ITALY'S REGIONAL ELECTIONS: THE LAUNCH OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001058

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: ITALY'S REGIONAL ELECTIONS: THE LAUNCH OF THE
NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

REF: A. FLORENCE 62

B. ROME 1025 (NOTAL)

C. 04 ROME 22

Classified By: A/POL MINCOUNS CANDACE PUTNAM, REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Italians will vote April 3-4 to elect new
governments in 14 of Italy's 20 regions. Most polls suggest
that PM Berlusconi's center-right coalition will lose in at
least two of these regions. These elections are not direct
predictors for next spring's national elections for
Parliament and Prime Minister, but they will launch intense
campaigning for those races. The center-left may make noisy
claims about weakening Berlusconi; however, we do not expect
the center-right's expected losses to threaten the stability
of the longest-running Italian government since the end of
World War II. END SUMMARY.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (U) More than forty million Italians are eligible to
vote April 3-4 to elect new governments in 14 of Italy's 20
regions. Some electors will also vote in local races for two
provincial ("county") governments (in Viterbo, Lazio and
Caserta, Campania) and 368 mayors and city councils. Run-off
elections in local races that require a candidate to be
elected by 50 percent of the vote will be held April 17-18.
(Since 2000, regional presidents are elected directly by
voters. The candidate receiving the most votes, even if less
than 50 percent, wins.) These elections will be followed on
May 8-9 by local elections (provincial and municipal) in
Sardinia, one of five autonomous regions that votes on a
different schedule from Italy's regions governed by ordinary
statute.


3. (U) Currently, eight of the 14 regions holding elections
are held by the center-right governing coalition. (Of the
six regions not voting this year, four are held by the
center-left and two by the center-right, giving an even 10-10
split among Italy's 20 regions.) Most information suggests
that the center-right will lose at least two of the regions
it currently holds, and possibly more. According to national
polls published in early March, the two regions considered
most likely to swing to the left are Liguria (historically
left-leaning, see Milan septel) and Abruzzo.

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LAUNCHING, NOT PREDICTING, THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
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4. (C) The primary significance of the regional balloting
is to launch intense campaigning for Italy's national
elections, expected in spring 2006. To a large degree, the
campaign for those elections has been underway since Romano
Prodi was still European Commission President (Ref C),but
the regional vote will herald the opening of a more intense
phase. Barring an absolute rout for the governing coalition
in the regions, Silvio Berlusconi is poised to be the first
prime minister in Italy's post-War history to complete a full
five-year term. (We will report septel on the factors that
will affect the timing of 2006 national elections.)


5. (SBU) Regional elections are not a direct predictor for
national voting. Voters are motivated by different issues,
and indeed in some cases are not motivated much at all to
vote in regional/local races. Italians look to national and
municipal governments to provide services and implement
policies important to them; regional governments (created in
the 1970s) do not hold historical resonance for Italian
voters.


6. (SBU) This holds true even more for center-right voters,
who in general are less disciplined party "militants." The
average supporter of Prime Minister Berlusconi's Forza Italia
(FI) party, for example, would not dream of participating in
a street demonstration, was not inspired by the thought of
selecting a European parliamentarian in 2004, and may or may
not vote in a local race. These tendencies hold, if more
mildly, for supporters of center-right coalition partners
National Alliance (AN, the party of FM/DPM Fini) and the
Union of Christian Democrats of the Center (UDC, the party of
DPM Follini). The Northern League (Lega, the party of former
Minister for Reform Umberto Bossi) is the exception, as a
primarily regional party that emerged to address
regional/local concerns. Thus, the center-right normally


fares worse in non-national campaigns. It is expected to do
so again in these elections.

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THE SGRENA/CALIPARI FACTOR
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7. (C) The March 4 shooting by U.S. military personnel near
Baghdad of Italian security officer Nicola Calipari, who was
escorting rescued hostage Giuliana Sgrena for repatriation
from Iraq, had the potential to impact regional elections,
even though such votes are not normally influenced by
international issues. However, we believe this will be a
non-issue in the campaign because of public perception that
PM Berlusconi stood up to the United States for Italy's
interests and successfully pressed for a joint investigation.
We do not see it as a factor in the elections, although the
PM himself may have secured some political boost from his
handling of the matter. (Ref B)

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CENTER-RIGHT BRACES FOR A SETBACK --
BUT BERLUSCONI WILL STILL BE HERE
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8. (C) The center-right majority is bracing for setbacks in
regional voting. The PM on March 3 declared his intention to
stay out of regional campaigning, thereby distancing his
popularity from the expected negative results. Berlusconi
has now agreed to stand with Fini and Follini at the side of
the center-right (AN) candidate for the Lazio (Rome's region)
presidency, Francesco Storace, during his closing April 1
rally. The about-face indicates the seriousness with which
the majority views signs of movement away from the
center-right, exacerbated by a decision by Italy's highest
administrative justice body, the Council of State, to allow
the tiny far-right Social Alternative (SA) party of
Alessandra Mussolini (granddaughter of Benito Mussolini) to
run in Lazio. SA had been barred by Lazio's Regional
Administrative Tribunal for collecting fraudulent signatures
to support its participation. With that decision overturned,
even a small percentage of right votes going to Mussolini's
party could jeopardize Storace's campaign. The center-right
wants to avoid the loss of this key (and previously
considered fairly safe) region.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The center-left can be expected to trumpet each and
every win as a mandate for Romano Prodi and his coalition in
next year's national elections. In fact, we do not see the
regional vote as predictive of national results. These
elections certainly will launch intense campaigning for the
2006 contests. Barring an unlikely rout, however, we do not
expect the loss of a few regional elections to threaten the
stability of the Berlusconi government.

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2005ROME01058 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL