Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05RABAT1721
2005-08-16 18:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

WESTERN SAHARA CBMS: MORE BACK AND FORTH

Tags:  MO PBTS PHUM PREL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001721 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND PRM; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA CBMS: MORE BACK AND FORTH

REF: A. RABAT 1645 AND PREVIOUS

B. 7/27 CASSIDY-LENDERKING EMAIL

Classified By: Pol/C Tim Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001721 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND PRM; GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009 TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA CBMS: MORE BACK AND FORTH REF: A. RABAT 1645 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. 7/27 CASSIDY-LENDERKING EMAIL Classified By: Pol/C Tim Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA Director of Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Loulichki (tapped to be Morocco's next Ambassador in Geneva) briefed Polcouns August 15 on the substance of the GOM's proposed reply to UNHCR concerning the confidence-building measures (in particular the family visit program) for the Western Sahara. Loulichki said Morocco saw three remaining areas where procedures still needed to be ironed out: ensuring that passengers registered to take the family-visit flight were the actual ones to travel (ie, minimizing manipulation of the participants by the Polisario, a recurring GOM gripe); extending duration of stays in the event of medical or humanitarian emergency; and calling on the GOA to take responsibility for travel and security for those participants going to the Tindouf side. When Polcouns remonstrated that the UNHCR had already addressed at least two of these issues in its July letter (Ref B),Loulichki asked the US to understand that Morocco had reduced its earlier concerns to just three, these remaining concerns needed to addressed for the resumption of the program, and protested in turn that UNHCR was treating Morocco's concerns inappropriately by not consulting with the parties; this, he felt, was UNHCR's role. He saw no reason why UNHCR could not address these issues and respond to Morocco "in a week's time." The ball hereby bounces back to Geneva. End Summary. ¶2. (C) MFA Director of Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Loulichki briefed Polcouns August 15, at the former's initiative, on the content of the GOM's draft letter to the UNHCR on confidence-building measures (primarily the family exchange visits) for the Western Sahara. Loulichki explained that, following the Ambassador's meeting with Deputy FM Fassi Fihri and his own conversation with the DCM on August 4 (Ref A),he was getting back to us as promised on how the GOM planned to respond to UNHCR about the resumption of the CBM program. ¶3. (C) Loulichki said UNHCR's July letter (Ref B) to the GOM had commented on most of the GOM concerns raised in earlier discussions. Nevertheless, three issues still needed to be dealt with before Morocco would agree to resume the program: �
A; -- individuals that either side presents to UNHCR as passengers for the cross-berm flights should in fact be the ones who make the flight. There should be no more "last-minute" changes by the Polisario (with the excuses that "so and so couldn't make the flight, so and so lives too far away and could not be located, and so on," Loulichki explained). -- individuals who wish to remain on either side of the berm for a few extra days (not permanently, he stressed) for compelling humanitarian reasons, such as the imminent death of a relative or medical reasons of their own, should be allowed to do so. The individual should provide a medical certificate verifying the illness, and UNHCR or MINURSO can corroborate it. -- the Algerians should oversee security for the family-visit participants when they arrive from the Moroccan side. Tindouf is part of Algeria, not an autonomous region, and the Algerians should take the lead in ensuring that the visitors can travel in safety and security, similar to what the Moroccans provide, Loulichki said. ¶4. (C) Loulichki emphasized that the GOM remained committed to the program and hoped that the US did not view Morocco as simply throwing out roadblocks to stall. In fact, Loulichki asked Polcouns to recall, Morocco had other concerns as well, but was either putting them aside or had found that UNHCR had adequately addressed them already. UNHCR Must Consult with the Parties -------------- ¶5. (C) Loulichki stressed that UNHCR must take these issues directly to "the parties." Morocco was perplexed that UNHCR had not done this previously. It was not UNHCR's role to make decisions like this on its own. It should be done in consultation with the other players. Morocco expected a good-faith effort to discuss these issues with the parties and reply to Morocco in a timely fashion. ¶6. (C) Polcouns said the US was concerned as a donor to this program that Morocco and the UN were still going around and around on the modalities when in our view what had been implemented before had actually worked pretty well as a measure to promote confidence between the parties. Moreover, UNHCR's July letter already addressed two of the three concerns Loulichki had highlighted, ie, extending stays on an exceptional basis and providing security on the Algerian side. UNHCR had already said that the current wording in the Action Plan sufficed to deal with these situations. Could Morocco perhaps work these issues informally while agreeing to the formal resumption of the program? Polcouns said going back to UNHCR again would obviously delay the program further. It was now the middle of August, and the CBM program had been grounded for almost a year. ¶7. (C) Loulichki insisted these three remaining issues were important to Morocco, and essential to restarting the program. There was no reason for UNHCR to delay in sharing these issues with "the parties" and getting back to Morocco "within a week." Polcouns said Loulichki knew that was unlikely. ¶8. (C) In contrast to what Fassi Fihri told the Ambassador in Ref A, Loulichki said the letter would go out under his signature, not that of FM Benaissa, as the incoming letter from UNHCR had not been signed at the level of minister. Loulichki to Geneva -------------- ¶9. (C) Loulichki added that he had been tapped to be Morocco's new Ambassador to Geneva. He would be dispatched "as soon as the King calls me." Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The GOM is determined to have things its way on the CBMs, and at some point we will have to decide whether we want to stay in the game as a donor. For the time being, we should, since the family exchanges have been useful, and while the negotiations over the resumption of the program have been tedious, we have made some progress in narrowing the gap. Let us urge UNHCR to move expeditiously with its response to the GOM and not pull the funding at this time. RILEY

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