Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO894
2005-04-22 20:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

ECUADOR: INITIAL CONTACTS WITH NEW GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000894 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: INITIAL CONTACTS WITH NEW GOVERNMENT

Classified By: Amb. Kristie A. Kenney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000894

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: INITIAL CONTACTS WITH NEW GOVERNMENT

Classified By: Amb. Kristie A. Kenney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Initial contacts indicate that the Palacio
government is greatly concerned about possible OAS actions
and seeks USG recognition, and would welcome a visit by an
OAS delegation. They are also intimidated by the very forces
of popular discontent that brought them into office, and
therefore leery of granting safe passage for former president
Gutierrez to depart the country. DCM attended the FM Parra's
briefing of diplomats from OAS nations on April 21. PolChief
met separately with Minister of Government Gandara and
Presidential Secretary for Administration Herreria on April

21. End Summary.

Foreign Minister Defends Legitimacy
--------------


2. (C) The MFA convoked OAS-member state representatives to
an April 21 briefing with Palacio's Foreign Minister, Antonio
Parra. OAS member states in attendance included Canada,
Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru,
Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, DR, Panama and the US.
The OAS rep in Quito, former Paraguayan Senator Carlos Maria
Ocampo, also attended. Notably absent from the gathering was
the Brazilian Ambassador (who has ex-President Gutierrez
staying at his residence). Parra greeted everyone warmly,
especially the Venezuelan whom he regaled with stories about
his father's and his tours as Ambassadors in Caracas years
ago.


3. (C) Parra explained his purpose was to offer the official
GOE explanation of the confused political situation. He
claimed Gutierrez set destabilizing events in motion on
December 8, 2004, when he blatantly violated the constitution
by firing the Supreme Court. He alleged that Gutierrez
continued to violate the Constitution with other unspecified
acts, culminating in his lawful removal from office after a
justified popular uprising. He offered that several
countries appeared confused by the Ecuadorian congressional
ruling that Gutierrez had "abandoned" his office, and
expressed frustration that some countries were concerned
about the constitutionality of succession mechanism. Parra
said he was concerned that friendly nations of the hemisphere
had not expressed support for Ecuador, which wanted friendly,

productive relations. He said he had spoken with several
Foreign Ministers, singling out the Peruvian FM, to clarify
the facts.


4. (C) Parra made repeated references to Bolivia in
defending GOE actions, implying that Bolivia was the
precedent for recent action in Ecuador. He rhetorically asked
how friendly countries could doubt Ecuador's commitment to
democracy; surely it was all a misunderstanding. Gutierrez's
"abandonment" of office need not be literal (physically still
in office when Congress voted him out). Gutierrez had most
certainly abandoned democracy, the constitution and his
responsibility to uphold law and order. Ecuadorian
authorities could not let the capital city explode while
standing by doing nothing.


5. (C) Parra said that a distinguished group of jurists from
Ecuador would make Ecuador's case on April 22 before the OAS
Permanent Council. They are: constitutional expert Gil
Barragan Romero; former FMs Edgar Teran and Mario Aleman; and
former Vice President Blasco Penaherrera. (Comment: The
latter three are well known lawyers who are very slick and
talk a pro-American game. However, their actions are often
at odds with their professed American sympathies. They come
from the established political classes, viewed Gutierrez as
an upstart, and refused even to talk to him from the outset
of his mandate.)


6. (C) OAS Rep. Ocampo was the only member of the invited
group to offer his views. He requested of Parra an official
written communique clarifying with "precision" Ecuador's
actions for tomorrow's OAS meeting. He noted there were many
questions remaining about constitutionality of congressional
action to unseat Gutierrez. Parra said the press had
misrepresented the facts, confusing everyone, and undertook
to get Ocampo an official position paper tomorrow. The
meeting adjourned after 30 minutes.

Minister of Government Concerned about Stability
-------------- ---


7. (C) PolChief met with Minister of Government Mauricio
Gandara on April 21. The USG has not come to a decision on
recognition, he told Gandara, but would like to open a
dialogue with key GOE officials. We have enjoyed good
cooperation with Gandara's predecessors on security issues of
mutual interest, and would hope to engage on those issues
once the situation stabilized.


8. (C) Gandara welcomed the contact, and expressed concern
about Secretary Rice's reported statement encouraging early
elections in Ecuador and possible OAS actions against
Ecuador. PolChief clarified that Secretary Rice did not
directly call for early elections and encouraged Gandara to
review the text of her comments. The OAS is naturally
concerned about the instability in a member country; would
Ecuador be open to a high-level OAS visit, should it be
offered? Gandara replied adamantly "of course we would."


9. (C) The irregular transfer of power from President
Gutierrez to Palacio "had its legal aspects," Gandara said,
but the political reality facing Ecuador was that there is no
going back to Gutierrez. He had attended the rebel Congress
session which swore in Palacio, and been sequestered with
Palacio and the Congress by the enraged crowd outside.
Formerly peaceful protests had been infiltrated by extreme
leftist elements, he said, which physically threatened him
and even the new president. Should Gutierrez somehow be
allowed to return to the political scene, these protesters
would react violently. For this reason, international
recognition is essential to the legitimacy of the Palacio
government.


10. (C) Asked about his near-term agenda, Gandara said he
would meet with the leader of the main indigenous
organization (CONAIE),Luis Macas, next to seek their
support. With the support of the congressional factions
which dismissed Gutierrez, the government would prepare a
bill to introduce to Congress on April 26 to name a Supreme
Court, and overturn the illegitimate Constitutional and
Electoral tribunals. Gandara expressed confidence that by
then, the uncertain situation would be substantially calmer.


11. (C) Belying his reputation as a fierce nationalist and
critic of the U.S. on certain issues, Gandara spoke in
general, conciliatory terms, saying "we agree with the U.S.
on our goals, but sometimes differ on methods only." Gandara
went on to emphasize that he had warm feelings for the people
of the U.S. and respect for the U.S. political system. He
cited as an example how impressed he was, when invited by the
Ambassador to meet visiting U/S Bolton at her residence last
year, that the U.S. would want to hear from its critics as
well as its friends on divisive issues.

Pres Admin Sec Cites Mutual Interests
--------------


12. (C) On April 22, PolChief met with Administrative
Secretary General Luis Alberto Herreria, who also made a

SIPDIS
pitch for OAS and USG recognition. Asked whether the GOE
would provide safe conduct for President Gutierrez, Herreria
denounced Gutierrez' links to Venezuelan President Chavez,
through Col. Patricio Acosta (who was fired by Gutierrez).
The new government rejects the Chavez-Castro-Lula axis, he
said, and would firmly oppose any further Chavez inroads in
Ecuador. The Brazilian offer of asylum for Gutierrez
presented the new government with a quandry--should the
government provide safe conduct, Herreria said with alarm,
"they (the protesters who brought Gutierrez down) would burn
down this national palace the same day." To emphasize how
reluctant the government is to confront protesters of any
sort, Herreria credited the new government with allowing a
protest outside the palace on April 21, even when military
intelligence sources indicated that the small group (of
approximately 50) had been organized by Gilmar Gutierrez, the
brother of the former president.


13. (C) PolChief noted that safe conduct is a provision of
international law and the GOE might consider the signals it
was sending at this sensitive time. Similarly, on the
economic front, it would be wise to carefully consider the
messages being sent to the business community. One example
affected a key USG interest--resolution of commercial
disputes. Any expropriation of U.S. firms such as
Occidential Petroleum would seriously damage our economic
relationship. Herreria said he was concerned by rash public
statements by new Finance Minister Correa and implied that he
would raise his concerns in the Cabinet meeting scheduled the
same day. Herreria also mentioned his own connections to the
U.S.--a warm relationship with a former Guayaquil CG, a
month-long IV program visit to the U.S. in the 1980's, and
deep respect for the U.S. political system.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Though the atmospherics of these initial contacts
has been warm and friendly, the Palacio government is clearly
concerned about its own survival. The GOE intensely craves
international community affirmation of this government's
legitimacy, and is intimidated by the popular forces which
brought them into office. Gandara, a fierce nationalist
critic of the U.S. on a host of issues (boat sinkings, the
Manta CSL, Occidential Petroleum dispute) was at his warmest,
citing the Ambassador's natural charm and his warm feelings
for the U.S. at length. Herreria emphasized his own links to
the USA, through contact with CG Guayaquil and participation
on a US-funded IV program in the '80s, and strenuously
invoked the spectre of Chavez to sway us toward recognition.

KENNEY