GOB FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGES FORGOING ASEAN CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000887 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM SUBJECT: GOB FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGES FORGOING ASEAN CHAIR REF: A. RANGOON 871 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. VIENTIANE 814 Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The SPDC on August 1 finally acknowledged the Vientiane communique of one week ago announcing that Burma would forgo the 2006 ASEAN Chair. One senior GOB official claimed to us that the SPDC generals, if Burma hosted ASEAN, would have been forced to make democracy and human rights concessions, but "now they will do nothing." The Deputy FM expressed surprise to us that the United States extended sanctions against Burma the day after the Chair decision, to us a typical sign that the SPDC does not grasp that it must make fundamental changes to merit any review of sanctions. End Summary. ¶2. (U) It took a week, but the Burmese regime has finally acknowledged the July 26 joint communique in Vientiane that addressed the 2006 ASEAN Chair issue. ¶3. (U) Official SPDC television broadcast on August 1 a synopsis of Foreign Minister Nyan Win's participation in the Vientiane meetings and said the FM had briefed his counterparts on the "progress of democratization" in Burma. The report, which was buried on page eleven in the GOB's official newspaper on August 2, stated that "in order to maintain the momentum of this process, and taking into consideration the interest of both ASEAN and Myanmar, the Government of the Union of Myanmar had decided to forgo its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006." ¶4. (C) Deputy FM Maung Myint, at an August 1 farewell event (septel),told the COM that "we did what you want (on July 26),so why did you then extend bilateral sanctions (on July 27)?" The COM replied that there is no link between the ASEAN Chair issue and the lifting of sanctions, which are tied to key issues related to democratization and respect for human rights. The COM added that the Chair issue was one for ASEAN to resolve, not the United States. ¶5. (C) MFA DG for Political Affairs Thaung Tun, who attended the Vientiane meetings, told the COM and A/DCM that the decision to forgo the chair had been a last minute one. He said that senior GOB officials had presented options to the SPDC, actually recommending that Burma keep the Chair, and the decision was "handed down" just prior to the ASEAN FM meeting. Asked who made the final decision, Thaung Tun said "there's only one person in Burma who makes the call on anything, and that's the Senior General (SPDC Chairman Than Shwe)." ¶6. (C) Thaung Tun said that career GOB diplomats were "professionally disappointed" with the decision, concluding that Burma would lose "prestige" by not hosting a year of ASEAN meetings. "However," he added, "the international community miscalculated, because these guys (the SPDC generals) would have been forced to make concessions on democracy and human rights when under the spotlight; now they will do nothing." He added that during the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Vientiane, several countries, which he declined to identify, had asked ASEAN members to "pause" before pressing for a skip in the rotation, "because Burma might actually accept the proposal, and then what?" ¶7. (C) Comment: DFM Maung Myint's view that there should be a link between the ASEAN Chair decision and U.S. sanctions does not surprise us. The GOB, despite ample information and our frequently repeated explanations, does not grasp that fundamental changes in regime behavior, particularly with regard to its treatment of the democratic opposition, are a prerequisite, and indeed just a beginning, for any review of sanctions. End Comment. Martinez