UNHCR AWAITS APPROVAL TO WORK IN THE SOUTHEAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001423 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015 TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM PINS PREL BM NGO SUBJECT: UNHCR AWAITS APPROVAL TO WORK IN THE SOUTHEAST REF: A. RANGOON 1413 ¶B. RANGOON 749 Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a December 14 meeting, the UNHCR Representative for Burma described the UNHCR's relationship with the GOB and UNHCR's access to the southeastern border region with Thailand. The UNHCR has informal support to do needs assessments, but still lacks an MOU to officially work in the Southeast Region. Its designated GOB counterpart ministry is known for its work relocating ethnic Burmans into "model villages" in territories traditionally occupied by other ethnic groups. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In Charge's December 14 courtesy visit to the UNHCR Representative for Burma, Jean-Francois Durieux described UNHCR's relationship and work with the GOB among the Rohingya of northern Rakhine State (ref A) and in the Southeast Region. In May the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) informed the UNHCR that it should coordinate its work in the Southeast Region, which includes Mon and Karen States, with the Ministry for Progress of Border Areas, National Races, and Development Affairs (NaTaLa) and no longer with MOHA. The UNHCR began working with NaTaLa in September. Durieux described NaTaLa as "reasonably open." NaTaLa agreed to help the UNHCR re-activate its stalled projects in the Southeast Region after the MOHA stopped the UNHCR's access there in June (ref B). NaTaLa also agreed that the UNHCR could operate its own radio network and allowed the UNHCR to select its own local implementing partners. The arrangements remain informal as NaTaLa wants to proceed on a "trial basis." This suits the UNHCR, which has never worked with NaTaLa before, as a useful test period. ¶3. (C) Since working with NaTaLa, the UNHCR has not sent international staff to the southeast, on the advice of the NaTaLa director-general that he could not sell the idea to his superiors. The UNHCR's local staff are "absolutely free" to travel in Karen and Mon States, and local people talk freely to them, allowing for good data collection, according to Durieux. The UNHCR would like to send mixed groups of local and international staff, with government escorts, to the southeast, with the eventual goal of unhindered access by all staff. This will not happen until the UNHCR and NaTaLa sign an MOU. NaTaLa told the UNHCR that an MOU cannot be signed before February 2006, and UNHCR has informed NaTaLa that they must have a signed MOU by mid-2006, at the latest. The UNHCR cannot continue to justify use of donor funds, absent a MOU and activities. In the meantime, local UNHCR staff have been allowed to carry out needs assessment in target communities, giving the UNHCR a presence in the field. AN NGO BITES THE DUST ¶4. (C) In a related development, Medicins Sans Frontieres - France told poloff on December 16 that it informed the Ministry of Health (MOH) a week earlier that MSF France will terminate its projects in Karen and Mon States and cease its operations in Burma in February 2006. MSF France has been waiting since April 2005, when the GOB ordered it to stop further fieldwork, to re-activate its activities in the Southeast Region. While the MOH regretted MSF France's decision, it admitted to MSF that it lacked the authority to permit MSF France to resume its work. CHOOSE YOUR VOCABULARY CAREFULLY ¶5. (C) Durieux stressed the UNHCR works along the eastern and western borders because that is where refugees live. The UNHCR had earlier sought to work in Chin State with Burmese who fled to India for refuge. The GOB denied there was a problem, as the Chin did not live in camps, which is the same logic they use for Shans in Thailand, calling the Shans instead "migrant workers." To appease the GOB the UNHCR refers to the Karen refugees in Thailand as "people of Burmese origin who UNHCR can help to return." KAREN REFUGEES: RESETTLEMENT OR REPATRIATION? ¶6. (C) Durieux called the recent agreement by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to allow some Burmese refugees to be resettled in third countries as a positive sign, given the harsh treatment of refugees by the RTG in the past. However, he warned the Thais could crack down on refugees again, if resettlement is seen as a "pull" factor. The attitude of the Karen National Union (KNU) is another important factor. The KNU, which views the refugees as its power base, might be reluctant to see them resettled. While nobody actively discusses repatriation of Karen refugees now, Durieux sees a possibility of voluntary repatriation sometime in the future. He doubted that the 140,000 refugees in Thai refugee camps would all be resettled. Those remaining behind may think seriously about returning; The UNHCR will not support forced repatriation. INTERNAL REFUGEES ¶7. (C) Durieux did not know how many IDPs live along the eastern border, but concurred with the Thai-Burma Border Consortium's figure of 600,000. He said, in the past, the KNU made people move around, but now he blamed the GOB for creating IDPs. According to Durieux, people moved because the Burmese Army has burned down thousands of villages, because they are tired of being rounded up for portering, and because war destroyed the local economy. He said most IDPs are tired of moving and would prefer just to remain where they are, and not be relocated to yet another site. The UNHCR would like to help IDPs cope in their current circumstances. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Should the UNHCR be permitted to work in the Southeast Region -- not a given, as evidenced by MSF France's experience in the same region -- it could provide some improved protection for the local people. However, as in northern Rakhine State, the UNHCR cannot directly counter military repression, just alleviate it somewhat. NaTaLa should also be viewed cautiously. It has not worked much with international organizations. Instead, it concentrated on relocating ethnic Burmans to land vacated by IDPs and refugees (often forcibly) and establishing "model villages" in traditional ethnic territory. End Comment. VILLAROSA