat was no longer imminent but should now be seen as a mid to long term threat due to recent SEPTEL reports that indicate key attack timelines have been passed and some operational shortfalls may currently exist on the part of the terror operatives. - The EAC recommended that the Ambassador request re-opening of the Embassy due to the perception held by the majority of EAC members that the threat was no longer imminent but mid to long term. EAC members agreed that intelligence reports were timely and accurate and that the government of the Republic of Yemen (ROYG) had taken good and prudent steps to increase and maintain high levels of security around Embassy residences, streets and facilities. - Political violence in the form of an insurrection in Saada, has resulted in numerous persons killed in action (KIA),at least one large gathering in Al-Babal Yemen in memorial for Saada security forces KIA and numerous grenade attacks in downtown Sanaa. The Ambassador and RSO briefed the EAC about the latest grenade attack reports to include the fact that at least one attack took place at the gate of the Old City where western personnel and tourists enter and exit the walled city. A second attack was reported to RSO by a credible witness against an official named Mustafah Zied (Spelled phonetically) said to be the third ranking Yemen Air Force Officer after his car pulled up to his house: He was wounded but not killed according to the report. Due to the veracity of the reports EAC members decided to strongly recommend the avoidance of non-essential travel in and around the downtown Sanaa, due to the random violence which has occured twice at or very near the old city and at least once near the Ministry of Defense. ¶3. (S/NF) In light of the current threat analysis EAC members recommended the following security steps for Monday, 11 April 2005: - A message to the Department requesting re-opening of the Embassy. - A Warden Message warning the community about grenade attacks downtown. - Emphasis by post management on changing times of travel and routes to and from the Embassy. - Travel restricted to non-essential travel throughout Yemen with special emphasis on avoiding downtown Sanaa. - Continued focus on enforcing the requirements under Authorized Departure to include restrictions on incoming personnel. ¶4. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene on Monday, 11 April 2005, to review ongoing security measures. Krajeski