CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000076 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV YM PARMS DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: CDA DELIVERS IRAQ ELECTIONS DEMARCHE, DISCUSSES SA/LW PROBLEM REF: A. STATE 275109 ¶B. SANAA 9 ¶C. 03SANAA 2790 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. CDA delivered ref A demarche to Principle Deputy Foreign Minister al-Dhabbi on January 8. In addition to the Iraqi elections, discussions focused on relations between the ROYG and its opposition in Parliament and media, the al-Khaiwani case, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SA/LWs) and ROYG failure to release visiting General Abizaid's communications equipment from the airport on January 3. End Summary. -------------- Iraqi Elections -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA delivered ref A demarche points to Prime Deputy Foreign Minister Dhabbi on January 8, emphasizing the need for ROYG support for the political process in Iraq. Dhabbi listened to the message without comment, but affirmed that the ROYG plans to send election observers. (Comment: President Saleh advised visiting General Abizaid that the elections should be postponed pending greater dialogue with Sunni elements to ensure their participation in the elections, ref B. While a public statement of support for the January 30 date is not likely, MFA officials affirm ROYG policy is to support the political process in Iraq, saying that the alternative would be disastrous for the entire region. End Comment). -------------- ROYG - Opposition Relations are "Boiling..." -------------- ¶3. (C) Dhabbi told CDA that that the government's relations with opposition elements are extremely tense. He attributed tensions to ROYG efforts to push through tough but necessary economic reforms and said the opposition is taking advantage of public apprehension about the cost of reforms by "playing a very negative role." Our relations with the opposition are "boiling," Dhabbi complained, "and at the same we are trying to fight terrorism and arrest terrorist suspects." Implying that the ROYG takes considerable heat from the opposition for its partnership with the U.S. in the GWOT, Dhabbi raised the reason he had asked for this meeting: "When diplomats and foreigners talk frequently to opposition leaders and journalists, he told CDA, "you give them the impression that they have your support." CDA responded that the Embassy maintains relationships and has routine contact with members of the opposition and the press as a matter of course, and that we would continue to do so. Dhabbi replied that he understood, but complained that when U.S. diplomats meet with, for example, the press syndicate and discuss the case of jailed journalist Khaiwani (ref C),"they take this to mean you support them against the government." -------------- Khaiwani Prosecuted According to the Law -------------- ¶4. (C) Dhabbi confided to CDA that he personally, along with others in the ROYG, did not agree with the jailing of Khaiwani, however, the as-Shura editor was tried and imprisoned according to the law. The DFM said that the ROYG was working on amendments to the Press Law, including banning the arrest of journalists for expression, but said it would take some time for a new law to be drafted and approved. CDA responded that the Embassy's position on Khaiwani's continued imprisonment was clear -- "it's a bad idea. Those calling for Khaiwani's release do have our moral support even if we have so far refrained from making a public comment on the issue." CDA told Dhabbi that the U.S. remains concerned about the Khaiwani case, as well as the arrest, detention and intimidation of other journalists. He told Dhabbi that these events represent a government crackdown on the media dating back to the al-Houthi insurgency last summer. It is damaging to Yemen's reputation in the international community, advised CDA, and may affect qualification for the MCA and other international development assistance programs. -------------- SA/LWs -------------- ¶5. (S) CDA raised U.S. concerns about SA/LWs proliferation in Yemen, pointing out that despite Saleh's repeated pledges, arms dealers continue to pursue weapons deals on behalf of the ROYG that far exceed the needs of the Yemeni Armed Forces. Dhabbi said that following A/S Bloomfield's meeting with Saleh last September, the President declared it illegal for dealers to buy weapons from eastern European or FSU countries. Nevertheless, pressed CDA, this practice is occurring as we speak, and the only reason to bring in excess arms into Yemen is to sell them on the regional black market. These weapons end up in terrorist hands, said CDA, and the USG remains prepared to help Yemen close this revolving door and get control of its weapons smuggling problem. Dhabbi agreed the issue must be tackled. "Those people," he said, "are making fortunes regardless of the damage to Yemen." -------------- Abizaid's Luggage/Communications Equipment -------------- ¶6. (C) CDA told Dhabbi that although the General's meetings with President Saleh and ROYG military officials went quite well, the visit was in many ways dominated by the refusal of the Yemeni authorities to clear the party's communications equipment. CDA characterized the incident as disturbing, demonstrating the level of the ROYG's mistrust for the U.S. Dhabbi said he had heard about the incident after General Abizaid had departed, and that there seems to have been some confusion over the unusual amount of equipment accompanying Abizaid. CDA said that it was not unusual at all for General Abizaid to have his personal communications equipment when overnighting off base. CDA added that General Abizaid will be reluctant to make another overnight visit to Yemen in the near future. ¶7. (C) Dhabbi disputed that the luggage fiasco was intended as a political message from the highest levels of the ROYG, it was, he insisted the unfortunate result of the Yemeni bureaucratic "mentality." We are not accustomed to anyone but the President traveling with such equipment, he said. Dhabbi suggested that next time the Embassy work face-to-face with the MFA, in addition to submitting all the necessary paperwork to customs authorities. CDA responded that we would do so, however, we do interpret the decision to hold the luggage and equipment as emanating from the highest levels of the ROYG, and that it was not taken well here or in Washington and may well have unfortunate repercussions. ¶8. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Noman, a western-leaning reformer, agreed it was an appalling incident. In a January 9 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief he reported that both FM Qirbi and Presidential Advisor Iryani were in the room with President Saleh when he gave the green light to release all of Abizaid party's luggage and equipment. Noman said that according to Iryani, Saleh's words were, "let it all in, just make sure that it all leaves with him." Noman said it was possible, however, that the President said this only to appease Qirbi and Iryani, or that someone else later convinced him to reverse his decision. Noman agreed with Dhabbi's assessment that it is ultimately a problem of "mentality." ¶9. (C) Comment. Post has become accustomed to occasional injunctions against meeting with the opposition, injunctions which reflect increased sensitivity on behalf of the ROYG to the activism of the opposition and the impact of this activism on Yemen's international image. ROYG's acting out against the opposition by trying to intimidate the media, and letting their suspicions of the USG get the better of them by holding up a VIP's personal luggage and equipment is self defeating and harms both their image and interests in the international community. End Comment. KHOURY