WILL SALEH'S SUCCESSOR PLEASE STAND UP?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002766



SIPDIS



NOFORN



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2015

TAGS: KDEM, KMCA, KMPI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, YM, DOMESTIC POLITICS

SUBJECT: WILL SALEH'S SUCCESSOR PLEASE STAND UP?



REF: A. SANAA 1910

B. SANAA 2162

C. IIR 6906

D. SANAA 2414

E. SANAA 2022

F. SANAA 1877



Classified By: Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d

.



1. (C) Summary. After 27 years in power, President Saleh's

recent announcement that he would not seek another term in

2006 has provoked increased speculation about potential

successors. There is widespread skepticism about Saleh's

intentions not to run, especially as there are few if any

viable candidates. Saleh has given little indication of how

he would transfer power, begging the question as to how and

when such a transition might take place. The general

public's growing acceptance of democratic institutions would

likely require, barring a national emergency, Saleh's

successor to take office by popular vote. At the highest

levels, however, true power still derives from the military

and the tribes, and the next President would have to meet

with their approval. In the case of Saleh's death or

retirement prior to 2013, his successor would almost

certainly be a military officer and likely a member of the

President's Sanhan tribe. Saleh's son, Ahmed Ali, is the

most obvious choice, but there are considerable doubts as to

his fitness for the job. Saleh has provided Yemen with

relative stability relying on his maneuvering skills and

strategic alliances, but has done little to strengthen

government institutions or modernize the country. As a

result, any succession scenario is fraught with uncertainty.

Although the Yemeni public complains freely about corruption

and lack of the democratic institutions necessary to

establish rule of law, Yemenis generally agree that for the

time being no one but Saleh can maintain the nation's unity

and stability. End summary.



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Saleh: The Only Game in Town

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2. (C) On July 16, President Saleh made the dramatic

announcement that he would bow out of the 2006 Presidential

Election. (ref A) Few observers believe he is sincere, but

Saleh's declaration placed urgency on the question of who

could succeed him as President. (Comment: Given the general

belief that a viable successor will not appear before next

year's September election, Saleh may well have made his

announcement simply to drive home the point. End Comment).



3. (C) There is no clear chain of command should the

President step down, die, or become incapacitated while in

office. The Vice President is only a figurehead. Other

prominent leaders are generally considered to be unacceptable

to one or another major tribal or regional constituency

within the Republic. It seems likely that Saleh would prefer

his son, Ahmed Ali, succeed him, although the heir apparent

does not currently command the same respect as his father and

is younger than 40, the Constitutionally mandated minimum age

for assuming the Presidency. When asked for names of

potential successors, Yemenis are unable to come up with a

single potential candidate. Despite yearnings for a genuine

democratic process, most believe that the next President will

come from within Saleh's inner circle of family and military

allies.



4. (C) Beginning with unification in 1990, Yemen embarked on

a program of limited democratic and economic reform.

Nevertheless, fifteen years after unification, Saleh retains

a firm grip on Yemen's executive apparatus, using the

military and government finance to exert control and

distribute patronage. Saleh also dominates the judiciary

through his chairing of the High Judicial Council, which has

sole power to appoint and remove judges. Yemen's Parliament

is weak and the ruling GPC party has a wide majority of

seats. Even opposition parties generally seek to influence

the President rather than replace him.



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A Deal With Two Devils

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5. (S/NF) Despite his authoritarian tendencies, Saleh is

unable to govern the country single-handedly due to tribal

and regional fractures. He relies heavily on a "power

sharing" arrangement with the country's leading tribal and

military figures, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar who heads the

Hashid Tribal Confederation, and Brigadier General Ali Mohsen

al-Ahmar, Commander of the Northeastern Military District and

reputedly the most powerful military man in the land. This

triumvirate was formed by written agreement in 1978,

following the assassination of President al-Ghushaimi. Both

Mohsen and Sheikh al-Ahmar wield great influence over

Presidential decision-making, but neither challenges Saleh's

presidential power directly.



6. (S/NF) Sheikh al-Ahmar is the 70 year-old Speaker of

Parliament and head of Yemen's largest opposition party,

Islah. As head of the Hashid Confederation, Sheikh al-Ahmar

heads a veritable government within the government, and is

able to broker deals between the ROYG and the tribal sheikhs

within his realm. Saleh's own Sanhan tribe belongs to

Hashid, making al-Ahmar the President's tribal leader. The

Hashid tribes are located largely in areas of the country

considered the most unstable, including Sa'ada (base of the

al-Houthi rebellion),Maarib, al-Jawf, and Amran. Al-Ahmar

is considered a founding father of the modern Yemeni

Republic, and uses his position as Speaker of Parliament to

advance his business interests and to grandstand on foreign

policy. Despite his age, al-Ahmar shows no sign of

retreating from public life and his sons hold positions of

prominence in Parliament, business, and tribal affairs.

Moderates and serious reformers within Islah blame al-Ahmar

for their party's inability to affect change in Yemen, and

many consider their leader more a part of the regime rather

than an oppositionist.



7. (C) Ali Mohsen is between 50 and 60 years old, and is

generally perceived to be the second most powerful man in

Yemen. Most reports indicate Mohsen is the cousin of Saleh's

two half brothers, although there is much confusion on this

matter, with some claims that he is himself a half-brother to

Saleh. Ali Mohsen's name is mentioned in hushed tones among

most Yemenis, and he rarely appears in public. Those that

know him say he is charming and gregarious. As Commander of

the Northeast Region and the First Armored Division, Ali

Mohsen acts as Saleh's iron fist. (Note: When Saleh took

power, with the help of Ali Mohsen, he held the position of

Commander of the First Armored Division. End note). The

area that Ali Mohsen controls includes the governorates of

Sa'ada, Hodeidah, Hajja, Amran, and Mahwit, and he is more

powerful than any governor. Mohsen was instrumental in the

North's victory in the 1994 civil war and in crushing the

recent Sa'ada uprising. It is estimated that he controls

over 50 percent of ROYG military resources and assets.



8. (S) This tripartite alliance has been the cornerstone of

Saleh's 27-year rule. It depends on the President's personal

relationships and history with both men. Although there have

been tensions, including of late an on-again-off-again public

war of words between Saleh and al-Ahmar, Saleh has remained

relatively unchallenged over the course of his rule. (Note:

Saleh's two predecessors were both assassinated within one

year. End note). In exchange, he has given both men a wide

berth to run their affairs with informal armies, courts, and

economic empires. Saleh often bows to their demands on

issues such as anti-corruption and gun control, and makes

direct payments from the treasury to the two men's tribal and

military constituencies. Despite the ad hoc nature of this

arrangement, it has proved essential in maintaining control

over this inherently tribal country. An acceptable successor

to Saleh would be expected to deliver a similar level of

stability.



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Scenario 1: Electoral Defeat, A Near Impossibility

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9. (C) Yemen is scheduled to hold presidential elections in

the fall of 2006. Assuming the President relents to his

party's demands and runs as expected, it is extremely

unlikely he will face a serious opposition challenger.

Democracy activists from across the political spectrum yearn

to see their next President elected through competitive

elections, but none can point to a single viable candidate at

this time. Islah, with a considerable mosque-based

constituency to draw from, is the only party with the

resources to mount a challenge to Saleh. It is, however,

difficult to imagine as long as Sheikh al-Ahmar runs the

party. (Note: in the last elections in 1999, Islah nominated

Saleh rather than its own candidate. End Note).



10. (C) There have been rumblings from Islah's rank and file

about fielding a candidate, most likely through the mechanism

of the opposition coalition the Joint Meeting Party (JMP).

Although JMP leaders continue to insist the opposition will

not nominate Saleh in 2006 and intends to back its own

candidate, they lack the organization, unity, or viable

national figure to succeed and are unlikely to try. Recent

rhetoric has focused instead on "unity and dialogue,"

pointing to a possible national unity party coalition that

will endorse Saleh for another term. (ref B)



11. (C) There are currently three declared candidates for

President: Tawfiq al-Khamri, Vice-President of the Council of

Yemeni Entrepreneurs, recently announced his intention to run

as the "business candidate;" Salaam al-Hakeemi who lives in

exile in Cairo and was involved in a failed 1979 coup

attempt; and Ahmed Noman, brother of Deputy Foreign Minister

Mustafa Noman, who currently resides in London. None of

these candidates represents a major political party or is

considered a serious challenge to Saleh. (Note: When his

brother announced his candidacy, Noman told us he received a

call from Saleh who jokingly asked if the DFM would be

leaving to manage the campaign. End Note).



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Scenario 2: A Fresh Start in 2013

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12. (C) Assuming Saleh wins the next election (a pretty safe

assumption),his last constitutional seven-year term would

expire in 2013. Considering his age and public opposition to

a constitutional amendment, most Yemenis believe that they

will have a new President by 2013 at the latest. Despite

weak institutions and submissive political parties, democracy

has permeated Yemen enough that the public will expect to

choose its next President in open elections. Ahmed Ali is

currently too young according to the Constitution to hold the

highest office. Saleh likely plans to use the next seven

years to groom his son (a la Mubarak),make him increasingly

visible, and place him in positions of higher responsibility

so that he will be seen as an acceptable candidate in 2013.



13. (C) Ahmed Ali is a colonel in the Yemeni military, and

heads the Yemeni Special Operations Forces and the Republican

Guard (both considered the most effective military units in

the country). The majority of Yemenis, tribal and non-tribal

alike, have a strong aversion to hereditary succession.

Until the 20th Century, hereditary succession was forbidden

by the Imamate. The Imam was required to be a Zaydi and a

direct descendent of the Prophet, but the most qualified

candidate was chosen by tribal consensus.



14. (C) These norms remain fresh for many Yemenis, and Ahmed

would have to overcome the view that his accession to the

presidency would be a betrayal of the republican character of

the state. Election by popular vote in a viable

multi-candidate election, however, would give Ahmed Ali

legitimacy if Saleh can mobilize sufficient tribal and

military support for his son. Faced with the absence of a

viable alternative, Ahmed Ali might gain sufficient backing,

but there is currently insufficient data to know if he would

be able to navigate Yemen's political complexities like his

father, the "Master Balancer." Reported feuding between the

sons of Saleh and Sheikh al-Ahmar raise additional doubts as

to whether the current power-sharing arrangement could be

extended to the younger generation.



15. (C) Other potential candidates in 2013 could include one

of the second generation of al-Ahmars. The most prominent of

Sheikh Abdullah's ten sons are Sadiq, the eldest, who has

already been anointed to succeed his father as head of

Hashid, and Hamid, who as head of the al-Ahmar group runs the

family's considerable business empire. Saleh's nephews,

Ammar and Yahya, both hold important positions in Yemen's

security establishment, but are too junior at the moment to

assert themselves and play any independent political role.



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Scenario 3: Coup

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16. (S/NF) A military takeover could only realistically be

launched by one of the five Area Commanders. Having himself

come to power by coup, Saleh has been extremely careful to

select Commanders whose loyalty is ensured by tribal bonds.

Members of Saleh,s Sanhan tribe control all military

districts and most high security posts, with the commanders

enjoying blood and/or close ties to Saleh. The Commanders

report directly to the President, outside the normal channels

of the Ministry of Defense and without constitutional

mandate. (ref C) They are the final authority in nearly every

aspect of regional governance. In practice, they behave like

tribal sheikhs and super-governors, parceling out new

schools, water projects, and money. Despite periodic efforts

to integrate military units, the Commanders recruit largely

from regional tribes.

17. (C) Brigadier General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Commander of

the Northeastern region, is the most powerful of these

military elites. The commander of the Eastern Area is BG

Mohammed Ali Mohsen. The Eastern Area includes the

governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra. Ali Faraj is

commander for the Central Area, which includes Al-Jawf,

Maarib, al-Bayda, and Shabwa, while the Southern Commander,

controlling the Aden, Taiz, Lahaj, al-Dhala and Abyan, is Abd

al-Aziz al-Thabet. Finally, BG Awadh bin Fareed commands the

Central Area, including the capital Sanaa. With the

exception of Ali Mohsen, all of these commands are subject to

periodic change or shuffle.



18. (C) Considering the degree of loyalty that Saleh enjoys

from his Commanders, it is unlikely they would launch a coup.

Sanhan connections permeate the entire military, with 31 of

the President's cousins heading army units throughout the

country. In the event of Saleh's sudden demise, however, the

Area Commanders would be the pool from which tribal leaders

would be likely to select their next President.



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Scenario 4: Sudden Death

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19. (C) According to Yemen's constitution, the Vice President

assumes the Presidency if the position becomes vacant and

holds office for a maximum of sixty days until elections can

be held. In the case of Saleh's death or incapacitation,

Sheikh al-Ahmar would likely be a key player in choosing a

new leader. By law, all Presidential candidates must be

submitted to the Speaker of Parliament, and approved by ten

percent of the legislative body. Given the short time frame,

this would give al-Ahmar a pivotal role in the selection of

potential candidates. The list would likely be negotiated

between al-Ahmar, representing the tribes (and Parliament),

and the military represented by Ali Mohsen. Citing national

unity, Parliament would likely accept a consensus candidate

to avoiding a messy electoral contest at a time of such

potential crisis and instability.



20. (C) In such a case, the most likely candidate would be

one of the Sanhani military commanders. Despite its

prominence in the state, Sanhan is a relatively minor tribe

in the Hashid Confederation. Nominating a leading figure

from the Hashid elite, such as al-Ahmar or one of his sons,

would infuriate the larger (but weaker) Bakil Confederation.

It would also alarm Southerners, who already believe the

state has been heavily infiltrated by tribes. Saleh's

relative anonymity within tribal politics, coupled with his

willingness to pay the tribes handsomely for their support,

was perhaps the main reason for his early success and

subsequent longevity. The tribes will look to extend this

arrangement by nominating another Sanhani candidate for

President.



21. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen himself would be a leading contender,

as he would be able to count on the loyal support of the

military and the backing of supporters in both the GPC and

Islah. Ali Mohsen's questionable dealings with terrorists

and extremists, however, would make his accession unwelcome

to the U.S. and others in the international community. He is

known to have Salafi leanings and to support a more radical

Islamic political agenda than Saleh. (ref D) He has powerful

Wahabi supporters in Saudi Arabia and has reportedly aided

the KSA in establishing Wahabi institutions in northern

Yemen. He is also believed to have been behind the formation

of the Aden-Abyan Army, and is a close associate of noted

arms dealer Faris Manna.



22. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen would likely face domestic as well as

international opposition if he sought the Presidency.

Mohsen's reputation may have been damaged in some circles by

his role in the al-Houthi rebellions. Although ultimately

successful in quashing the insurgency, the campaign resulted

in hundreds of fatalities, months of clashes, and earned the

enmity of the northern tribes and traditional Zaydis.

Yemenis generally view him as cynical and self-interested. A

major beneficiary of diesel smuggling in recent years, he

also appears to have amassed a fortune in the smuggling of

arms, food staples, and consumer products. If he holds true

to form, Mohsen would likely prefer to play kingmaker,

choosing another loyal military officer to hold the

Presidency.



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Scenario 5: Popular Revolt

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23. (C) Widespread discontent with corruption in the ROYG

manifested itself in direct hostility towards the President

and his clan during recent nationwide riots in protest of the

lifting of fuel subsidies. The ROYG has never had a firm

grip on tribal regions of the country, but recent

developments hint at a greater degree of instability. The

fuel demonstrations spread to the tribal regions of Marib and

al-Jawf, and resentment there continues to simmer over what

the tribes believe is neglect by the ROYG. (ref E) This

followed on the heels of two al-Houthi rebellions, which in

the latter stages included attacks against ROYG officials in

the capital. Contacts in other regions, including Hadramawt,

Aden, and Taiz, note their own discontent with ROYG

corruption and mismanagement and predict renewed resistance

from Southerners. Discontent is common among Southerners,

particularly in Aden, who feel that unity did not produce

hoped for economic and political benefits. Instead, they

complain that carpetbaggers from the north have stolen all

economic opportunities in the south, and that life was better

before 1990 unification. In the event of a popular revolt

that gets out of hand, a strong military leader like Ali

Mohsen is likely to step in to reassert order.



24. (C) The next few years may well bring increased upheaval

around the country, especially if economic conditions

continue to worsen and the ROYG fails to implement serious

anti-corruption measures. (ref F) The Yemeni public,

however, lacks the organization, education and motivation at

this point in time to topple the Saleh regime. Many Yemenis

point out that the daily practice of Qat chewing by most

Yemeni men is the major impediment to affecting change

through peaceful means. "As long as we care more about

chewing Qat than democracy," said one political activist

sadly, "we cannot make a difference." Yemenis are used to

complaining about the Government, but they also fear

widespread instability and believe it more likely to result

in regional violence and balkanization than a positive change

in regime.



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Looking for the Status Quo

--------------



25. (C) Comment: President Saleh has been so successful at

co-opting or eliminating his competition that few viable

alternatives to his leadership exist at the moment. Those

figures who exert real influence, specifically Sheikh

al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen, also have powerful enemies and

prefer to be kingmakers rather than kings. Saleh's success

stems from his personal relationships and a complex network

of deals and alliances. Regardless of the scenario, it is

certain that the officers and sheikhs who comprise this

patronage network would seek a successor who could maintain

the status quo. This person would almost certainly be a

Sanhani in the mold of Saleh, such as one of the Area

Commanders or Ahmed Ali, if he is able to fill his father's

shoes. The status quo, however, is becoming increasingly

difficult to maintain, given a declining economy, rising

frustration over official corruption, and increasing U.S. and

international pressures on the regime to change the way it

does business. Considering these challenges, it is no wonder

that even Saleh's staunchest opponents are in no hurry to

name his successor, just yet. End comment.

Krajeski