IRAQ/ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI SPEAKS TO THE SENATE ON

UNCLAS ROME 000821 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV MOPS EAID MCAP IZ IT IRAQI FREEDOM SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: PM BERLUSCONI SPEAKS TO THE SENATE ON NICOLA CALIPARI INCIDENT REFTEL: ROME 799 ¶1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified, please protect accordingly. ¶2. (U) Summary: Italian PM Berlusconi stressed to the Senate March 9 the importance of the U.S.'s "unprecedented" decision to allow Italy to participate in the investigation of the circumstances that led to the March 4 killing of Italian SISMI official Nicola Calipari in Baghdad. Indicating that Italy would stay the course in Iraq, Berlusconi said there is no direct link between the presence of troops and the nationality of hostages. He cautioned against traveling to Iraq, saying the Italian Government could not guarantee the safety of unessential personnel. Berlusconi never broached the word ransom, but in the debate that followed, former PM Amato said paying ransoms could be "counterproductive" and that policy should be revisited. In later TV statements, FM Fini denied that the Government had paid money to obtain the release of ex- hostage Sgrena. End summary. ¶3. (U) PM Silvio Berlusconi spoke for about 20 minutes March 9 to an almost full and very attentive Senate Assembly on the release of Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena and the incident that followed, in which Italian SISMI official Nicola Calipari was killed. Berlusconi's speech was well received, including by the majority of the leftist parties. At the conclusion, the Senators stood up to observe a minute of silence in commemoration of the slain official. Berlusconi was flanked by a number of Government Ministers, including FM Gianfranco Fini and MOD Antonio Martino. U.S. and Italy have different versions -------------- ¶4. (U) Berlusconi summarized the reconstruction of events FM Fini had exposed to the Chamber of Deputies the previous day, saying it was based on what Calipari's SISMI colleague -- the one driving -- had testified. He too, like Fini, noted that this version did "not/not coincide totally with what the U.S. authorities have communicated so far." Underscoring his resolve to "demand from the U.S. its maximum cooperation to determine the truth and identify responsibilities" ("and even President Bush is convinced of this," he said),he mentioned his meeting with Ambassador Sembler the evening of the incident, as well as his "long telephone conversation" with President Bush, the telcons between Fini and Secretary Rice and MOD Martino and Secretary Rumsfeld, and President Bush's letter to Italian SIPDIS President Ciampi. Joint investigation is very important -------------- ¶5. (U) Berlusconi underscored that the U.S.'s true "willingness to cooperate" was "concretized" with its "unprecedented" decision -- which he characterized as being of "maximum importance" -- to accept the request he made to President Bush that Italian officials be included in the investigation that would ascertain "facts and responsibilities." He posited that this showed the U.S. would not "subtract itself from ascertaining the truth." Arguing that the "truth of facts cannot but be shared" both by Italy and the U.S., he remarked that the "unreasonable" incident would be closed only after "frank and mutual acknowledgement of possible responsibilities." In a tribute to the U.S.'s true friendship for and admiration of Calipari, and to its sorrow for his death, he added, "we are certain that the grief the Americans feel, who that same day lost four of their own soldiers, is equal to ours." Italy not intimidated by kidnappings -------------- ¶6. (U) The PM also noted that, although there is no single hand behind kidnappings in Iraq, the end strategy is the same: to spread fear and induce foreign governments to abandon Iraq into the hands of terrorists. "This strategy has failed," he said, "and Italy with its resolve has certainly contributed to its failure." Italy, like the other countries committed to supporting Iraq's reconstruction, "did not allow itself to be intimidated and did not give in to the kidnappers' blackmail." Saying that there is no direct connection between the presence of troops in Iraq and the nationality of the hostages taken captive, he suggested -- as Fini had during his speech the previous day -- that Italy would not withdraw its troops as long as the Iraqi government requested their presence there. (Note: The lower house of parliament is scheduled to vote next week on the decree to extend funding for Italy's troops in Iraq to June 30. The majority coalition has sufficient votes and Embassy is confident that the decree will be approved. The Senate has already approved it.) Government can't protect unessential personnel -------------- - ¶7. (U) On the issue of hostages, Berlusconi vowed for the Government's constant resolve to reject the captors' "political blackmail" -- meaning having the kidnappers determine the Government's political decisions. He said that to obtain the release of its hostages the Government had always activated every possible "political, diplomatic and intelligence channel," that the Italian intelligence services are highly professional and effective and "have greater expertise of Iraq than others," and that the center-left opposition has shared this policy. For the first time since kidnappings started in Iraq, he warned that the Government could not be held accountable for the safety of unessential personnel there, but could "guarantee the security" only of those who "operate in tight coordination with and under the protection of our military contingent," including humanitarian organizations. Referring to the MFA's travel warnings on Iraq, he asked Italians not to travel to that country. (Note: after Sgrena's kidnapping February 4, the Government had ordered all Italian journalists to leave Iraq. It lifted the ban on March 5.) Politicos question ransom payments; Fini denies them -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) Berlusconi's statements on the Government's inability to protect all Italian nationals in Iraq opened a guessing game within political circles on "what he really meant." Speaking for the center-left "Union" (Romano Prodi's political grouping) during the debate that followed, former PM Giuliano Amato voiced a common doubt that is beginning to surface among Italian politicians. After expressing appreciation for the Government's stance on the Sgrena kidnapping and the Calipari incident (the joint investigation "is an important precedent," Amato said),he queried whether politicians and the State should not ask themselves how to prevent these events from happening again. Breaking an unspoken veil, Amato pointed to the "policy of ransoms, which we all shared for the safety of our nationals abroad, regardless of whether it was then implemented in specific circumstances." He continued, "this policy in the long run can become counterproductive, because it can contaminate the necessary transparency and loyalty with other States with which we cooperate in these situations; and even more, because it can endanger the security of other Italians" in Iraq and elsewhere. ¶9. (U) Similarly, in an article in leading daily Corriere della Sera March 10, DPM Marco Follini -- a staunch Catholic -- made a strong case against negotiating with "the cut-throats of international terrorism," because "we have to do everything possible to protect future victims." He continued, "we have to be dramatically clear and declare with all due solemness that it is not possible to come to terms with terrorists, under no circumstances." The debate is on. ¶10. (U) Responding to these allegations, DPM/FM Fini, during a late-night talk show March 9, categorically denied that "the Italian Government had authorized money payments" to facilitate the release of Giuliana Sgrena. "The Italian Government never negotiated in exchange for money, I want this to be clear," he said. ¶11. (SBU) Press reactions to Berlusconi's presentation were strongly positive. While this issue will not go away any time soon, Fini's and Berlusconi's presentations combined with the announcement of the joint investigation appeared to put things on a more positive footing, as demonstrated by Berlusconi's widely reported quote, "we can't ask for more." ¶12. (U) Embassy Baghdad minimize considered. Sembler NNNN 2005ROME00821 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED