JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001307 SIPDIS STATE FOR P AND EAP; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM JA SUBJECT: JAPAN IN BURMA: PROFILE IN COWARDICE REF: A. TOKYO 6026 ¶B. TOKYO 5853 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. TOKYO 5850 ¶D. RANGOON 1216 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Japanese Ambassador to Burma said he used recent meetings with senior GOB officials to pursue GOJ objectives on democratization, human rights, and economic reform. He believes he succeeded in convincing Burma to reconsider its ILO withdrawal, but indicated that he did not raise Aung San Suu Kyi in order to help ensure that his basic message got delivered to senior SPDC generals. The Ambassador agreed with us in principle on the need for international unity on basic objectives in Burma and for closer U.S.-Japan collaboration. He criticized Western sanctions, however, and grew visibly uncomfortable at the notion of Japanese and U.S. diplomats in Rangoon meeting more regularly to share views, indicating that he feared GOB retribution. Apparently, he views maintaining "friendly relations" with Burma as outweighing shared U.S.-Japan values. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Charge and the Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Nobutake Odano, exchanged views on November 16 during a lengthy conversation that covered respective Burma policies, recent political developments in Burma, and senior-level U.S.-Japan dialogue on Burma strategies. P/E Chief and Japanese pol counselor Ichiro Maruyama also participated in the meeting. JAPAN DISCOURAGES BURMA'S ILO WITHDRAWAL ¶3. (C) The Charge told Ambassador Odano that she was keen to discuss ways to cooperate with the Japanese Embassy on sharing information and perhaps coordinating strategies, noting that Burma had been a topic addressed recently between U/S Burns and MOFA Deputy Minister Nishida (refs A, C),among other senior officials. The Charge asked Odana about the substance of his recent meetings with the Labor and Foreign Ministers. ¶4. (C) Amb Odano said that he used these meetings to raise Japan's goals on democratization, human rights, and economic reform. He had explained to the ministers that, as a "long-standing friend" of Burma, Japan advised the GOB to: accelerate its road map process and allow the participation of all political parties; protect human rights; and pursue steps toward a full market economy. "More foreign investment," Odano told the Charge, "could allow creative and talented Burmese to become agents of change." ¶5. (C) Odano focused most of his efforts on reversing the recent Burmese decision to withdraw from the ILO (ref D). He discouraged Burma from withdrawing, which would lead to "negative effects on many fronts," by observing that Japan's own withdrawal from the League of Nations had led to the destruction of his country. The Minister of Labor responded that GOB-affiliated organizations, such as the USDA, had been "upset" by the ILO's treatment of Burma and had "pressured" the GOB to quit, but he added that no final decision had been made. "It appears the GOB has taken our advice," said Odano, offering that he had heard earlier in the day that the GOB's representative in Geneva had told the ILO that Burma would remain a member if the ILO carries out its mandate "properly." (Note: We subsequently received a copy of a letter from the Labor Minister to the ILO stating that the GOB remained open to alternatives. End Note.) BUT DID YOU RAISE ASSK? ¶6. (C) The Charge pressed Amb Odano to provide more details on his message to the GOB on democratization. "Did you address, for example, the National Convention process or the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi?" she asked. Odano responded that the GOB had already committed to its own seven step road map. So he urged the GOB to speed up the process, pointing to quick progress achieved in Afghanistan and in Iraq on new constitutions. "As for political prisoners," said Odano, "my mission won't be successful unless the ministers deliver my message to senior SPDC generals, so I didn't put everything on the table at once." ¶7. (C) Addressing Odano's message to speed up the road map, the Charge noted that the process must be inclusive to have any credibility. Odano replied that the regime's plan for a referendum on a new constitution would provide an opportunity for the Burmese people to participate. A referendum, responded the Charge, would be meaningless without open debate. Furthermore, she added, the regime had lost the last election in 1990 and would surely take measures to avoid a similar outcome again. "Well," said Odano, "I'm not sure we had very much debate in Japan when we produced a new constitution after the war," stating that the Burmese people first needed the opportunity to vote. They could modify constitutional language later, he asserted, citing the examples of Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries. DISSECTING THE GREAT CAPITAL MOVE ¶8. (C) The Charge observed that she saw little logic in the generals' decision making. Amb Odano agreed and cited three leading theories, which he had gathered from press reports, behind the SPDC's sudden relocation of the country's capital to Pyinmana: to create a defensive stronghold against a U.S. invasion; to isolate the GOB from domestic anti-goverment threats; and to respond to the advice of palm readers. He added a view that the move might also reflect closer ties with China, observing that the two countries were in a "marriage of convenience." ¶9. (C) Odano said China must play a more constructive role in Burma. Claiming that "China won't listen to Japan," he suggested the United States could have some influence, having succeeded in securing Chinese cooperation on North Korea. The Charge responded that all three countries--China, Japan, and the United States--were involved in the Six-Party Talks, noting that the North Korea case might be a model for how "we can all work together on Burma." She observed that Chinese influence and interest in Burma has its limits, because the PRC desires above all stability and the current political situation doesn't inspire much confidence. SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND ¶10. (C) The Charge, responding to Odano's request for thoughts on strategies, replied that the international community should be united on basic goals with regard to Burma to send a clearer signal to the regime. A good case can be made, she said, that all members of the broader international community, while having different approaches to the problem, fully agree on the need for democracy, respect for human rights, and overall reform. The rest of the ASEAN countries, she said, look outward and are increasingly accountable to their own citizens. In her introductory meetings with other Ambassadors she had found broad agreement that the regime must move toward a more open system. ¶11. (C) A united international community would be good, said Odano, but if the approach is one of sanctions and pressure, it won't help the country and will only push the generals further into the trenches. "We need to show them that we are here to help," he said, "and that is why Japan has a robust humanitarian assistance program." He lamented the ouster of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, describing the former head of military intelligence as a "progressive element" who "still got bashed" despite his efforts to reach out. "Even when the generals are ready to take bold initiatives, the international community discourages them," said Odano, insisting that Burma would have done "something positive" had it not relinquished the 2006 ASEAN chair. ¶12. (C) The Charge responded that she had not approached Amb Odano to pursue collaboration on sanctions, which are not in any case the source of Burma's woes - regime policies are. She reiterated that "we need to work together in a positive, constructive manner to achieve shared objectives." For example, she said, Japan's apparently successful efforts to get the GOB to rethink the utility of staying in the ILO were positive, and could help keep the regime from rolling back progress that had been achieved on forced labor. She also noted reports that Burma would pursue a "no action" measure on the annual UNGA Burma resolution and observed that Japan had discouraged such behavior in the past by convincing the regime that it was not in the country's interest to work against the international community. SURELY BURMA CAN'T DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN ¶13. (C) The Charge offered to host a lunch for the Japanese and U.S. Embassy policy teams to compare notes and exchange views. Amb Odano noted that President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi, meeting that day in Tokyo, had collaborated on many security and regional issues. Despite contributing to "many" briefing papers for his PM, however, he asserted Burma had not come up in the meetings with the President. "We have the same goals," he said, "but it is very difficult to agree on how to reach them." Odano said that the GOB had friendly ties with Japan, but continued to be resentful over the suspension of Japanese aid. "This makes our access to the cabinet very difficult," he said, appealing to the Charge to "keep our conversation among the four of us (in this room)." ¶14. (C) The Charge said that U.S.-Japan cooperation was "no secret" and noted that the Bush-Koizumi meetings would SIPDIS generate substantial press. She pointed out that at many posts Japanese and American diplomats meet regularly and collaborate on a number of sensitive issues. "Surely," she said, "the Generals cannot drive a wedge between us." Odano responded that the GOB has "no sophistication to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States," but added Burma thinks that Japan is "already under U.S. influence, and I don't want to give them any more reason to think Japan responds to U.S. pressure." Japan, he said, pursues democracy and human rights in Burma "because these are Japanese values." ¶15. (C) Lunch with the Americans, Amb Odano allowed with obvious discomfort, would be fine, "but first I need to digest these recent negative developments, such as the UNSC debate, the ILO issues, and the GOB relocation to Pyinmana." The Charge offered that perhaps January would be a more convenient time to get together and Odano responded, "Well, the National Convention will still be going on then," before changing the subject. COMMENT: SPEAK SOFTLY AND CARRY A PAPER SWORD ¶16. (C) This was our second substantive discussion with Ambassador Odano in recent weeks (the Charge made an introductory call on September 19). On both occasions, Odano expressed similar views on engagement and a perceived growth in Chinese influence. Nevertheless, his visible discomfort at the mere notion of a lunch with U.S. Embassy policy officers was startling. He made it clear that he fears retribution from the GOB, and yet Japanese diplomats have told us that following the 2004 ouster of Khin Nyunt and the demise of military intelligence, GOJ access to the regime has been severely curtailed. So what does Amb Odano seek to avoid? Apparently he views his primary mission as maintaining "friendly relations" with Burma, and so will not risk displeasing the ruling generals by meeting with the U.S. to discuss shared values. End Comment. VILLAROSA