AUSTRALIA SEES GRIM BURMA GETTING GRIMMER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001054 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM AU SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA SEES GRIM BURMA GETTING GRIMMER REF: A. RANGOON 1053 ¶B. RANGOON 989 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. RANGOON 332 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: CDA SHARI VILLAROSA FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Australian Ambassador Bob Davis painted a bleak picture of life in Burma today during Charge's initial call on him on September 13. His outlook matched the pessimistic perspectives of Malaysia's and Brunei's Ambassadors on September 12 (ref A). Davis said that Burma in 2005 is proving to be a bad place for foreigners to do business, and an Orwellian nightmare growing even worse for ordinary citizens. Even those well connected to the regime are being watched more closely, and all must get advance approval from Senior General Than Shwe for overseas travel or meetings with foreign diplomats. The rivalry between regime leaders over succession and their cuts of business continues to drive internal politics. End summary. PARANOIA RUNS DEEP -------------- ¶2. (C) The October 2004 ouster of Khin Nyunt left the isolationists in charge of Burmese policy, Ambassador Davis told the Charge. Even traditional friends of the Burmese regime find it difficult to gain access to decision-makers now. The MFA now asks for 3-4 weeks advance notice of in-country travel and meetings with other Ministries and reviews each request before forwarding it to Cabinet or a sub-Cabinet group for final decision (or, often, no decision and no response). ¶3. (C) Any Burmese government worker, even at lower levels, who wishes to travel abroad must receive the personal approval of Than Shwe. This has a chilling effect on training and scholarships, since few Burmese want their personnel folder to be reviewed by the Senior General, who may question why the nominee is held in high regard by foreign missions. Likewise, any Burmese organization that meets with a foreign diplomat in country without advance permission risks being suspected of subversive aims, even if the meeting was totally innocent. THE POWER STRUGGLE -------------- ¶4. (C) The SPDC remains obsessed with the Khin Nyunt case, Amb. Davis said. Some of the 5,000 former MI staff and Khin Nyunt associates the regime whom sought to arrest have gone underground or escaped to neighboring countries, and many of the regime's intelligence files disappeared last October. The SPDC is now trying to replace the files by calling in people who were arrested or questioned in the past and asking them to relate their life stories and all their contacts to new case officers. The suspended sentence/house arrest that Khin Nyunt and others received is not a sign of judicial independence or a possible Khin Nyunt comeback, Amb. Davis believes, but a new regime strategy whereby those under house arrest can "buy" better conditions for themselves and their family members. ¶5. (C) The rivalry between Than Shwe and Maung Aye continues, Amb. Davis said, although he noted that the supposed "coup" last month (Ref B) gained notice more from filial ties than from facts. According to the Ambassador, a Bangkok-based Burmese exile reporter tried to sell the story of a leadership crisis to international wire services there and, when they refused to run it, gave it to his brother-in-law, the BBC World Service announcer who went public with the story. The concurrent movement of senior officials when Maung Aye's daughter gave birth prematurely in a Rangoon military hospital and the father of Than Shwe's son-in-law was medevaced to Singapore then fueled the rumors. ¶6. (C) Amb. Davis said that Maung Aye clearly expects to move to the Senior General role once Than Shwe,s health or grasp on power weakens further, while Than Shwe does not seem comfortable with this prospect and has allowed other loyalists to rise to increased prominence in recent months, most notably Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Thura Shwe Mann, Prime Minister Soe Win (quietly promoted to Major General recently) and Secretary-1 Gen. Thein Sein. THE CONNECTED GET RICHER -------------- ¶7. (C) Judging from the number of Mercedes, Ferraris and SUVs in the elite parts of Rangoon, the generals and businesspeople with the right connections continue to enjoy the good life while the rest of the country regresses. Davis agreed with the Charge that there seem to be more wealthy Burmese businesspeople today than was true five years ago, but the gap between ordinary citizens of Burma and the elite grows wider every day. ¶8. (C) The regime likes public works projects, Amb. Davis said, because cronies get the contracts (such as the two crony construction companies building the new "capital" at Pyinmana) and the projects get them into the papers. One Cabinet Minister candidly told Amb. Davis that the GOB continues to build power plants, rather than repair the sorry state of the existing transmission lines, because it is better to have photo ops at new generating stations than standing next to new power lines. ¶9. (C) Australia believes that about 80 percent of foreign trade and financial transactions involving Burma are not recorded. A Burmese commercial lawyer told Amb. Davis that he understands little about the import/export business but makes $10,000 monthly (with a cut to his military patrons) by selling duty-free licenses to local supermarkets and hotels to bring in foreign goods. Amb. Davis said that most foreign-based investors, especially Singaporeans, had been badly burned in Burma in recent years and would gladly sell their remaining investments if they could find buyers (NOTE: in contrast to the Singaporean Ambassador's assertions in Ref A). WHILE EVERYONE ELSE GETS WORSER -------------- ¶10. (C) The people of Burma tolerate their deteriorating living conditions, Ambassador Davis said, not because of Buddhist tolerance or stoicism, but simply from fear. One may not see as many armed soldiers at street corners as in other repressive countries, but every citizen can feel the regime,s power every day. The massacre of 1988 and attack on Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003, as well as the GOB's frequent use of indefinite detention, are potent reminders. In most trials, the accused do not have access to their lawyers and, when they are, the lawyers are often not allowed to speak or take notes at the trial. In some cases (ref D),"lawyers" from Special Branch or military intelligence are appointed instead of lawyers chosen by the accused,s family. Many arrested never even get a trial: some have been held in jail without charges for over 15 years. ¶11. (C) Amb. Davis urged that international humanitarian aid to Burma be allowed to freely enter, especially in the public health, nutrition and education sectors. The people hit hardest by cancellation of overseas aid efforts are in the ethnic regions furthest from the center, Davis said. Ethnic issues still color much of Burmese politics, and the military's tendency to shoot first and negotiate later has grown even stronger since Khin Nyunt fell. More than ever, one must be an ethnic Burman and a Buddhist to have any access. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Davis came across as a very well informed and insightful observer of Burma. Charge cited the close collaboration at all levels of our embassies in other posts and pledge to encourage that here (it is already ongoing). We should have very productive relations. End comment. Villarosa