PROGRESS REPORT ON YEMEN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002997 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM SA IZ YM COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON YEMEN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION REF: A. SANAA 2848 ¶B. SANAA 2365 ¶C. STATE 163140 ¶D. SANAA 2806 ¶E. SANAA 2822 ¶F. SANAA 2945 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (S) Summary. In July, Ambassador presented President Saleh with a white paper assessing the Republic of Yemen Government's (ROYG) level of counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation. The Ambassador shared USG concerns that Yemen's efforts to combat terrorism have been neither consistent nor aggressive. The paper identified specific steps the ROYG could take to strengthen cooperation ahead of Saleh's November 2005 bi-lateral with President Bush and other members of DOS, DOD, and the intelligence community. Since delivering the assessment, the Ambassador has met frequently with high-level Yemeni officials, encouraging them to demonstrate the political will necessary to broaden and deepen CT cooperation. Despite an overall increase in CT cooperation at the beginning of the year, the ROYG has made minimal progress on the desired action items. End Summary. -------------- - Evaluation of Progress on Desired Action Items -------------- - ¶2. (S) The following is an evaluation of ROYG progress on the specific steps identified in the white paper: Access to Detainees/Information sharing ¶3. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni officials grant unrestricted access to detainees to be connected to terrorist groups. Yemeni officials to allow the U.S. full advance vetting of potential Ramadan releases. Yemeni authorities should provide fingerprints and photographs of all terrorist-related detainees and render dual Yemen/U.S. citizen Jaber Elbaneh to the United States for trial for terrorist-related crimes. ¶4. (S) ROYG Action: Provision of counter-terrorism intelligence to U.S. officials markedly increased during the first half of 2005. The Yemeni government, however, has not provided sustained access to any detainees connected to terrorist groups. Despite a formal request, Embassy has yet to receive advance notice of Ramadan releases. On September 26, Saleh publicly announced he would pardon and release imprisoned supporters of radical cleric Hussein Al-Houthi (ref A). Supporters have not yet been released. Yemeni authorities did not provide fingerprints and photographs of all terrorist-related detainees. Dual Yemen/U.S. citizen Jaber Elbaneh remains in Yemeni custody. Stemming Flow from Yemen to Iraq ¶5. (S) Desired actions: The Yemeni government publicly discourages Yemenis from traveling to Iraq, highlighting the insurgency's continued killing of Iraqis, and criminalizes participating in the insurgency. Yemeni government shares with U.S. officials information (names/DPOBs, passport number, etc.) on Yemenis attempting to travel to Iraq, foreigners traveling through Yemen suspected of intending to reach Iraq, and cooperation with regional governments to stem the flow. Yemeni government invites the Saudi Mabahith to station a representative in Sanaa to coordinate Yemen-Saudi efforts to track and stem Iraq-bound extremists (this is a key desired action). ¶6. (S) ROYG Action: Yemeni security services took a number of steps to stem the flow of foreign fighters after discovering in late 2004/early 2005 that returning foreign fighters were plotting to attack ROYG officials and western embassies. Security services have quietly started to monitor and arrest local foreign fighter facilitators. The Yemeni government, however, has yet to publicly discourage travel to Iraq or provide increased information on travelers to U.S. officials. Yemeni officials have informed Embassy that they are cooperating closely with Saudi Arabia on CT issues, but have not provided any specifics of that coordination. Detention of Former Iraqi Regime Elements (FREs) ¶7. (S) Desired Actions: Based on an ORCA-developed list, Yemeni government provides detailed information on efforts to monitor, detain, or arrest FREs in country, as well as Yemeni returnees from jihad in Iraq. ¶8. (S) ROYG Action: While not providing a comprehensive review of FREs, Yemeni authorities did pass information on the whereabouts of Umar Sabawi Ibrahim al-Tikriti. In September, Embassy requested Yemen,s support for Sabawi,s detention and extradition to Iraq. Yemeni authorities did not detain Sabawi or coordinate with Iraqi services on his extradition. No streamlined custodial transfers have been established. Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) ¶9. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government passes legislation necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW except by the Yemeni Ministry of Defense. Yemeni government enforces the restrictions and reports violations (publicly and to U.S. officials). Yemeni government takes steps to stem the flow of weapons out of Yemen and into the Horn of Africa and Saudi Arabia. ¶10. (S) ROYG Action: The Yemeni government has not passed legislation necessary to criminalize importing SA/LW. In September, Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman admitted that the Yemeni government shipped 5,000 Kalashnikovs to Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in July following a personal request from Yusuf to President Saleh during the June OIC conference in Sanaa (ref B). Despite Saleh's March promise to suspend all third-party End User Certificates (EUC),information indicates Yemeni arms brokers are still negotiating the purchase of SA/LW on behalf of the Ministry of Defense (ref C). Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad ¶11. (S) Desired actions: Offices to be closed, representatives deported or banned from conducting activities on behalf of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),and U.S. officials notified of Yemeni government actions. Second best outcome: Representatives are placed under surveillance and investigation and information collected by the Yemeni government is shared with U.S. officials. ¶12. (S) ROYG Action: Hamas and PIJ offices have not been closed and no representatives have been deported. Information gathered through surveillance has not been shared. Sheikh Zindani ¶13. (S) Desired actions: Zindani,s assets frozen and his passport revoked. Information from Zindani,s financial flows shared with U.S. officials. Yemeni government takes a strong public stance against terrorist financing. ¶14. (S) ROYG Action: Zindani,s assets have yet to be frozen nor his passport revoked. No information on his assets has been shared. In September, the Yemeni government requested detailed evidence on Zindani's financial support to terrorists groups (ref D). If proof could not be provided, Yemen requested assistance removing his name from the UN terrorist-financing list. Yemen/Saudi border ¶15. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni and Saudi governments explore additional measures to monitor and control the border; Yemeni government dedicates additional resources to arms smuggling interdiction on the Saudi border. Yemen provides data required for the USG to move forward with an update of the TIP/PISCES program in Yemen. ¶16. (S) ROYG Action: Yemeni officials have not informed the Embassy of any joint measures with Saudi Arabia to monitor and control the border. No additional resources have been dedicated to arms smuggling interdiction. The Embassy has received the data requested to move forward with the TIP/PISCES program. Cash Couriers ¶17. (S) Desired actions: Yemen adopts legal restrictions in line with its Arabian Peninsula neighbors and the FATF recommendations, begins aggressive enforcement, and provides the USG with data on seized cash and couriers. Consistent with FATF Special Recommendation IX, Yemen should adopt measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligation. Yemen should ensure that it has competent authorities who have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or that are falsely declared or disclosed. Moreover, Yemen should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false declaration(s) or disclosure(s). ¶18. (S) ROYG Action: No action has been taken on cash couriers. Public Diplomacy/Hearts and Minds ¶19. (S) Desired actions: Yemeni government launches an anti-extremism public awareness campaign, discouraging support to the Iraqi insurgency, highlighting the un-Islamic-ness of terrorist acts, and explaining the global effort to combat terrorism. ¶20. (S) ROYG Action: The Yemeni government has not launched an anti-extremism public awareness campaign. -------------- Comment: Why the Lack of Movement? -------------- ¶21. (S) Despite receiving a clear message on the importance of sustained progress on CT issues, including during a recent visit by CT Advisor Fran Townsend, the ROYG continues to delay implementing the desired actions. When discussing Saleh's visit, ROYG officials tend to steer the conversation towards possible USG deliverables, rather than discussing the specifics of CT cooperation. While willing to publicly declare support for the GWOT in a signed "Memorandum of Intention" (ref E),the ROYG is less enthusiastic about demonstrating support by granting access to detainees, combating terrorist financing, or stopping the flow of SA/LW. ¶22. (S) Post 9/11, Saleh has played a delicate balancing act between competing interests. He clearly recognizes the threat terrorist elements pose to regime stability and is appreciative of USG support to strengthen the security forces. On the other hand, many powerful political players, like Zindani and arms dealers, have a clear interest in maintaining the status quo. Saleh maintains power through a complex network of deals and alliances and is therefore frequently unwilling to act unilaterally on CT issues. This balancing act is becoming increasingly more important ahead of the 2006 Presidential elections, especially considering Saleh appears ready to rescind his pledge not to seek re-election (ref F). Krajeski