SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000891 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005 REF: A. SANAA 883 ¶B. SANAA 882 ¶C. SANAA 876 ¶D. SANAA 875 ¶E. SANAA 863 ¶F. SANAA 860 ¶G. SANAA 836 Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and review security measures taken by the Embassy and community. EAC members recommended continuation of security measures in line with those delineated in REFTEL B, to include a restriction on non-essential travel and continued closure of the Embassy to the public. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, USAID. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his meeting with the President of the Republic of Yemen's government (ROYG) and noted the serious nature of fighting between ROYG forces and supporters of an insurrection in the Saada region. The Ambassador gave an overview of the security situation to the EAC, noting the perception that terrorists had operatives in Yemen on standby with others available to be brought in country. Additionally, the Ambassador reminded the EAC that the terror network was thought to be targeting the American and Jewish community in Yemen as well as the ROYG. The Ambassador noted the likelihood that terrorists want to make Yemen a place that they can operate in again as in the past, and stated that it was possible that terrorists perceive ROYG as one of the most vulnerable Arab regimes. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC members noted that, to date, no intervention had occured against the terrorist cell currently being tracked by USG and ROYG agencies. RMAS advised EAC members that information regarding the threat was of a very good quality and new analysis of the threat indicates that attack planning may not be as imminent as previously thought. After a discussion lead by the DCM, EAC members decided that the threat remained serious and unpredictable, with to little known about the location, method, timing and targets of the potential attack. Therefore, EAC members recommended the following security steps: - Send a Warden Message advising continued caution while informing the community that the Embassy would remain closed on Sunday, 10 April 2005. - Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling to the Embassy. (RSO Comment: The EAC decided that mandating the use of armored vehicles for the movement of personnel was not necessary and the MO stated that in his opinion the Embassy did not have sufficient armored vehicles in its inventory to support such a policy.) - Conduct an expanded EAC meeting at 1400 hours on Sunday, 10 April 2005. - Continue the suspension of programs at the Yemen American Language Institute (YALI) in line with the Embassy's closings. - Ensure adherence to restrictions on incoming personnel in line with "Authorized Departure." - Continue to monitor employee travel times and routes to and from the Embassy. ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador lead the EAC in a review of: Requirements under the newly implemented Authorized Departure policy; Press Guidance; Consular Issues following cessation of public services; The overload of incoming communications impacting post operators and Post 1; The impact of closing on YALI; Overall security for community members to include an American Archeologist team involved in the excavation of the Queen of Sheba Temple in Ma'rib as well as the passing of threat information to Fulbright scholars throughout the country. (RSO Comment: The Public Diplomacy Officer informed the EAC that the archeological group conducting excavation in Ma'rib pulled back to Sanaa to lower their exposure, and the EAC agreed that Fulbright scholars would be provided information, through PD, necessary to allow them to make changes in their personal conduct to allow them to protect themselves.) ¶5. (S/NF) RSO provided the EAC an overview of post's security profile noting ongoing tensions in Saada, as well as the fact that no additional incidents potentially related to Saada had occured in Sanaa since the grenade attacks against military targets as outlined in REFTELS. Additionally, the RSO noted no indications of pre-attack planning by RSO surveillance detection elements and discussed steps taken by MOI to improve security on the street around Embassy residences, at choke points between the American housing area and the Embassy, as well as improvements in hotel security at the Sheraton in Aden. The RSO informed the EAC that no incidents were noted on the Embassy or YALI perimeters related to their closing to the public. Finally, RSO noted that passing new tearline information to the MOI regarding the latest threat was still pending issuance of a tearline from RMAS. ¶6. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene on Sunday, 10 April 2005, to review ongoing security measures. Krajeski