BURMA'S INFORMAL ECONOMY: COMMODITY TRADE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000372

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2015
TAGS: ETRD EAGR ENRG ECON PGOV BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S INFORMAL ECONOMY: COMMODITY TRADE

REF: A. RANGOON 327


B. 03 RANGOON 1552

Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (SBU) Summary: As noted in ref B, the gray and black
markets help keep the Burmese people and government afloat in
the rough seas of chronic economic mismanagement. However,
little is clearly known about the size of these markets
except for unsubstantiated assumptions that they are perhaps
even as large as the formal economy. In an effort to try and
quantify these anecdotes, this is the first of a series
scrutinizing various sectors of the shadow economy. Because
the black market is so vast, and because it is generally
illegal and thus a very sensitive topic of discussion, we
cannot claim these snapshots are definitive. However,
perhaps they will give some clearer picture of what is meant
when we say "Burma's informal economy."


2. (SBU) This report looks some of the primary agricultural
commodities that are smuggled out of Burma on a daily basis:
rice, beans and pulses, and rubber. It also examines one of
Burma's major smuggled imports: diesel fuel. All told, we
estimate the illicit trade in these items to be around $100
million, only 2 percent of total trade volume in 2004, but
about 20 percent of the value of legal trade in these items.
End summary.

Agricultural Trade: Rice


3. (C) Burma remains largely an agricultural economy, with
the vast majority of its people still tied to the land
growing rice, beans and pulses, oil seeds, and a wide variety
of other crops. Despite the Burma's reliance on agriculture,
the sector is very underdeveloped, with little value added
and very low quality exports. The agricultural sector is
also still burdened by overregulation. Despite a
half-hearted foray into privatization of the rice market in
2003, the GOB since January 2004 has re-asserted control over
exports of rice and some other staples by banning their
export altogether.


4. (C) A large black market in agricultural products has
evolved from the combination of an overwhelmingly
agricultural economy, tight and capricious government export
policies, a long tradition of smuggling and corruption among
border officials, and strong demand for Burmese products in
neighboring states (with porous borders). During CY 2004,
when rice exports were technically barred, very reliable
private statistics show the GOB itself exported -- or
directed private firms to export -- around 82,500 metric tons
of rice (mostly 25 percent broken) and 18,000 metric tons of
broken rice. Most of these legal exports went to Bangladesh,
with the rest going to African countries, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore. According to a Burmese agricultural
trade expert, the legal exports of rice in 2004 were sold for
around $195 or $200 per metric ton, with most of the broken
grains going for $100 per ton, for the lowest quality, or
$165 per ton, for better varieties. Using these figures, the
estimated gross revenue from legal rice exports in 2004 was
about $19 million.


5. (C) However, the Burmese rice market in 2004 was
particularly conducive to black market activity. As always,
the demand from neighboring Bangladesh for rice and unhusked
rice (paddy) was far higher than legal supply. Also, in 2004
the unexpected cutoff of legal exports in January led to
sharp price drops for farmers -- who had produced more
expecting to benefit from the liberalized export policy.
Likewise, private exporters, who had purchased rice to
export, were stuck with stocks when the reforms were suddenly
reversed.


6. (C) An expert on the rice trade admitted he did not know
exactly how much went out of the country illegally in 2004,
however, based on demand and supply assumptions he estimated
smugglers took about 80,000 metric tons of rice and 40,000
metric tons of paddy to Bangladesh alone in 2004. He said
that a little bit of rice was also smuggled into China this
year, but none was taken to Thailand (unlike some previous
years). He estimated exporters got $180-$190 a metric ton
for paddy and $205-$210 per ton for smuggled rice (buyers are
willing to pay more for easier informal procurement across
the border or by sea). Thus, the surmised value of illegally
exported rice and paddy in 2004 to be around $24 million, or
126 percent the estimated revenue from legally exported rice.


7. (C) Thus far in 2005, the GOB has given no indication it
will allow private sector rice exports. However, exports by
the government of aging stockpiles has increased
significantly year-on-year. Nonetheless, with the near total
ban in place, the dynamics for large-scale smuggling of rice
remain.

Agricultural Trade: Beans and Pulses


8. (C) Though beans and pulses can be freely exported by the
private sector, reliable private statistics show legal
exports in CY 2004 fell to 800,000 metric tons, from 1
million metric tons in CY 2003, due to a soft primary export
market -- India -- and stronger domestic prices. Using an
estimate of $280-$300 per metric ton of beans and pulses, the
total gross value of Burma's legal beans and pulses exports
in 2004 was likely between $224 million and $240 million.


9. (C) China was the major destination for smuggled beans and
pulses. Burma's road links to China are much better than
those to India making smuggling large quantities of
agricultural products more feasible. Chinese demand for
certain types of Burma's beans and pulses is also
significant. An agricultural trade specialist estimated that
120,000 metric tons of various beans and pulses were smuggled
across Burma's border with China either outright or by way of
underinvoicing by a legal exporter. According to the
specialist, the Chinese often paid more than the market price
for these products, so we can estimate the value of these
illegally exported beans and pulses at more than $36 million
-- about 15-20 percent of legal exports.


10. (C) According to sources, the situation for Burma's beans
and pulses appears unchanged in 2005. Exporters complain of
soft legal export markets, and increasing intrusion by the
GOB -- and affiliated businesses -- into the formal trade.
Thus, we expect exporters to rely increasingly on a continued
stream of illegal beans and pulses exports into China.

Rubber


11. (C) Burma is not a major global exporter of rubber, and
the quality of its exports is low. However, the market value
of the product, and the dominance of the black market, make
it a notable commodity for this study. According to an
agricultural trade specialist, because of GOB restrictions on
rubber exports (lifted partially in late 2004) 50 percent of
Burma's total rubber exports were smuggled in 2004. The
illegally exported commodity, in basically raw form, goes
from southern Burma to Malaysia (by ship to Penang) or
overland to China. According to the specialist's estimates,
in 2004 about 20,000 metric tons of raw rubber was smuggled.
Assuming about $1,250 per ton (the price earned by legal
exporters),the gross value of the smuggled rubber was about
$25 million. Strangely, the expert reported, legal exports
of rubber have picked up in 2005. Thus, the amount of
smuggled rubber may decline in percentage terms this year.

Diesel Fuel


12. (C) On the import side, a large and important area of
black market activity is diesel. The legal import of diesel,
rigorously controlled by the Ministry of Livestock and
Fisheries (reflecting the traditionally heavy usage of diesel
by Burma's fishing fleet),was rife with corruption in 2004.
Two ministry officials were caught and arrested after
stealing 420,000 gallons of imported diesel fuel -- along
with the 260 mln kyat (about $290,000) entrusted to them by
private importers. In addition the GOB, fearful of foreign
exchange expenditures, regularly cut off imports of this
essential product -- needed not only for vehicles, but also
to fuel power generating turbines and the thousands of
private generators used across the country. The result was a
shortfall in predicted imports in 2004 of around 416,000
barrels -- despite an increase in diesel imports by around 20
percent (to about 4.8 million barrels) compared to CY 2003.
Most of Burma's legal diesel imports came from Malaysia in CY
2004 and, according to press reports and estimates, importers
paid around $45-$50 a barrel. Thus, the total value of legal
imports of diesel in 2004 was $216 million to $240 million.


13. (C) The volume of illegally imported diesel is not well
known. Likewise, the price of diesel fluctuated dramatically
in 2004 so its value cannot be clearly characterized. Thus,
we use a rough guess to assume the balance of the expected
diesel imports (416,000 barrels) came informally -- from
Malaysia by boat, either through Tanintharyi Division on the
Andaman Sea or Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal and that
buyers paid about $50/barrel for smuggled diesel. This
calculation puts the gross value of smuggled diesel at $20.8
million.


14. (C) 2005 looks to be another banner year for diesel
smugglers. Though energy shortages remain the norm in
Rangoon and elsewhere, and diesel fuel retail prices are at
historic highs, the GOB is focused solely on conserving hard
currency. The government, banking on a half-baked campaign
to use compressed natural gas (CNG) for vehicles, has made it
clear it would import as little diesel as it can get away
with in 2005. Likewise, the government has stopped refining
for domestic use any of the roughly 340,000 barrels a month
worth of crude oil coming from the condensate produced at the
two major offshore natural gas fields -- Yadana and Yetagun.
Finally, the GOB, apparently tired of paying foreigners for
oil production, has announced it will allow no further
foreign investment in onshore oil fields (ref A).

Comment: A Small Corner, But the Numbers Add Up


15. (C) These calculations are educated guesses about a tiny
portion of the black market economy. However, even from
these four products (rice, beans and pulses, rubber, and
diesel) we see the value of black market activity topping
$105 million. While this is only 2 percent of the IMF's $5
billion projected total trade volume for Burma FY 2004-05
(April-March),it is more than 20 percent of the value of
legal trade in these items. We expect the proportion of
black to white trade to increase dramatically when we look at
high-value, heavily smuggled products such as gems, timber,
and narcotics (septel). End comment.
Martinez