WILL SALEH'S SUCCESSOR PLEASE STAND UP?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002766

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2015
TAGS: KDEM, KMCA, KMPI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, YM, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: WILL SALEH'S SUCCESSOR PLEASE STAND UP?

REF: A. SANAA 1910
B. SANAA 2162
C. IIR 6906
D. SANAA 2414
E. SANAA 2022
F. SANAA 1877

Classified By: Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d
.

1. (C) Summary. After 27 years in power, President Saleh's
recent announcement that he would not seek another term in
2006 has provoked increased speculation about potential
successors. There is widespread skepticism about Saleh's
intentions not to run, especially as there are few if any
viable candidates. Saleh has given little indication of how
he would transfer power, begging the question as to how and
when such a transition might take place. The general
public's growing acceptance of democratic institutions would
likely require, barring a national emergency, Saleh's
successor to take office by popular vote. At the highest
levels, however, true power still derives from the military
and the tribes, and the next President would have to meet
with their approval. In the case of Saleh's death or
retirement prior to 2013, his successor would almost
certainly be a military officer and likely a member of the
President's Sanhan tribe. Saleh's son, Ahmed Ali, is the
most obvious choice, but there are considerable doubts as to
his fitness for the job. Saleh has provided Yemen with
relative stability relying on his maneuvering skills and
strategic alliances, but has done little to strengthen
government institutions or modernize the country. As a
result, any succession scenario is fraught with uncertainty.
Although the Yemeni public complains freely about corruption
and lack of the democratic institutions necessary to
establish rule of law, Yemenis generally agree that for the
time being no one but Saleh can maintain the nation's unity
and stability. End summary.

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Saleh: The Only Game in Town
--------------

2. (C) On July 16, President Saleh made the dramatic
announcement that he would bow out of the 2006 Presidential
Election. (ref A) Few observers believe he is sincere, but
Saleh's declaration placed urgency on the question of who
could succeed him as President. (Comment: Given the general
belief that a viable successor will not appear before next
year's September election, Saleh may well have made his
announcement simply to drive home the point. End Comment).

3. (C) There is no clear chain of command should the
President step down, die, or become incapacitated while in
office. The Vice President is only a figurehead. Other
prominent leaders are generally considered to be unacceptable
to one or another major tribal or regional constituency
within the Republic. It seems likely that Saleh would prefer
his son, Ahmed Ali, succeed him, although the heir apparent
does not currently command the same respect as his father and
is younger than 40, the Constitutionally mandated minimum age
for assuming the Presidency. When asked for names of
potential successors, Yemenis are unable to come up with a
single potential candidate. Despite yearnings for a genuine
democratic process, most believe that the next President will
come from within Saleh's inner circle of family and military
allies.

4. (C) Beginning with unification in 1990, Yemen embarked on
a program of limited democratic and economic reform.
Nevertheless, fifteen years after unification, Saleh retains
a firm grip on Yemen's executive apparatus, using the
military and government finance to exert control and
distribute patronage. Saleh also dominates the judiciary
through his chairing of the High Judicial Council, which has
sole power to appoint and remove judges. Yemen's Parliament
is weak and the ruling GPC party has a wide majority of
seats. Even opposition parties generally seek to influence
the President rather than replace him.

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A Deal With Two Devils
--------------

5. (S/NF) Despite his authoritarian tendencies, Saleh is
unable to govern the country single-handedly due to tribal
and regional fractures. He relies heavily on a "power
sharing" arrangement with the country's leading tribal and
military figures, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar who heads the
Hashid Tribal Confederation, and Brigadier General Ali Mohsen
al-Ahmar, Commander of the Northeastern Military District and
reputedly the most powerful military man in the land. This
triumvirate was formed by written agreement in 1978,
following the assassination of President al-Ghushaimi. Both
Mohsen and Sheikh al-Ahmar wield great influence over
Presidential decision-making, but neither challenges Saleh's
presidential power directly.

6. (S/NF) Sheikh al-Ahmar is the 70 year-old Speaker of
Parliament and head of Yemen's largest opposition party,
Islah. As head of the Hashid Confederation, Sheikh al-Ahmar
heads a veritable government within the government, and is
able to broker deals between the ROYG and the tribal sheikhs
within his realm. Saleh's own Sanhan tribe belongs to
Hashid, making al-Ahmar the President's tribal leader. The
Hashid tribes are located largely in areas of the country
considered the most unstable, including Sa'ada (base of the
al-Houthi rebellion),Maarib, al-Jawf, and Amran. Al-Ahmar
is considered a founding father of the modern Yemeni
Republic, and uses his position as Speaker of Parliament to
advance his business interests and to grandstand on foreign
policy. Despite his age, al-Ahmar shows no sign of
retreating from public life and his sons hold positions of
prominence in Parliament, business, and tribal affairs.
Moderates and serious reformers within Islah blame al-Ahmar
for their party's inability to affect change in Yemen, and
many consider their leader more a part of the regime rather
than an oppositionist.

7. (C) Ali Mohsen is between 50 and 60 years old, and is
generally perceived to be the second most powerful man in
Yemen. Most reports indicate Mohsen is the cousin of Saleh's
two half brothers, although there is much confusion on this
matter, with some claims that he is himself a half-brother to
Saleh. Ali Mohsen's name is mentioned in hushed tones among
most Yemenis, and he rarely appears in public. Those that
know him say he is charming and gregarious. As Commander of
the Northeast Region and the First Armored Division, Ali
Mohsen acts as Saleh's iron fist. (Note: When Saleh took
power, with the help of Ali Mohsen, he held the position of
Commander of the First Armored Division. End note). The
area that Ali Mohsen controls includes the governorates of
Sa'ada, Hodeidah, Hajja, Amran, and Mahwit, and he is more
powerful than any governor. Mohsen was instrumental in the
North's victory in the 1994 civil war and in crushing the
recent Sa'ada uprising. It is estimated that he controls
over 50 percent of ROYG military resources and assets.

8. (S) This tripartite alliance has been the cornerstone of
Saleh's 27-year rule. It depends on the President's personal
relationships and history with both men. Although there have
been tensions, including of late an on-again-off-again public
war of words between Saleh and al-Ahmar, Saleh has remained
relatively unchallenged over the course of his rule. (Note:
Saleh's two predecessors were both assassinated within one
year. End note). In exchange, he has given both men a wide
berth to run their affairs with informal armies, courts, and
economic empires. Saleh often bows to their demands on
issues such as anti-corruption and gun control, and makes
direct payments from the treasury to the two men's tribal and
military constituencies. Despite the ad hoc nature of this
arrangement, it has proved essential in maintaining control
over this inherently tribal country. An acceptable successor
to Saleh would be expected to deliver a similar level of
stability.

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Scenario 1: Electoral Defeat, A Near Impossibility
-------------- --------------

9. (C) Yemen is scheduled to hold presidential elections in
the fall of 2006. Assuming the President relents to his
party's demands and runs as expected, it is extremely
unlikely he will face a serious opposition challenger.
Democracy activists from across the political spectrum yearn
to see their next President elected through competitive
elections, but none can point to a single viable candidate at
this time. Islah, with a considerable mosque-based
constituency to draw from, is the only party with the
resources to mount a challenge to Saleh. It is, however,
difficult to imagine as long as Sheikh al-Ahmar runs the
party. (Note: in the last elections in 1999, Islah nominated
Saleh rather than its own candidate. End Note).

10. (C) There have been rumblings from Islah's rank and file
about fielding a candidate, most likely through the mechanism
of the opposition coalition the Joint Meeting Party (JMP).
Although JMP leaders continue to insist the opposition will
not nominate Saleh in 2006 and intends to back its own
candidate, they lack the organization, unity, or viable
national figure to succeed and are unlikely to try. Recent
rhetoric has focused instead on "unity and dialogue,"
pointing to a possible national unity party coalition that
will endorse Saleh for another term. (ref B)

11. (C) There are currently three declared candidates for
President: Tawfiq al-Khamri, Vice-President of the Council of
Yemeni Entrepreneurs, recently announced his intention to run
as the "business candidate;" Salaam al-Hakeemi who lives in
exile in Cairo and was involved in a failed 1979 coup
attempt; and Ahmed Noman, brother of Deputy Foreign Minister
Mustafa Noman, who currently resides in London. None of
these candidates represents a major political party or is
considered a serious challenge to Saleh. (Note: When his
brother announced his candidacy, Noman told us he received a
call from Saleh who jokingly asked if the DFM would be
leaving to manage the campaign. End Note).

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Scenario 2: A Fresh Start in 2013
--------------

12. (C) Assuming Saleh wins the next election (a pretty safe
assumption),his last constitutional seven-year term would
expire in 2013. Considering his age and public opposition to
a constitutional amendment, most Yemenis believe that they
will have a new President by 2013 at the latest. Despite
weak institutions and submissive political parties, democracy
has permeated Yemen enough that the public will expect to
choose its next President in open elections. Ahmed Ali is
currently too young according to the Constitution to hold the
highest office. Saleh likely plans to use the next seven
years to groom his son (a la Mubarak),make him increasingly
visible, and place him in positions of higher responsibility
so that he will be seen as an acceptable candidate in 2013.

13. (C) Ahmed Ali is a colonel in the Yemeni military, and
heads the Yemeni Special Operations Forces and the Republican
Guard (both considered the most effective military units in
the country). The majority of Yemenis, tribal and non-tribal
alike, have a strong aversion to hereditary succession.
Until the 20th Century, hereditary succession was forbidden
by the Imamate. The Imam was required to be a Zaydi and a
direct descendent of the Prophet, but the most qualified
candidate was chosen by tribal consensus.

14. (C) These norms remain fresh for many Yemenis, and Ahmed
would have to overcome the view that his accession to the
presidency would be a betrayal of the republican character of
the state. Election by popular vote in a viable
multi-candidate election, however, would give Ahmed Ali
legitimacy if Saleh can mobilize sufficient tribal and
military support for his son. Faced with the absence of a
viable alternative, Ahmed Ali might gain sufficient backing,
but there is currently insufficient data to know if he would
be able to navigate Yemen's political complexities like his
father, the "Master Balancer." Reported feuding between the
sons of Saleh and Sheikh al-Ahmar raise additional doubts as
to whether the current power-sharing arrangement could be
extended to the younger generation.

15. (C) Other potential candidates in 2013 could include one
of the second generation of al-Ahmars. The most prominent of
Sheikh Abdullah's ten sons are Sadiq, the eldest, who has
already been anointed to succeed his father as head of
Hashid, and Hamid, who as head of the al-Ahmar group runs the
family's considerable business empire. Saleh's nephews,
Ammar and Yahya, both hold important positions in Yemen's
security establishment, but are too junior at the moment to
assert themselves and play any independent political role.

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Scenario 3: Coup
--------------

16. (S/NF) A military takeover could only realistically be
launched by one of the five Area Commanders. Having himself
come to power by coup, Saleh has been extremely careful to
select Commanders whose loyalty is ensured by tribal bonds.
Members of Saleh,s Sanhan tribe control all military
districts and most high security posts, with the commanders
enjoying blood and/or close ties to Saleh. The Commanders
report directly to the President, outside the normal channels
of the Ministry of Defense and without constitutional
mandate. (ref C) They are the final authority in nearly every
aspect of regional governance. In practice, they behave like
tribal sheikhs and super-governors, parceling out new
schools, water projects, and money. Despite periodic efforts
to integrate military units, the Commanders recruit largely
from regional tribes.
17. (C) Brigadier General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Commander of
the Northeastern region, is the most powerful of these
military elites. The commander of the Eastern Area is BG
Mohammed Ali Mohsen. The Eastern Area includes the
governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra. Ali Faraj is
commander for the Central Area, which includes Al-Jawf,
Maarib, al-Bayda, and Shabwa, while the Southern Commander,
controlling the Aden, Taiz, Lahaj, al-Dhala and Abyan, is Abd
al-Aziz al-Thabet. Finally, BG Awadh bin Fareed commands the
Central Area, including the capital Sanaa. With the
exception of Ali Mohsen, all of these commands are subject to
periodic change or shuffle.

18. (C) Considering the degree of loyalty that Saleh enjoys
from his Commanders, it is unlikely they would launch a coup.
Sanhan connections permeate the entire military, with 31 of
the President's cousins heading army units throughout the
country. In the event of Saleh's sudden demise, however, the
Area Commanders would be the pool from which tribal leaders
would be likely to select their next President.

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Scenario 4: Sudden Death
--------------

19. (C) According to Yemen's constitution, the Vice President
assumes the Presidency if the position becomes vacant and
holds office for a maximum of sixty days until elections can
be held. In the case of Saleh's death or incapacitation,
Sheikh al-Ahmar would likely be a key player in choosing a
new leader. By law, all Presidential candidates must be
submitted to the Speaker of Parliament, and approved by ten
percent of the legislative body. Given the short time frame,
this would give al-Ahmar a pivotal role in the selection of
potential candidates. The list would likely be negotiated
between al-Ahmar, representing the tribes (and Parliament),
and the military represented by Ali Mohsen. Citing national
unity, Parliament would likely accept a consensus candidate
to avoiding a messy electoral contest at a time of such
potential crisis and instability.

20. (C) In such a case, the most likely candidate would be
one of the Sanhani military commanders. Despite its
prominence in the state, Sanhan is a relatively minor tribe
in the Hashid Confederation. Nominating a leading figure
from the Hashid elite, such as al-Ahmar or one of his sons,
would infuriate the larger (but weaker) Bakil Confederation.
It would also alarm Southerners, who already believe the
state has been heavily infiltrated by tribes. Saleh's
relative anonymity within tribal politics, coupled with his
willingness to pay the tribes handsomely for their support,
was perhaps the main reason for his early success and
subsequent longevity. The tribes will look to extend this
arrangement by nominating another Sanhani candidate for
President.

21. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen himself would be a leading contender,
as he would be able to count on the loyal support of the
military and the backing of supporters in both the GPC and
Islah. Ali Mohsen's questionable dealings with terrorists
and extremists, however, would make his accession unwelcome
to the U.S. and others in the international community. He is
known to have Salafi leanings and to support a more radical
Islamic political agenda than Saleh. (ref D) He has powerful
Wahabi supporters in Saudi Arabia and has reportedly aided
the KSA in establishing Wahabi institutions in northern
Yemen. He is also believed to have been behind the formation
of the Aden-Abyan Army, and is a close associate of noted
arms dealer Faris Manna.

22. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen would likely face domestic as well as
international opposition if he sought the Presidency.
Mohsen's reputation may have been damaged in some circles by
his role in the al-Houthi rebellions. Although ultimately
successful in quashing the insurgency, the campaign resulted
in hundreds of fatalities, months of clashes, and earned the
enmity of the northern tribes and traditional Zaydis.
Yemenis generally view him as cynical and self-interested. A
major beneficiary of diesel smuggling in recent years, he
also appears to have amassed a fortune in the smuggling of
arms, food staples, and consumer products. If he holds true
to form, Mohsen would likely prefer to play kingmaker,
choosing another loyal military officer to hold the
Presidency.

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Scenario 5: Popular Revolt
--------------

23. (C) Widespread discontent with corruption in the ROYG
manifested itself in direct hostility towards the President
and his clan during recent nationwide riots in protest of the
lifting of fuel subsidies. The ROYG has never had a firm
grip on tribal regions of the country, but recent
developments hint at a greater degree of instability. The
fuel demonstrations spread to the tribal regions of Marib and
al-Jawf, and resentment there continues to simmer over what
the tribes believe is neglect by the ROYG. (ref E) This
followed on the heels of two al-Houthi rebellions, which in
the latter stages included attacks against ROYG officials in
the capital. Contacts in other regions, including Hadramawt,
Aden, and Taiz, note their own discontent with ROYG
corruption and mismanagement and predict renewed resistance
from Southerners. Discontent is common among Southerners,
particularly in Aden, who feel that unity did not produce
hoped for economic and political benefits. Instead, they
complain that carpetbaggers from the north have stolen all
economic opportunities in the south, and that life was better
before 1990 unification. In the event of a popular revolt
that gets out of hand, a strong military leader like Ali
Mohsen is likely to step in to reassert order.

24. (C) The next few years may well bring increased upheaval
around the country, especially if economic conditions
continue to worsen and the ROYG fails to implement serious
anti-corruption measures. (ref F) The Yemeni public,
however, lacks the organization, education and motivation at
this point in time to topple the Saleh regime. Many Yemenis
point out that the daily practice of Qat chewing by most
Yemeni men is the major impediment to affecting change
through peaceful means. "As long as we care more about
chewing Qat than democracy," said one political activist
sadly, "we cannot make a difference." Yemenis are used to
complaining about the Government, but they also fear
widespread instability and believe it more likely to result
in regional violence and balkanization than a positive change
in regime.

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Looking for the Status Quo
--------------

25. (C) Comment: President Saleh has been so successful at
co-opting or eliminating his competition that few viable
alternatives to his leadership exist at the moment. Those
figures who exert real influence, specifically Sheikh
al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen, also have powerful enemies and
prefer to be kingmakers rather than kings. Saleh's success
stems from his personal relationships and a complex network
of deals and alliances. Regardless of the scenario, it is
certain that the officers and sheikhs who comprise this
patronage network would seek a successor who could maintain
the status quo. This person would almost certainly be a
Sanhani in the mold of Saleh, such as one of the Area
Commanders or Ahmed Ali, if he is able to fill his father's
shoes. The status quo, however, is becoming increasingly
difficult to maintain, given a declining economy, rising
frustration over official corruption, and increasing U.S. and
international pressures on the regime to change the way it
does business. Considering these challenges, it is no wonder
that even Saleh's staunchest opponents are in no hurry to
name his successor, just yet. End comment.
Krajeski