NLD VIEWS ON CAPITAL RELOCATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001276 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM SUBJECT: NLD VIEWS ON CAPITAL RELOCATION REF: A. RANGOON 1265 ¶B. RANGOON 1233 Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an exchange of views on November 8 with NLD leaders, party Secretary U Lwin expressed befuddlement over the regime's relocation of Burma's capital to remote Pyinmana. He revealed, however, his own participation in military exercises under a former Burmese dictator that had concluded "in every case" Pyinmana was the best strategic location for command headquarters in the event of a foreign invasion. NLD leaders also offered views on the regime's National Convention, efforts to engage the UN Security Council on Burma, and the recent sentencing of Shan politician Hkun Htun Oo. End Summary. PYINMANA - TO THE BUNKERS ¶2. (C) P/E Chief met on November 8 with NLD Central Executive Committee members U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei to exchange views on recent developments. The NLD elders were befuddled by the regime's announcement on November 7 that it had commenced the relocation of Burma's administrative capital to remote Pyinmana (ref A). "I suspect that Than Shwe has again been taking the advice of his fortune-teller," said U Lwin, adding that "there is no good reason to move the capital." ¶3. (C) U Lwin, a former Deputy Prime Minister and defense attache, revealed some history behind the selection of Pyinmana as a "command and control" center. "Even in my time (as a military and government leader under former dictator Ne Win)," said U Lwin, "we went through endless war-gaming exercises that addressed a potential invasion by China, India, or even the United States." In every case, he said, decision makers agreed that the most strategic location for a war-time military headquarters, based on its central location and natural barriers, would be Pyinmana FAREWELL TO ARMS? ¶4. (C) The NLD leaders affirmed that the SPDC had made no effort to reach out to the NLD, or to other pro-democracy parties, in advance of the reconvening of National Convention, scheduled for December 5 (ref B). U Lwin, saying the party has not heard "in quite some time" from General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest, SIPDIS opined that the upcoming session of the NC "will be the last" and suggested that the regime is anxious to conclude the 
process. ¶5. (C) U Lwin and U Nyunt Wei both noted that it would be impossible for the SPDC to follow the NC quickly with a referendum on a new constitution, unless the cease-fire groups agree to surrender their arms. "The problem," U Lwin added, "is that the armed groups will resist and say that (former Prime Minister) Khin Nyunt never mentioned such a requirement when negotiating the cease-fire agreements." ¶6. (C) U Lwin said he was perplexed that the SPDC had ceased its annual dry season military offensives against remaining insurgent groups. "Maybe the Burmese regime has lost its spirit for fighting," said the former Burmese Army colonel, "or maybe their efforts at diplomacy with the ethnics are actually producing results." PESSIMISM OVER UNSC EFFORT ¶7. (C) We observed that the NLD had issued a special appeal on October 28, urging members of the UN Security Council to support the findings of the Tutu/Havel report. U Lwin said that he personally doubted the UNSC effort would succeed. He noted that while Tutu and Havel are respected statesmen, "they are not from this region" and annual UNGA resolutions have no support beyond the West. U Lwin said he was still bitter over a letter he received from the UN in 2003 that, he claimed, described the UNSYG as having "no mandate on Burma because no one from ASEAN supports UN resolutions." U Lwin concluded that, while the UNSC "might consider the Burma question," real action will be thwarted by "the veto of two countries (China and Russia)." HKUN HTUN OO ¶8. (C) We shared with the NLD leaders the Department's November 7 statement on recent sentences handed down for SNLD Chairman Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan political leaders. The NLD leaders said they had had virtually no contact with ethnic Shan pro-democracy parties in recent months and had no observations on the fate of Hkun Htun Oo. ¶9. (C) After our meeting, the NLD distributed a declaration by the Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) that criticized the long-term imprisonment of Hkun Htun Oo and Sai Nyunt Lwin as "harmful to efforts aimed at building national reconciliation and unity among the country's nationalities." The SNLD, which expressed gratitude to Emboffs for the Department's statement, issued its own press release on November 9 that demanded the unconditional release of Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan leaders, criticizing the SPDC for equating "the expression of opinions and views with conspiracy and treason." ¶10. (C) Comment: Sadly, our exchange with the NLD leaders reflects the tenor of our recent meetings with the country's leading opposition party. They have a great deal to offer with regard to historical events and thinking. Strategic views, however, seem to be lacking, especially about how the NLD could take advantage of a potential emerging vacuum as the GOB heads packing, literally, for the proverbial hills. End Comment. VILLAROSA