WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002414 SIPDIS SENSITIVE PINR: C-NE5-00281 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL KDEM KMPI KMCA YM SUBJECT: WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE? REF: A. SANAA 1723 ¶B. SANAA 542 ¶C. SANNA 1782 Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With the 2006 Presidential and Local Council elections fast approaching, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, or "Islah" is taking center stage in Yemeni politics. Islah is a coalition of northern tribal interests and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). The party boasts the highest membership of any other political party in Yemen, including the ruling General Peoples Conference (GPC). As both tribal and Islamist, it is difficult to pinpoint where Islah lies on the ideological spectrum. Insiders point out that Islah's moderate characteristics come from the traditionally peaceful Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). The YMB's more radical elements also affect party behavior from time to time. Many observers maintain that Islah is motivated more by tribal and political interests than religion. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Islah holds 45 out of 301 seats in Parliament. Although difficult to confirm, the party's leadership claims to have between 800,000 to one million members. The party's support is steadily growing among the young, religious conservatives, moderate, reform-driven intellectuals, women and (quietly) even from GPC party members. Geographically, the party's support is strongest in the industrial city of Taiz, the central region surrounding the towns of Ibb and Jibla, and in powerful tribal pockets of the north. Recently, the party has gained members from the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) in Aden, most likely a result of Islah's social programs and the southward migration of Islahis. Islah lacks strong support from Yemen's Zaydi population, concentrated in the north and west of the country (ref. A). -------------- - The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood: Mostly Moderate -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) Islah was formed in 1990 as a coalition of northern tribal leaders led by the Hashid tribal confederation and its paramount chief, Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB). Sheikhs Yassin Abdullah and Abdul Majid Zindani founded the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB) twenty years earlier in Taiz. In its early years, the YMB was funded by Saudi Arabia and spread it ideas through the Yemeni educational system, heavily reliant on Egyptian teachers, many of whom were affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The YMB has always officially rejected violence, advocated democratic change and believed that any political system chosen by a Muslim community is religiously acceptable. Nevertheless, there are Islahis associated with the YMB who espouse a more radical and militant brand of Islam. ¶4. (C) Within Islah today, the emerging, though not controlling, faction consits of the moderate reformers. Their influence can be seen in Islah's platform that mandates "democracy bound by Islamic teachings," as well as in the opposition coalition Joint Meetings Party (JMP) whose Islah representative is Political Director Mohammed Qahtan. Discussions with influential Islahis always center on the need for a "peaceful struggle" to achieve a democratic and non-corrupt state (ref. B). In addition to Qahtan, leading Islahi moderates include the current SYG Mohammed Abdullah Yadoumi, Assistant SYG Abdul Wahab al-Anisi, Economic Chief Mohammed al-Affendi, Planning Chief Mohammed al-Saidid and journalist Nabil as-Sufi. They are not, however, party Chief al-Ahmar's inner circle responsible for Islah's relationship with President Saleh and the ROYG. ¶5. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are usually well-educated technocrats who espouse a more moderate ideology than Islah's core leadership. Although not social liberals, their positions are left of al-Ahmar and his inner circle on economic reform, political freedoms, human rights and women's issues. They also repeatedly express outright rejection of a strict application of Sharia Law. Most recently, the moderate reformers were responsible for Islah's block vote in Parliament favoring a bill limiting al-Ahmar's tenure as Speaker (Ref C). Leading moderate Islahi MPs include French educated Dr. Abdul Rahman Ba Fadhl, Abdul Razak al-Hajri, Ali Ashal and Ali Annsi. -------------- Is Secularism a Front? -------------- ¶6. (C) Radical fundamentalism permeates Islah through a small but vocal faction. During the 1994 Civil war, Islahi Shura Council member Imam Abd al-Wahab al-Dailimi issued a Fatwa to northern troops sanctioning the pillage of "secular, anti-Islamic" southern cities. Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Committee, Yassin Abdul Majid al Qubati, the reclusive spiritual head of Islah, is also a religious fundamentalist. In the countryside, particularly around Ibb and Jibla, residents regularly complain about religious Islahis pressing the authorities to enforce a stricter interpretation of Sharia. They also recall how, when the Islahis controlled the educational system, fundamentalist teachings were mandated in schools. ¶7. (C) Some believe that the YMB's fundamentalist side extends to more than just a small faction of the party. Dr. Saif Asali, a former Deputy Minster of Finance who left Islah in 2003, claims that the YMB (and by extension Islah's leadership) ultimately aims to establish an Islamic government in Yemen. He asserts Islah's leadership practices a carefully orchestrated "dualism," speaking of moderation to the West while preaching radical doctrine in the mosques. NDI Democratic Development Director Dr. Saad Talib disagrees with Asali. Talib contends that that while there may be a radical element within Islah, it is not the controlling faction. -------------- Zindani and the Salafis -------------- ¶8. (C) Another Islahi fundamentalist faction is led by Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, a charismatic anti-American Salafi Imam designated as a terrorist financier by the US Department of Treasury and UN Security Council. Zindani is the Chairman of the Islah Shura Council, the body responsible for forming Islah's platform and confirming its leadership. Many claim that this position gives him veto power over party policy. Talib disagrees. He claims that the emerging moderates have clearly eroded Zindani's power in the Shura Council and points to Islah permitting women's participation in the Shura Council over Zindani's objections as an example. Moderate Islahis confide in private that Zindani is a "burden" on the party. ¶9. (C) Conservative Salafi Islam rejects Islamic interpretations formulated three generations after prophet Mohammed's death. Salafis also vehemently oppose Shi'a Islam. The number of Salafis in Islah is unknown, although Asali estimates that they compose less than one percent of the party's membership. Sufi concurs, holding that the Zindani faction's influence on Islah is negligible. -------------- Islah's Secular Politics -------------- ¶10. (C) Although it is Yemen's primary Islamic party, its day-to-day dealings appear driven by practical politics and a secularly based democratic and economic reform agenda. "The biggest secret about Islah," says UN Advisor to the Ministry of Human Rights El-Obaid el-Obaid, "is that just like the GPC it is driven by political and tribal interests and, also like the GPC, on most issues has no ideology at all." Sufi agrees noting, "If you look at our platforms and papers, you will see that religion really has nothing to do with the decision-making process. We are purely a political machine." Indeed, Islah's positions on economic and legal reform never mention religion or Sharia. In Parliament, Islahi MPs rarely turn to Sharia as a basis for their arguments. ¶11. (C) Islah's interest-based pragmatic politics can ultimately be attributed to Party Chief al-Ahmar and Yemen's tribal traditions. Al-Ahmar heads the party's fifteen-member Supreme Committee and has the final say on much of the party's agenda. Many also say that al-Ahmar, who clearly does not belong to any of Islah's Islamist camps, balances the party. Talib calls al-Ahmar the "hypocritical" side of Islah. "The Brotherhood needs al-Ahmar's protection from a possible crackdown, so you will never hear Islah condemning the well-known corruption of the tribes or al-Ahmar's sons who run his lucrative businesses despite Islah's anti-corruption platform." Insiders overwhelmingly agree that al-Ahmar is not popular among the party's rank and file, who see him as President Saleh's tribal Sheikh and ultimately part of the regime. -------------- Moderate Reformers: Islah's Best Hope -------------- ¶12. (C) Although a more cohesive party than the GPC, Islah is still more a marriage of convenience between the YMB and tribal (including regime) interests. For now, Islah's different factions are united in their focus -- to strengthen their position in order to become a more effective opposition in upcoming elections. The moderate reformers, who in a short time have managed to effectively lobby for their agenda within the party, have been the most successful element in this effort of late. These moderates oppose al-Ahmar, whom they accuse of allowing Saleh to control the party. However, they need al-Ahmar for the moment to provide both constituents and protection against an outright political attack by the ROYG. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are currently the only group with the potential to create an effective, democratically run political party with any hope of being elected to power. That this group is seen as Islah's best hope is reflected in the quiet support they receive from moderates within the GPC. Reform-minded, western educated technocrats within the ROYG (and therefore members of the GPC),show their subtle support by pressing their western interlocutors to get to know these Islahi progressives. Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman, a strong supporter of reform and a key embassy contact, has repeatedly pressed us to seek the participation of Islahi moderates in USG-funded regional training and conferences on democratic reform. That Noman would make such suggestions, despite President Saleh's continued protestations to Ambassador on emboffs frequent meetings with opposition elements, demonstrates the strength of his belief that moderates within Islah can play an important role in implementing the democratic and economic reforms necessary for Yemenis to have a better future. End Comment. Krajeski