S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000723

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/OPO/FPD, CENTCOM FOR
POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 27 MARCH 2005

REF: A. (A) TD-314/11841-05


B. (B) SANAA 00557

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: CDA Nabeel Khoury, convened an EAC
meeting on March 27, 2005, to discuss a litany of recent
security concerns to include security at the hotels in Aden,
recent threats from Yemen citizens who have lost family
members in Iraq, as well as a review of general security
concerns in light of U.S. development and military assistance
in country. Additionally, para. 4 delineates a meeting
between hotel management and the RSO. EAC meeting key
offices and personnel represented at the meeting included:
DCM, LEGATT, RMAS, POLE, OMC, and RSO. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) RMAS briefed EAC members about security concerns
regarding the Sheraton Hotel in Aden. RMAS noted that a cell
previously thought to be targeting the Aden Hotel had in fact
turned out to be planning a mass casualty attack on Aden,s
Sheraton Hotel. Although previous RMAS reporting documents
the fact that host nation, Republic of Yemen (ROYG) security
forces interdicted the cell conducting pre-attack planning,
RMAS explained to the EAC that it is possible that remnants
of the terrorist cell could be reconstituted to resume
pre-attack planning. Based on the non-specific but potential
threat that may exist in Aden, EAC members recommended that
the DCM and RSO take action to improve security at the
Sheraton in particular and to hotels frequented by the
western community in general, immediately.


3. (S/NF) EAC discussed the findings of a hotel security
survey conducted by FPD of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden. Based
on RMAS threat reporting, the EAC recommended immediate
action to first provide a positive 24 hours, 7 days a week
stand-off at the Sheraton. The DCM instructed the RSO to
immediately contact Sheraton Hotel management in Aden to
request action. The EAC agreed that if no constructive
mea

sures were taken to improve security within the next three
days at the Sheraton Hotel, the Embassy should inform the
American community through a Warden Message about ongoing
security concerns related to the Sheraton Hotel and Aden.


4. (S/NF) RSO met with Sanaa Sheraton Hotel manager, Tony
Gubran, at the Sanaa Sheraton at 1230 hours on 28 March 2005.
Tony is acting manager of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden, during
the interim until a new manager arrives. RSO provided Tony a
general threat briefing regarding Embassy concerns about the
Sheraton Hotel in Aden. Tony asked RSO to travel with him,
on or about April 3, 2005, to Aden to provide the owner and
him guidance for setting up the security of the hotel,s
physical plant; RSO agreed. Following the briefing, Tony
immediately contacted the owner and Sheraton headquarters and
advised them of the potential risk of a serious incident at
the Sheraton Hotel, if hotel management did not take
immediate action to improve perimeter security. Tony then
contacted personnel at the Sheraton Hotel in Aden and
instructed them to begin immediately:

- Restricting car parking: No cars allowed to park
closer than 25 feet.
- To use an existing drop barrier to slow incoming
vehicles.
- To register all vehicle plate numbers entering the
Sheraton property.
- Screening vehicles specifically looking for large
packages.
- To check car trunks.
- Screening trucks and receiving area deliveries.
- Posting two Group 4 contract guards at the Beach.
- Ensuring the beach remains well illuminated.
- Placing all security personnel on high alert.
- Requesting Yemen authorities to post additional armed
sentries on the perimeter
(Tony asked the RSO to conduct liaison on Sheraton,s
behalf).



5. (SBU) The OMC also advised the EAC about an individual
in the Yemeni Coast Guard, in Aden, who lost a son in Iraq
due to Coalition Forces security operations. The angry
father believes his son went to Iraq as a Mujahadeen to fight
Coalition Forces and was subsequently killed. According to
the American Embassy OMC source in Aden, the father, a Coast
Guard Officer named Major Abd-Rabu or Abd al-Rabu, made
general threats against Americans. RSO informed EAC members
that he provided the name of the angry father and
circumstances of the threats to the MOI on March 26, 2005,
with a written request to intervene. OMC stated that he had
received word on March 27, 2005, that in fact Yemen Coast
Guard/MOI officials had taken action to prevent the Yemen
Officer from striking out at Americans. RSO awaits
confirmation from MOI as to what specific action they have
taken to interdict a potential attack against Americans by
the man or the man,s family members and associates. RSO
placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper
system.


6. (S/NF) EAC members also discussed a second case
reported by RMAS REFTEL, involving a threat that was made
against the Ambassador and Westerners in general, by a father
disgruntled because he believes his son was being detained in
Iraq by Coalition Forces. RSO informed the EAC that he
presented information regarding the threatening person's name
to MOI. RMAS and RSO reported no verification of
intervention by local authorities regarding the threat. RSO
placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper
system.


7. (C/NF) At the request of the RSO the Charge advised the
EAC that an expanded EAC would be held to look at the overall
threat environment in respect to current operational tempo,
especially continued growth in travel and exposure brought
about by development activity, i.e. USAID expansion and large
military assistance programs and training that create
clusters of 30 people or more in soft-target hotels and
buildings.


8. (SBU) One EAC member asked the committee to consider
her perception that the post danger pay differential was too
low when compared to the threat and to other posts with
similar risk profiles. The DCM agreed to ask the Management
Office for guidance.


9. (SBU) EAC members inquired of RSO as to DS/IP/FPO's
response to previous concerns regarding cuts in static
residential guard services as noted reftel B. RSO advised
EAC that he would conduct appropriate inquiries.
Khoury