SANAA EAC MEETING 05/15/2005

S E C R E T SANAA 001303 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2015 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 05/15/2005 Classified By: RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Post EAC convened on May 15 at 15:00 A.M.local time to discuss recent threat information targeting Embassy facilities and personnel. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DAT, FPD, MO, LEGATT, POLE, POLM, OMC, CCE-Y, USAID, RSO, CONS, and PD. ¶2. (S/NF) The Ambassador provided a summary of a report recently provided by ROYG Interior Minister Alimi in connection with the recent arrests of several al-Houthi cell members in and around Sana'a. The information provided indicates that members of the al-Houthi rebellion had entered Sana'a with the intent, as part of a broader campaign, to conduct attacks, including rocket or missile attacks, against the US Embassy and the Ambassador specifically. Reports suggested that the cell members were considering attacks from high vantage points near the Embassy compound, as well as exploring the possibility of targeting the Ambassador during two of his recent official trips outside Sana'a. The report found no indication that the cell in question had any interaction or linkage with Al-Qaeda, but suggests that they seem to have adopted some of the same methods and tactics. The ROYG assured post that local security forces have arrested nearly the entire cell in question, and expect to detain the remaining members shortly. Further information regarding this threat and the ROYG response will be provided in septel. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that this most recent report continues the now well-established pattern of groups and individuals in Yemen targeting the official American presence in-country for attack, and agreed that maintaining and reinforcing the strong security practices already in place is the best response at the moment. The EAC also reviewed the Ambassador's operational security practices, and discussed the possibility of extending or expanding the compound perimeter with heightened enclosures to mitigate the possibility of rocket attacks. Krajeski