AL-HOUTHI LEADERS FLEE YEMEN, REBELLION NEAR END

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 001037

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: AL-HOUTHI LEADERS FLEE YEMEN, REBELLION NEAR END
BUT VIOLENCE CONTINUES

REF: A. SANAA 949

B. SANAA 426

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. The level of conflict between government and
rebel forces in the Sa'ada region seems to be decreasing, but
clashes continue in isolated areas. The leaders of the
uprising are rumored to have fled the country, perhaps under
a negotiated agreement. There is considerable risk that
violence may again flare up, as tribes become involved the in
the conflict due to charges of harsh army tactics and
widespread resentment among the population. End summary.

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Leadership on the Lamb
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2. (C) Clashes between al-Houthi rebels and government forces
are diminishing in Sa'ada, but fighting continues in the
regions of al-Shafa'a, Razamat, and Beni Ma'ad. There is
continued unrest in Sa'ada city, as well, where a March 23
attack killed three security officials in the al-Salaam
quarter. According to a number of media sources, rebel
leaders Badr Eddin al-Houthi and Abdullah Ayedh al-Razami
have fled Yemen for either Saudi Arabia or Bahrain. (Note:
These reports are unconfirmed and there are separate rumors
that at least some of the leadership is hiding in the al-Jawf
region of Yemen. End note). According to Abd al-Majid
al-Fahd, a democracy activist and Sa'ada native, the
government used a heavy hand to crush the uprising and actual
casualty numbers are closer to 700 than the official count of
approximately 300 (ref A). After visiting the region,
al-Fahd said that because of severe ROYG tactics, Sa'ada
residents overwhelmingly support the rebels, although most
remain unwilling to take up arms at this time. Journalist
Hamoud Munasser confirmed this impression, saying mass
arrests in Sa'ada and its environs have also inflamed local
sentiment against the ROYG.


3. (C) Al-Fahd contended that the leaders' departure was
likely the result of mediation efforts by Sheikh Abdullah
al-Ahmar, leader of the region's Hashid tribal confederation
and head of the opposition Islah party. The ROYG initially
excluded Al-Ahmar from policy issues related to Sa'ada, and
many Islah members complained of being left out and
uninformed of events during the conflict. As the conflict
threatened to widen, however, it appears the Sheikh was
recruited to negotiate its end. Al-Fahd noted that
combatants from al-Shafa'a and Razamat come from segments of
the Wa'ila tribe that follow the Zaydi Shi'a sect (while
other parts of Wa'ila are Saudi influenced Salafis). In Beni
Ma'ad, however, government forces were fighting the entire
Sahara tribe. Munasser confirmed this news with reports that
army reinforcements are now being deployed to the Beni Ma'ad
region. In Yemen's culture of tribal revenge, the
involvement of tribes in the fighting does not bode well for
a decisive end to the conflict. News of a grenade attack
March 25 outside the Ministry of Finance building in Sanaa
suggests that while the major offensive may be over,
unconventional attacks along the lines seen over the past two
weeks may continue.

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Rebellion "Going Tribal?"
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4. (C) According to Al-Fahd, this round of fighting in Sa'ada
marks a turning point for President Saleh. It is the first
time in his presidency that the ROYG has launched a full
offensive against an entire tribe (the Sahara). Previously,
the al-Houthi rebellion was characterized as a military
operation against religious zealots. Official statements
from Iran and from Ayatollah al-Sistani in Iraq condemned
ROYG military operations as anti-Shi'a. Al-Fahd, however,
believes the ROYG security forces moved "quickly and
brutally" in Sa'ada, to keep down contentious tribal groups
in al-Jawf that were threatening to join al-Houthi en masse.


5. (C) Comment: Information on what is going on in Sa'ada
has been hard to come by throughout this second al-Houthi
rebellion. ROYG Officials who are usually open with emboffs
claim to be in the dark, travel to the region is very
restricted and the media is banned from the area. Al-Fahd is
one of our few contacts that has been both in the area
recently, and is willing to talk about it. As a democracy
advocate, however, his interests do not lie with the regime
and he may have exaggerated the severity of the conflict.
If, as he contends, the ROYG's response to the uprising has
led to growing tensions between northern tribes and the ROYG,
the conflict could take on new dimensions in the future. End
comment.
Krajeski