DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES: BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001177 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP, G, DRL, S/P E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015 TAGS: PREL KDEM BM SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES: BURMA REF: A. STATE 16982 ¶B. STATE 156961 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The promotion of democracy in Burma is this mission's top priority as reflected in our Mission Program Plan. Our support for promoting democracy and respect for human rights has been long-standing and requires perseverence. Although this strong support for democracy has severely strained our relations with the Burmese military regime, it has garnered us broad public support from the Burmese people. Given the entrenched nature of the military regime, we cannot promise dramatic changes in the short-term, but believe we can effectively stretch the boundaries of the possible to give more space for civil society to develop and to give support and encouragement to the many supporters of democracy in Burma to persist in their struggle. We run already successful American Center programs that can be expanded beyond Rangoon to the second major city of Mandalay if we get Department approval. We also will receive $100,000 in FY06 for small grants that we will use to promote democracy and civil society development. We also recommend a diplomatic push to emphasize that a national referendum on a new constitution will not confer any legitimacy on the regime without the inclusion of representatives of all the Burmese people in the drafting and a free, fair and open public debate. End Summary. Key Areas of Democratic Deficit -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Democratic Deficit understates the situation in Burma today. The military regime retains all governing authority, and the country has no free press, a complete absence of basic human rights (including freedom of speech, association, and movement),no rule of law, no independent judiciary, highly controlled access to information, severely restricted political party activities, and systematically emasculated civil society institutions. Religious minorities face increasing repression as the military tries to use Buddhism to give itself greater standing. The population remains subject to forced labor at the whim of military authorities. ¶3. (C) Progress in Burma requires a long-term effort. Our overall policy reamins focused on fostering a meaningful political dialogue among Burma's diverse political forces, aiming at achieving a peaceful transition to democracy. The military regime, however, has rejected all bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote an inclusive national reconcilation dialogue, the free operation of political parties, and the release of over 1000 political prisoners, including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite intermittent glimmers of hope that the message might be getting through, the military appears determined to protect its continued rule of the few over the many disenfranchised. ¶4. (C) This year marks the 43rd year of authoritarian rule and 17 years under the current military regime, which came to power promising a "quick" transition to democracy. The regime generals in the past years have retreated further into their collective shell of isolation. This retreat is partially a response to international pressure, but also reflects renewed attention to power sharing issues with the country's ethnic minorities, a concern that remains unresolved since Burmese independence. Although the military convened a National Convention in 1993 to draft a Constitution as part of its "roadmap to democracy," it hand-picked the representatives, restricted debate, detained and isolated the pro-democracy movement leaders, and harassed and repressed democratic activists. The military has announced that they will reconvene the National Convention later this year in order to finalize a new Constitution. Yet after 12 years, no one has seen any provisions in writing. ¶5. (C) The regime's open disdain for the UN system and the international community has become more apparent. The regime has prohibited a visit by the UNSYG's Special Envoy, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, since March 2004. It has been two years since UN Human Rights Rapporteur Paolo Sergio Pinheiro was allowed to enter the country. In the interim, world leaders and international organizations, inlcuding the UNSYG, the UNGA, the UNCHR, and the ILO, have continued to press the regime, unsuccessfully, for significant reform. The regime has also imposed increased restrictions on UN agencies and international NGOs operating inside Burma. The military intimidates its citizens by questioning them about any contacts with foreigners, including the source of funds for programs they initiate. Foreign missions and visitors face increasing delays and difficulties in obtaining routine visas and residence permits. Short-term Objectives -------------- ¶6. (C) Given the overall grim prospects for a transition to democracy in the near future, we propose some modest steps to stretch the boundaries to promote meaningful discussions among the Burmese people and prepare them to control their future. We propose to do this by expanding our successful American Center programs to Mandalay and by utilizing $100,000 in ESF funds already appropriated to give support to civil society groups working inside Burma. In addition, we recommend that a diplomatic effort be launched to forestall the adoption of a new Constitution (drafting of which may be concluded by the end of this year) after a sham referendum designed to entrench the military in power. Diplomatic and Programmatic Strategy -------------- ¶7. (C) Stretching the Boundaries: In spite of regime efforts to paint the international community, and especially the United States, as "enemies of the state," there is a phenomenal thirst among Burma's diverse population for all that we have to offer. The democratic opposition values U.S. mission counsel and support. The ethnic minorities, distrusted by the central government, value our efforts to include them in our programs. The general population eagerly avails itself of the abundant, accurate, and unvarnished information we provide. Our American Center in Rangoon (which houses the best, and one of the only, libraries in the country) draws up to 8,000 visitors a week and has 12,000 enrolled members. Almost 400 Burmese, including opposition activists and former political prisoners, have enrolled in our English language and civics instruction programs. Participants in our public diplomacy exchange programs in the United States return to their NGOs and independent associations with new leadership and management skills to build a stronger civil society. ¶8. (C) We can do more: --Increasing Outreach: We must turn away interested students for our programs in Rangoon due to space limitations. We should not be turning away any interested individuals seeking the truth. The USG owns prime real estate in Mandalay, currently unoccupied, that could serve as a center for expanding our successful public diplomacey programs. Mandalay is Burma's second largest city, the cultural capital, and the gateway to Northern Burma and most ethnic areas. China, Japan, UK, and France operate educational programs there and China and India have active consulates. We recommend expanding our successful American Center programs (library and classes) to Mandalay in order to reach many democracy activists and ethnic minorities who are prohibited from traveling to Rangoon. We need to begin now to seek the necessary approvals from the authorities(which can take a very long time),while the Department coordinates the necessary Washington approvals, so that we can get Mandalay open soon. --Training: Quick to recognize threats to its authority, the military has closed universities for extended periods of time and then dispersed them away from urban centers. The military hand-picks the heads of business and professional associations, even the monkhood, to avoid challenges. They view the private sector as easy plunder rather than a force for development. They discourage the reporting of bad news as negatively reflecting on their rule, so data collection has disappeared. They have begun moving to replace trained civil servants throughout the bureaucracy with military officers having no background or expertise in the jobs they assume. As a result, leadership, decision making, and management skills have withered in Burma. The regime's repression and intimidation of the democratic opposition has severely restricted the ability of political party leaders to develop sufficient capacity to govern. Our American Center has programs in place to teach English to democracy activists, with an emphasis on governance and civics. We have offered successful journalism training programs to support professional development within a growing independent media sector. We have oragnized an eMBA program for progressive business leaders seeking the tools necessary to make the private sector an engine of change for political and economic reform. All these, plus more, can be expanded with additional space and funding. --International Visitors/Exchanges: The USG currently funds six IVs annually. We could easily double or triple that figure to accommodate strong candidates from independent NGOs and civil society. Burma does not currently have a Fulbright program, despite being one of the original Fulbright countries in 1947. We should reactivate this program that has demonstrated its outstanding record of success of preparing future leaders around the world. We should also consider funding non-GOB individuals to regional meetings on democracy-related issues and support more regional speakers to visit Burma for appropriate programs we could arrange here. --Independent Information. The vast majority of Burmese citizens, including government and military officials, obtain the only available accurate information about domestic developments and world news via the independent short-wave radio broadcasts of Radio Free Asia (RFA),the VOA, the BBC, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB). The distribution of radios inside the country would enhance broader access to reliable information. We should also work with these four Burmese-language radio services to broaden their democracy and capacity-building programming and support efforts to boost their signal strength. --Burma Congressional Earmark: Tens of millions of dollars in ESF and HA funds have been spent on Burmese refugees and exiles in Thailand, a tiny percentage of the 50 million people living inside Burma, and unlikey to return to Burma anytime soon. We welcome the opportunity to use the $100,000 identified for this Embassy to use in promoting democracy this fiscal year. We are in the process of identifying independent homegrown NGOs working in Burma, so that we can show what can be done from within to promote the establishment of democracy and provide civil society opportunities to develop the skills that a democratic Burma will require. ¶9. (C) Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy: Annual UNGA and UNCHR resolutions on Burma demonstrate the international consensus on the need for change. The current efforts to engage the UN Security Council on Burma have struck a nerve in the military leadership. They have launched vituperative attacks on the "outside forces" attempting to discredit the regime (amusingly, printing the criticisms that they then try to rebut). The democratic opposition, ethnic groups, student leaders have all publicly endorsed the effort further enfuriating the regime. We should continue to support efforts such as this to keep Burma on the international agenda, which serves to remind the military of their illegitimacy. ¶10. (C) At the same time, we must launch an international effort to forestall a sham referendum enshrining a constitution tailored to order by the military (see para 4 above). The regime has announced plans to conclude the drafting by the National Convention later this year; they would then stage a referendum to ratify it. With all opposition completely excluded from deliberations, debate prohibited, and nothing in writing, this hardly portends a free, fair and open decision by the Burmese people. Yet many diplomats in Rangoon consider that it would be "good enough" to gain the release of ASSK and future amendments could then correct the flaws. We need to work with our European, Australian, and Japanese partners to convince the Chinese and ASEAN nations in particular that a flawed constitution at this stage is "not good enough." The Chinese and ASEANs have disagreed with many elements of our Burma policy, but they should not be under any illusion that the international community as a whole will recognize a sham. They themselves recognize the many failures of the regime and their limited influence on the regime despite their willingness to "engage." Since stability seems to be a major concern to them, remind them that any process that excludes a major portion of the population will only ensure that conflicts will continue and the economy will further deteriorate--thus fueling instability. They should be telling the military, at a minimum, that they only way to conclude this process is by bringing in all the political players in advance to have an open debate--maybe this could start the national reconciliation so overdue in Burma. ¶11. (C) Humanitarian Assistance: Finally we wish to flag an issue that merits Washington attention because it has an impact on our bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Based on our conversations with Europeans, Australian and Japanese diplomats here, other donors have begun searching for other ways that they can influence developments in Burma. They have seized on Burma's serious humanitarian needs. They recognize that the regime itself is largely responsible for causing, or at least failing to address, a host of crises. They also see a role for the international community to alleviate the suffering of innocent people. The military protects only itself, not the people. No one wants to provide support that would in any way bolster the regime or relieve the generals of their responsibility to undertake fundamental reform. Nonetheless, credible international NGOs make a compelling case that foreign assistance can not only address humanitarian needs, but it can be delivered independent of the government and in ways that also build civil society and encourage grassroots democracy. Despite our demonstrated track record of generous humanitarian assistance around the world, many donors quietly point to us as the obstacles in addressing humanitarian needs in Burma. We should be willing to discuss with other donors their ideas about how to move forward in Burma to advance our own ideas, including exploring methods to broaden our humanitarian assistance in creative ways to take advantage of this "democracy building" space. Flexibility, Creativity, and Persistence -------------- ¶12. (C) The regime will strongly resist overt efforts to support the democratic opposition and those who seek an end to military rule. The regime will equally resist efforts to influence directly its own government and military ranks to adapt or be more receptive to democratic practices. Thus we have proposed a low-key approach that tries to expand the boundaries in which can operate and open up space for the Burmese people. We do not doubt that the military knows what we are doing in our American Centers, yet they do not interfere. Let's take advantage of that and probe where we can do more. This will mean that we should not publicize our specific intentions. That does not mean that we should not speak out critically about this regime. Those words of criticism for the abuses and the need for more freedom coming from the President and Secretary are heard widely by the Burmese people through radio broadcasts and welcomed as moral support that they are not alone in their struggle. ¶13. (C) We must pursue our democracy objectives in Burma with flexibility and creativity. While we can be bold and firm in our bilateral relationship with the regime, our democracy programming should not provoke the generals in a way that would jeopardize the very people we are supporting or result in further restrictions that close entirely the small space in which we currently operate. We need to operate in partnership with UN agencies and NGOs and through our existing American Center and traditional public diplomacy mechanisms. Expansion of our efforts may also require "stealth" democracy programs which are carried out through business development, humanitarian assistance, conservation, and other projects that do not draw undesirable attention from the authorities. ¶14. (C) The United States provides a voice and a source of hope to the vast majority of the Burmese population who oppose authoritarian rule and are inspired by core U.S. values of good governance and respect for the rule of law. They gain strength from the presence of our mission and from U.S. policies. While tangible progress in achieving our democracy objectives in Burma will be very difficult, we must persist. Villarosa