IRAQ: ITALIANS FOCUSED ON UN MANDATE, TROOP

S E C R E T ROME 002348

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS IZ IT UNSC IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALIANS FOCUSED ON UN MANDATE, TROOP
PARTNERSHIP, NOT EMBEDDING

REF: A. STATE 111092

B. ROME 2115

Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Jonathan Cohen for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) a
nd (d)


1. (C) Summary. Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq
Policy Ambassador Richard Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Commander
LTG Lance Smith led a delegation to Rome July 6-7 to discuss
the way forward in Iraq with senior Italian diplomatic and
military officials. The Italians stressed that Italy's
continuing presence in Iraq is a political decision
conditioned on the request of the Iraqi government and an
international legal framework, preferably in the form of a
new UN Security Council resolution, and domestic Italian
politics. They will not embed troops in Iraqi units, but
will continue to mentor them. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith led an interagency
delegation to Rome July 6-7 as follow-up to the Ref A
"Engaging the coalition" demarche. The delegation met with
senior diplomatic and military officials from Prime Minister
Berlusconi's office, the Italian General Defense Staff,
Defense Minister's Martino's office, and the MFA. At the
Prime Minister's office, Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith met
with Berlusconi's Military Advisor LTG Alberto Ficuciello,
Deputy National Security Advisor equivalent Gianpaolo
Scarante, and Diplomatic Advisors Francesco Talo and Marco
Carnelos. At the MOD, the delegation met with CHOD Admiral
Giampaolo Di Paola, Vice CHOD LTG Fabrizio Castagnetti,
Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister, Achille Amerio, Vice
Chief of the Department of Planning, Rear Admiral Rino Me,
Vice Chief of the Joint Operational Command, Major General
Tommaso Ferro, CHOD Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Luigi
Binelli Mantelli, and Joint Special Operations Commander,
Brigadier General Marco Bertolini. At the MFA, the
delegation met with Deputy Political Director Giacomo
Sanfelice, NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi, and Iraq
Task Force Director Luigi Maccotta. Ambassador Jones also
participated in a separate meeting chaired by Maccotta
focusing on political and economic developments (septel).
Acting Political Minister Counselor, PolOff, and Defense
Attache also attended the meetings.

Seeking a New International Legal Framework
--------------


3. (C) In each of the meetings the Italians stressed the need
for a UN "umbrella" to help legitimize Italy's continuing
presence in Iraq. Defense Minister Martino's Diplomatic
Advisor Achille Amerio was most direct, stating that a new
legal structure in the form of a new UN mandate would be
"very helpful" in view of Italian national elections next
spring. The new mandate would be most useful if it were more
than a reiteration or extension of UNSCR 1546, he said,
taking into account the progress that has been made. Vice
CHOD Castagnetti (soon to become the Commander of the Joint
Operational Command) echoed these views, asking what the US
envisions (what is "Plan B?") should the political process
get derailed, a question raised in each meeting.


4. (C) At the PM's office, Deputy National Security Advisor
Scarante, stressing that Italy's presence in Iraq is a
political decision, said that PM Berlusconi is focused on two
points: demonstrating to the public that the Italian
presence is making a difference and that the situation is
improving -- and winning the Italian elections next May.
Italy's continuing presence therefore has two conditions: 1)
a specific request by the Iraqi government and 2) an
international legal framework, preferably in the form of a UN
resolution. General Ficuciello (who lost a son in the
November 12, 2003 Nassiriyah bombing) echoed these
statements, noting that public opinion drives politics, and
that the closer Italy gets to its own elections, the more it
needs an international political umbrella to cover its
presence in Iraq.


5. (C) Ambassador Jones responded that the Iraqi government
has already on several occasions (most recently at the June
Brussels conference) made statements expressing the value of
the Coalition's presence and requesting that the mandate be
continued. For planning purposes, he said, we need to start
working on a solution by September to bridge the gap between


the end of the current resolution's mandate (the end of the
political process -- presumably the December elections) and
the time at which the newly elected Iraqi government will be
in place and capable of making a new request for continued
coalition presence (which could be weeks after the actual
elections). LTG Smith agreed that it was very likely the new
government would ask the Coalition to stay, but recognized
that Coalition partners might make decisions based on
domestic political considerations and therefore needed a
justification for staying beyond the December elections.


6. (C) Responding to the question of "what is Plan B,"
Ambassador Jones explained that UNSCR 1546 remains valid
through the end of the political process, whether that be in
December or delayed by several months or longer (as provided
for in the TAL). He expressed "cautious optimism," however,
that the process was moving ahead on schedule, with greater
representation of the Sunni population, and fully expected
the drafting committee to complete the new constitution
before the August 15 deadline.

Embedding vs. Partnership
--------------


7. (S) The Italians were firmly opposed -- on legal grounds
-- to the concept of embedding their troops with Iraqi
troops. Under the current parliamentary mandate, CHOD Di
Paola explained, Italian troops in Iraq cannot participate in
"intentionally offensive operations" that may be required by
Iraqi troops. (Comment: The Italian mission in Iraq,
Operation Antica Babilonia, is a "humanitarian" mission.
Attempts to change the mission would not only enflame an
already hostile public but would require a new parliamentary
mandate, something Berlusconi probably would be unwilling to
risk in the current political environment. End comment.) Di
Paola noted, however, that Italian troops are effectively
"semi-embedded" since they work and plan with the Iraqis,
though they are not physically located with them. This
seemed a satisfactory approach in the areas where Italian
forces are located, he said. General Smith agreed, saying
that partnership is the concept that matters, and that he had
seen personally that it works well in the Italian case in
Nassiriyah.


8. (S) General Ficuciello reiterated Admiral Di Paola's view,
explaining that Italy has a different approach
("partnership") that is working quite well: train the Iraqi
forces and then let them do the job. LTG Smith agreed that
this approach contributes to our goals of mentoring and
promoting leadership, though it does not give the Iraqis the
access to intelligence or communications abilities that
embedding would. The important thing, both sides agreed, was
that the Iraqis take control of their own security forces.
Italian partnership with Iraqi forces in their AOR was
contributing satisfactorily to that goal.

Troop Withdrawals
--------------


9. (S) LTG Smith opined that MNF-I Commander General Casey
probably would ask for more forces as the December elections
near, but that after that there would be a potential to
reduce forces. Admiral Di Paola asked if a 30-40 percent
reduction in 2006 was reasonable. LTG Smith replied that it
might be, but withdrawing too soon would leave a vacuum
liable to create a situation like that of 1980s Afghanistan
that allowed the Taliban took over. (Comment: Apart from the
CHOD's question, none of the Italian interlocutors spoke of
numbers or deadlines. All agreed with the US strategy of
condition-based withdrawal, and were visibly relieved to hear
LTG Smith mention potential reductions in 2006. At the G-8
Summit in Gleneagles, PM Berlusconi reiterated his intention
of withdrawing, in coordination with Coalition partners, 300
troops in September, a move that would still leave Italy with
approximately 3,000 troops in Iraq. End comment.)

Insurgency
--------------


10. (C) The Italians also were eager to hear US views on the
Iraq insurgency, both in terms of numbers and tactics. LTG
Smith said he expected violence to be volatile and probably
to grow as the December elections near, noting that though


fewer in numbers, the insurgents are developing more
sophisticated techniques. Ambassador Jones added that the
insurgents' new strategy of intimidation is aimed at the
Iraqi people and other Arab nationals (such as the Egyptian
Ambassador whose murder became publicly known during these
meetings) whose countries were supporting the Iraqi
government. Ambassador Jones argued that such attacks might
cause some countries to pull back in the short-term, but that
in the long-term it would hurt the terrorists own interests.
Both sides agreed that the election of a new, permanent
government and decreased visibility of coalition forces would
help stem the violence.


11. (S) To counter the insurgency, LTG Smith said the US
strategy is to turn over more and more of the responsibility
to the Iraqi security forces, who have a better idea of what
is going on in their own cities, and to consolidate coalition
bases to areas outside of the cities, lowering the visibility
of the coalition forces. In response to General Ficuciello's
question about whether the Iraqi people's perception of the
coalition forces was improving, General Smith cited the
increased number of tip-offs received as evidence that the
Iraqi people are tired of the insurgency and willing to help
the coalition in their efforts to defeat it. However, he
noted, the perception varies from province to province; in
al-Anbar, for example, we will always be considered
occupiers.

Regional Actors
--------------


12. (C) Several of the Italian officials inquired about the
role of regional actors such as Syria and Iran. Both
Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith responded that the US is
watching Iran carefully, though so far there have been no
overt attempts to oppose our efforts. They expressed more
concern about Syria and its role in allowing foreign fighters
to cross into Iraq. Ambassador Jones said the US is urging
all of Iraq's neighbors to be supportive of the political
process and not to view it in terms of a Shia-Sunni problem,
and is encouraging countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to
forgive Iraq's debt to help improve the economic situation.

NATO Training Mission
--------------


13. (C) Both the MFA and MOD stressed Italy's strong
commitment to the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I),including
leadership of the war college, staff college and junior
officers college in Ar-Rustamiyah, as well as bilateral
training conducted in Italy. Force protection, however,
remains a concern for Italy. MFA Deputy Political Director
Sanfelice urged the US to enlist other Coalition members in
protecting the NATO forces, and MFA NATO Office Director
Brauzzi suggested that some of the countries that are
withdrawing from the Coalition might be persuaded to
contribute to NTM-I's force protection.


14. (U) Ambassador Jones has cleared this cable.

BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

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2005ROME02348 - Classification: SECRET