S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000895

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2015
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/10/2005

REF: A. SANAA 891


B. SANAA 883

C. SANAA 882

D. SANAA 876

E. SANAA 875

F. SANAA 863

G. SANAA 860

H. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC
meeting on April 10, 2005, to review the current threat and
security measures in light of that threat. The EAC agreed
that current threat indicators now point to a mid to long
term, not imminent, threat and recommendation of opening the
Embassy is at this time warranted. With the exception of a
recommendation to open the Embassy, EAC members agreed that
continuation of security measures delineated in REFTEL A, to
include continuation of a restriction on non-essential travel
throughout Yemen with emphasis on avoiding downtown Sanaa.
Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting
included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC,
RSO, USAID. End Summary.


2. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his meeting with
the Minister of Foreign Affairs who noted the serious nature
of fighting between ROYG forces and supporters of an
insurrection in the Saada region. The Ambassador asked key
officers to provide input clarifying current operational
concerns and imperatives resulting in the following
discussion points:
- The majority of EAC members expressed the view that the
threat was no longer imminent but should now be seen as a mid
to long term threat due to recent SEPTEL reports that
indicate key attack timelines have been passed and some
operational shortfalls may currently exist on the part of the
terror operatives.

- The EAC recommended that the Ambassador request re-opening
of the Embassy due to the perception held by the majority of
EAC members that the threat was no longer imminent but mid to
long term. EAC members agreed that intelligence reports were
timely and accurate and that the government of the Republic
of Yemen (ROYG) had taken good and prudent steps to increase
and maintain high levels of security around Embassy
residences, streets and facilities.

- Political violence in the form of an insurrection in Saada,
has resulted in numerous persons killed in action (KIA), at
least one large gathering in Al-Babal Yemen in memorial for
Saada security forces KIA and numerous grenade attacks in
downtown Sanaa. The Ambassador and RSO briefed the EAC about
the latest grenade attack reports to include the fact that at
least one attack took place at the gate of the Old City
where western personnel and tourists enter and exit the
walled city. A second attack was reported to RSO by a
credible witness against an official named Mustafah Zied
(Spelled phonetically) said to be the third ranking Yemen Air
Force Officer after his car pulled up to his house: He was
wounded but not killed according to the report. Due to the
veracity of the reports EAC members decided to strongly
recommend the avoidance of non-essential travel in and around
the downtown Sanaa, due to the random violence which has
occured twice at or very near the old city and at least once
near the Ministry of Defense.


3. (S/NF) In light of the current threat analysis EAC
members recommended the following security steps for Monday,
11 April 2005:
- A message to the Department requesting re-opening of the
Embassy.
- A Warden Message warning the community about grenade
attacks downtown.
- Emphasis by post management on changing times of travel and
routes to and from the Embassy.
- Travel restricted to non-essential travel throughout Yemen
with special emphasis on avoiding downtown Sanaa.
- Continued focus on enforcing the requirements under
Authorized Departure to include restrictions on incoming
personnel.


4. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene on Monday, 11 April
2005, to review ongoing security measures.
Krajeski