ASEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BURMA: PART II

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL TH LA CB ECON EINV BM ID VN
SUBJECT: ASEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BURMA: PART II

REF: A. RANGOON 1053

B. RANGOON 973

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassadors of Thailand, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, like their ASEAN colleagues (ref
A) encourage U.S. engagement with the Burmese regime, but
share generally negative views on the current situation and
prospects for progress in Burma. Of this group, only the
Thai Ambassador appears to be making any effort to actively
engage the GOB. His focus appears narrowly limited to
keeping the Burmese in Burma. End Summary.

THAILAND: KEEP THE BURMESE IN BURMA


2. (C) Ambassador Suphot Dhirakaosol, posted to Burma for
about a year and a half, told the Charge during a
mid-September call that a 2,000 km common border is a primary
concern that drives Thailand's policy of engagement with the
Burmese regime. If the political crisis in Burma persists,
Suphot said, those who flee Burma won't go to China or India,
they will head straight for Thailand. Therefore, Thailand
wants to help Burma develop in order to reduce current and
potential border problems. The Charge observed that not all
issues respect borders, such as disease and narcotics, and
encouraged Thailand to seek real, meaningful reform in Burma.
He described a plan to establish hospitals on the Burmese
side of the border that met Thai standards. Unfortunately,
he rued, the GOB had expressed little interest.


3. (C) Suphot said that Thailand had concluded it could only
encourage gradual progress in Burma. "We can't change
everything in one day," he said, acknowledging that the
Burmese military was intent on keeping power by denying the
population the opportunity to access information and to
develop. He described ongoing efforts to bring Burmese
military officers to Thailand, but said the senior leaders
would not permit subordinates to travel. Even senior leaders
would not travel, like their ASEAN counterparts, he said,
"because they never change." He demurred when the Charge
asked if Thailand saw any results from its Burma policies,
but added that the RTG only made "suggestions" to Burma
because "the generals don't respond to pressure." Suphot
added that Thailand tried not to do anything that the regime
would consider as interference, "since we must avoid causing
problems that will send more refugees, and spread insecurity,
into Thailand."


4. (C) The Charge said that Thailand has many important
lessons to offer Burma, particularly having shifted from
military to civilian rule. She encouraged Suphot to note to
his GOB interlocutors that all the other ASEAN countries had
opened up to the outside world, and yet Burma remained closed
and therefore increasingly impoverished. Suphot agreed,
noting that he would encourage the Minister of Agriculture
and Irrigation "to give the Burmese people opportunities."
He subsequently told Charge that Thailand had proposed to
establish plantations in Burma, where Thai wages would be
paid to keep Burmese in Burma. However, he acknowledged that
the Thai private sector was reluctant to invest here without
guarantees because of the bad investment climate. Asked if
the GOB would honor any guarantees, he admitted that was a
problem.

INDONESIA: HAVE PATIENCE


5. (C) Indonesian Ambassador Wyoso Prodjowarsito, in Rangoon
for over two years, urged "patience" in dealing with the
Burmese regime, referring repeatedly to the regime's road map
to democracy and related assurances regarding an eventual
political transition. "We must wait for a draft constitution
to emerge from the National Convention process," he urged.
Prodjowarsito also said the international community needed to
wait for a referendum on the constitution, "which should
include all Burmese people." He added, however, that "of
course, Aung San Suu Kyi should be released" and bemoaned his
perceived inability to effect change. "Everything,"
Prodjowarsito predicted, "will be the same after two days,
two months, two years."


6. (C) Prodjowarsito said that (former Indonesian Foreign
Minister) Ali Alatas had been pleased with his meetings with
regime leaders during an August visit to Burma (ref B). The
Ambassador said, however, that Alatas had come only on UN
reform business; it was "not good timing" to bring up
democracy issues. The Charge noted the relevance of
Indonesia's successful experience in adopting democracy
through multiparty elections. Suggesting that the GOI could
offer a helpful model to the GOB, the Charge noted that the
Indonesian military, like the SPDC, had once claimed that
only the armed forces could keep the country together. On
advice of former President Megawati, replied Prodjowarsito,
he had himself offered Indonesia's help during his meetings
with the GOB. They just smile, he said, and say "thank you."


7. (SBU) According to Prodjowarsito, Indonesia has only three
investment projects in Burma and a small amount of trade.
Indonesia does not need to do business in this difficult
environment, he said, because of its own big domestic market.
Furthermore, constantly changing economic policies and
limited bank relationships create a challenging business
climate. Besides, he added, Indonesian businessmen have
"never heard of Myanmar, they only know Burma." The Charge
asked if the GOI sponsored any training, and Prodjowarsito
replied, "Who would we send? There is no Parliament here."

VIETNAM: WE CAN'T, YOU SHOULD


8. (C) Ambassador Tran Van Tung, a recent arrival in Burma,
warmly welcomed Charge referring to improved relations
between the US and Vietnam, as reflected by the recent visit
of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to the U.S. Charge noted
that Vietnam had become a growing, dynamic economy that could
offer useful lessons to Burma. He responded that the
international community had helped Vietnam, and urged the
U.S. to make the first move--"if the U.S. is not willing,
then the military will not be either." He added that
punishing the Burmese serves no useful purpose. He
acknowledged that the regime's focus on political stability,
posed many difficulties and that too much fear over change
usually results in nothing being accomplished.


9. (C) When queried about Vietnamese messages to the Burmese
leadership, Ambassador Tung cited visits by Vietnam's Prime
Minister and former President. He said that they urged the
regime to open up citing Vietnam's own experience with
sanctions. Vietnam had decided to open up to the outside
world and then the international community responded.
Vietnam, he averred, would only move forward; Burma should
follow suit and become part of the international community.
Beyond visits, the Ambassador indicated relations were
minimal. Since both are basically agricultural nations,
trade has been modest. Although it has potential, "business
in Burma is difficult."


10. (C) Tung said he had had a 30-minute meeting with SPDC
Chairman Than Shwe rather than the usual 15 minutes, but
offered no details, and agreed with Charge that the Cabinet
Ministers appeared to have little influence. He insisted
that high-level Burmese officials understood the need for
their country to open up and know they cannot develop
otherwise. When urged to repeat that message to the regime,
he replied that the U.S. is the appropriate country to send a
message. He said that Vietnam would be willing to share its
experiences with the GOB, but expressed doubts that Burma
would use his country as an example.

LAOS: "WE DON'T CARRY GUNS INTO TEMPLES"


11. (C) Lao Ambassador Chanthavy Bodhisane, an almost
invisible member of the diplomatic corps during his four
years in Burma, indicated that he spends most of his time
playing golf. Admitting he rarely sees any GOB officials, he
relies on his household staff for information about current
events. He said his staff was very loyal because he gave
them rice. There is little bilateral trade, he said, and no
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation. (Note: DEA Rangoon
recently participated in a major heroin seizure in
cooperation with Lao, Chinese, and Burmese authorities. End
Note.) The strongest tie between the two countries is
Buddhism, which results in a modest number of Laos traveling
to Burma. Asked to compare the two countries, Bodhisane
offered, "we don't carry guns into temples," referring to the
common practice observed by many Burmese military officers of
always wearing weapons.

CAMBODIA: LOWEST PROFILE OF ALL


12. (C) While the Charge has yet to call on Cambodian
Ambassador Hul Phany, she has already met him socially on
numerous occasions. He never has anything to say about
current events in Rangoon, but is always quick to volunteer
to sing at any event. Numerous of his staff, including his
own son, want visas to the U.S. for their children.

COMMENT: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE


13. (C) Each of the ASEAN Ambassadors advocates engagement
with the Burmese regime, while admitting they have little to
show for it. Of this group, only the Thai Ambassador has
made any real effort to reach out beyond former PM Khin
Nyunt, deposed over a year ago. The rumor mill has it that
Ali Alatas did not even bother to debrief the Indonesian
Ambassador about his visit. While it is true that Thailand's
pragmatic approach has, for example, achieved an uneasy peace
along its common border with Burma, the SPDC has dismissed
all Thai efforts aimed at political reform (the regime's
rejection of the Bangkok Process comes to mind).
Nonetheless, we believe that the ASEANS have a comparative
advantage in being able to demonstrate to the Burmese regime
that opening up can bring increased prosperity, and that
stability can be maintained as militaries yield to civilian
governments. End Comment.
Villarosa