RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SEES A DIFFERENT BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001129 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR SEES A DIFFERENT BURMA Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: the Charge,s initial courtesy call on Russian Ambassador Oleg Kabanov on September 27 revealed that U.S. policy and Russian policy toward Burma remain poles apart. Amb. Kabanov echoed the Burmese regime,s assertions that only the military can maintain order in the country and that democracy can only lead to chaos and collapse &in such a backward country.8 ¶2. (C) The Charge d,Affaires called on Amb. Kabanov on September 27 at his residence within the Russian Embassy compound, a Stalinist-style bunker next to the Foreign Ministry in downtown Rangoon. The Russian mission,s views of Burmese politics seem stuck in the same Stalinist frame. Kabanov began by asking about the pending referral of the situation in Burma to the UNSC, calling that a &serious move that could lead to new sanctions.8 The Charge explained that Nobel laureates Havel and Tutu had helped raise the issue to recent prominence. Many people agreed that a discussion of how the UN could play a more constructive role to promote dialogue in Burma would be useful in light of the fact that the current situation in the country is unstable and adversely affects its neighbors. ¶3. (C) Kabanov agreed that past international efforts to get the Burmese regime to engage in dialogue had been unsuccessful, but urged that we reconsider our position on the GOB,s own seven-step Road Map and constitutional convention. The Charge noted that any lasting solution has to include all the people and ethnic groups of Burma, and to date the GOB,s process was exclusionary and scripted, not representative and open. ¶4. (C) The Russian Ambassador said that, in his view, the choice in Burma was not between perfect and imperfect but between &any8 and &none.8 He said the constitutional convention was the only remaining chance for political reform in Burma. The process had taken longer than expected, he surmised, because the GOB sought to extract additional concessions from the ceasefire groups (CFGs),with limited success since the ouster of Khin Nyunt. The portions of the constitution he had seen leaked, Kabanov said, called for a more independent judiciary, the disbanding of all ethnic armies and a single Armed Forces of Burma. The hardest thing would be persuading the CFGs to give up their arms and financial privileges, he added. The Charge responded that secret negotiations hardly create a transparent SIPDIS constitutional process that reflects all views, so the ethnic groups resist giving up their weapons under such circumstances. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Kabanov expressed the view that the regime generals were not trying to fool the world with their Road Map, but only need more time to negotiate internally. He conceded that they will not willingly give up any of their own economic interests. He said the GOB would not release Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and negotiate with the NLD because they &cannot fight on two fronts, and the ethnic groups are more formidable and a greater threat since they have arms.8 The Charg responded that the continued imprisonment of ASSK and over one thousand others indicates that the military fears ideas more than guns. ¶6. (C) Kabanov expressed confidence that when the constitutional draft is released, it would provide an opportunity for public engagement on reform. The Charge asked whether he thought the GOB would ever be willing to permit a real public debate on the constitution and allow a free flow of information to facilitate informed choice. He said that a public discussion of the constitution would open up new opportunities for opposition groups to return to the political process. He conceded Aung San Suu Kyi would easily win if an election were held in Burma at this time and surmised the regime would seek to prevent such a result in a future vote. The Charge said that, in such a case, the election would have no credibility and achieve nothing. ¶7. (C) Growing more exercised, the Russian Ambassador complained that Western countries are &too impatient now.8 He noted that it took centuries for democracy to develop in Europe and that it could take a very long time here, too. He added that in 1988, the military had &been forced8 to restore order in Burma when &chaos erupted from public demonstrations8 after the ouster of Ne Win. The Charge disputed Kabanov,s allegations and termed the military,s murder of hundreds of unarmed people engaged in peaceful protest as completely unjustified. Kabanov claimed that he had learned from a former Russian diplomat here that there were &hooligans8 among the demonstrators and that street crime was widespread in August 1988. The Charge reiterated that the victims were unarmed and protesting peacefully; it was the military that was out of line. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: the Russians, primary objective in Burma is intelligence gathering and arms sales. Russia might agree at higher levels to not block UN discussion of Burma, but the Russian Ambassador in Rangoon clearly follows the regime line. Kabanov seemed nostalgic for the era when his country was also an autocracy; he told the Charge that he keeps the 55-volume set of Lenin,s collected works in his office, noting that it took years in exile for the Bolsheviks to plan and organize &reform8 of the Russian political system. He dismissed NLD as having no plan, instead seemingly content to wait for change on the military,s terms. End comment. Villarosa