Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05SANAA1534
2005-06-07 10:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU

Tags:  MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 001534 

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO AMY COLETTA, MAINSTATE POL/MIL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU

REF: SECSTATE 104157

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 a, b, and
d

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 001534 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO AMY COLETTA, MAINSTATE POL/MIL E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: MASS PARM PREL YM YE COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: YEMEN: FUNDING FOR THE CSF-CTU REF: SECSTATE 104157 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 a, b, and d ¶1. (S) Summary. Post welcomes the opportunity to address the issue of including Yemen,s Central Security Force-Counter-Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) in Yemen,s FY 05, 06, and 07 Foreign Military Financing allocations. Post assesses that the inclusion of the CSF-CTU in FMF is an essential element in supporting Yemen as a partner in the GWOT. Reallocating scarce FMF dollars away from the Ministry of Defense and its components, to the Ministry of Interior,s CSF-CTU, will cause some disgruntlement within the MOD. However, we believe that the disgruntlement is transitory and manageable. End Summary. ¶2. (S) Post assesses that the use of FMF to equip the CSF-CTU is absolutely essential. RMAS has already ceased providing equipment to the CSF-CTU. Without a replacement-funding source, replenishment of worn-out equipment and acquisition of additional gear will cease. The operational capability of Yemen,s premier counter-terrorism unit will steadily degrade, without intercession of FMF. Use of RMAS funds for equipment was the right answer for a quick start, but FMF is the only available tool for the long term. The Department of Defense currently provides training to the CSF-CTU in the form of a continuing Mobile Training Team and occasional Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) teams. Using FMF funds to equip the CSF-CTU allows the equipping and training of the CSF-CTU to remain in the Embassy and under the purview of the Embassy,s Office of Military Cooperation. ¶3. (S) The recommended change in funding strategy will have a minimal effect on Yemen,s MOD. There are several reasons for this: *Yemen,s MOD has traditionally relied on national funds, usually spent on Russian or other Eastern European sourced equipment, for the majority of its Defense procurement. *Yemen MOD,s procurement effort is very unsophisticated, and has until recently, not fully utilized its annual FMF allocation, but rather built up a sizeable &unallocated8 balance. *Yemen MOD does not have a Defense acquisition strategy, but is given to &impulse buying8 when it realizes it has options other than national funds. There may be some minor resentment from the Yemen MOD that &their8 FMF mo
ney is to be shared with the MOI,s CSF-CTU, and not just with the Yemen Coast Guard (also part of the MOI). We believe that this sentiment will be manageable. Our usual reply to the allegation that we favor MOI over MOD is that we will always reinforce success, and especially with our most cooperative partners. ¶4. (S) Post deems MOI (CSF-CTU and YCG) as a willing partner with the United States. YCG and CSF-CTU are transparent organizations that actively seek cooperation and allow monitoring of their activities by the OMC and other organizations. Unlike the MOD, MOI allows U.S. officials access to training plans, arms rooms, and supports long range planning. MOI supports and cooperates with efforts by Post to conduct end use monitoring. MOD is at best opaque and a reluctant partner with the United States. Several elements of the military are viewed as corrupt and part of the small arms/light weapons problem in Yemen. Unlike MOI (with exceptions) the MOD is not open to long range planning, or allowing access for inspections. Typically MOD only cooperates with the U.S. when it suits their needs or they want something (like 5000 M-16's). The one exception in MOD at this point is the YSOF which has demonstrated more openess than the remainder of MOD. This may be due to the fact that it is commanded by President Saleh's son. ¶5. (SBU) Proposed FMF funding breakout for Fiscal Years 05, 06, and 07: a. FY 05 ($ 9.9 M) Ministry of Interior 4.9 M Yemen Coast Guard 2.9 M -New Equipment .8 M -Shotguns -Tactical gear for boarding teams -Body armor -Maritime Radios -Ammunition -Spare Parts .5 M -Spare parts/tools for 25,defender boats and 42, Arch Angel boats -Infrastructure/Trng 1.6 M -Communications infrastructure for new Coast Guard stations -Blanket order training case -Computers/ADP for classrooms -Advice/Support to establish Yemeni Boarding Operator Course Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 2.0 M -New Equipment 1.2 M -Sniper Rifles w/optics -Shipment of EDA M-113s with parts and training -NVD scopes for sniper rifles -EDA M-79 grenade launchers -4 recoilless rifles -20 7.62 NATO machine guns -Ammunition -Spare Parts .2 M -Spare Parts for Armored HMMWV,s -Infrastructure/Trng .6 M -Blanket order case for medical supplies -.5 M Blanket order case for CT training MTT,s Ministry of Defense 5.0M Yemen Air Force 2.5 M -New Equipment 0.0 M -Spare Parts 2.2 M -F-5 CAD/PAD buy -F-5/C-130/Huey spare parts blanket order -Infrastructure/Trng .3 M -Upgrades to Air Force operations center Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 2.0 M -New Equipment 1.7 M -Weapons for one SOF battalion -NVD,s for one SOF battalion -Assorted tactical equipment for one SOF battalion -Ammunition -Spare Parts .2 M -Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s -Infrastructure/Trng .1 M -Upgrades to YSOF operations center Yemen Navy .2 M -New Equipment 0.0 M -Spare Parts .1 M -Tools and parts for boats -Infrastructure/Trng .1 M -Upgrades to Navy operations center Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB Fusion Center) .3 M -New Equipment .3 M -Computers/ADP and communications equipment -Spare Parts 0.0M -Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M b. FY 06 ($ 10 M request) Ministry of Interior 5.3 M Yemen Coast Guard 2.6 M -New Equipment 0.8 M -Body Armor -Maritime Radios -Long Range Optics -Spare Parts 1.0 M -Blanket order parts case for boats -Spare parts for weapons/commo -Infrastructure/Trng 0.8 -Blanket order training case Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 2.7 M -New Equipment 2.0 M -Ammunition -Weapons (M-4,s, M-2,s) -Body armor -Assorted tactical equipment -Spare Parts 0.2 M -Spare parts for armored HMMWV,s -Spare parts for NVD,s and weapons -Infrastructure/Trng 0.5 M -Blanker order training case for CT training MTT,s Ministry of Defense 4.7 M Yemen Air Force 2.0 M -New Equipment 0.0 M -Spare Parts 1.8 M -F-5 CAD/PAD buy -F-5/C-130/Huey spare parts blanket order -Infrastructure/Trng 0.2 M -Blanket order for US maintenance training courses Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 2.4 M -New Equipment 1.7 M -Weapons for one SOF battalion -NVD,s for one SOF battalion -Assorted tactical equipment for one SOF battalion -Ammunition -Spare Parts 0.4 M -Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s -Infrastructure/Trng 0.3 M -Blanket order for US courses Yemen Navy 0.1 M -New Equipment 0.0 M -Spare Parts 0.0 M -Infrastructure/Trng 0.1 M -Blanket order for US training courses Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB Fusion Center) 0.2 M -New Equipment 0.1 M -Computers/ADP and communications equipment -Spare Parts 0.1 M -Spare parts and tools for communications equipment -Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M c. FY 07 ($ 25 M est.) Ministry of Interior 15.2 M Yemen Coast Guard 7.5 M -New Equipment 2.7 M -Additional 25, Defender boats -Long range communications -Shotguns and M-16A4,s -Ammunition -Spare Parts 2.0 M -Spare parts and tools for boats -Spare parts and tools for communication systems -Infrastructure/Trng 2.8 M -Building upgrades for Coast Guard stations -Communication infrastructure upgrades -Upgrades to maintenance facilities -Blanket order training for US courses -Blanket order training for Coast Guard MTT,s Yemen Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 7.7 M -New Equipment 2.9 M -Assorted tactical equipment -Air ground radio systems -Transport trucks -Mobile command post -Ammunition -Spare Parts 1.2 M -Spare parts and tools for M-113,s and HMMWVs -Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s -Infrastructure/Trng 3.6 M -Range improvements -Establishment of Yemeni Counter Terrorism school/course and CQB course -Blanket order training case for CT training MTT,s Ministry of Defense 9.8 M Yemen Air Force 4.0 M -New Equipment 1.0 M -Upgrades for F-5,s -Upgraded communications systems capable of air ground communications -Spare Parts 1.7 M -Spare parts/engines for F-5,s/C-130,s, and Hueys -F-5 CAD/PAD buy -Infrastructure/Trng 1.3 M -Upgrades to maintenance/logistics facility -Blanket order for US training courses Yemen Army/Special Operations Forces (YSOF) 4.4 M -New Equipment 2.7 M -Weapons for two SOF battalions -NVD,s for two SOF battalions -Assorted tactical equipment for two SOF battalions -Ammunition -Spare Parts .5 M -Spare parts for weapons and NVD,s -Infrastructure/Trng 1.2 M -Establishment of a Yemeni mountain warfare school/course Yemen Navy 1.2 M -New Equipment 0.5 M -Maritime radios -Life jackets -Spare Parts 0.1 M -Spare parts and tools for boats -Infrastructure/Trng 0.6 M -Blanket order training for US courses Yemen Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (MOD/MOI/PSO/NSB Fusion Center) 0.2 M -New Equipment 0.1 M -Computers/ADP and communications equipment -Spare Parts 0.1 M -spare parts and tools for communications equipment -Infrastructure/Trng 0.0 M Krajeski

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