CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING REF: A. SECSTATE 43965 ¶B. QUITO 680 ¶C. QUITO 589 C... id: 30154 date: 4/5/2005 19:14 refid: 05QUITO748 origin: Embassy Quito classification: SECRET//NOFORN destination: 05SECSTATE43965 header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. -------------- header ends -------------- S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000748 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EC VE ASEX SUBJECT: CHAVEZ INFLUENCE SLIGHT, BUT GROWING REF: A. SECSTATE 43965 ¶B. QUITO 680 ¶C. QUITO 589 Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Separated by only a thousand miles and led by ex-colonels from similar backgrounds, Ecuador and Venezuela nonetheless aren't closest of friends. Commercial, cultural, and people-to-people ties are slight, compared to those of other near-neighboring countries. There is genuine dislike between Presidents Gutierrez and Chavez, due mainly to the latter's Machiavellian manipulation of the personal relationship; the GoE leader thus shies away from most joint appearances and recently assured us he had no intention of visiting Caracas soon. Ecuadorian media regularly lambaste Hugo's efforts to silence and/or co-opt Venezuela's fourth estate. ¶2. (S) Chavez is not without allies here, however. Ecuador's indigenous and traditional left are both numerous and potent; despite no personal affinity for the Bolivarian despot, they delight in his anti-imperialist, gringo-bashing message. The GoV embassy is ably led and is utilizing Cuba's long-established Ecuador inroads to further Chavez interests. Evidence seems to tie the Venezuelans to a spate of violence against the Gutierrez opposition, its aim to foment an even more violent response. Finally, Ecuador's political cannibalism and general (and worsening) instability plays right into Chavez's hands. END SUMMARY. -------------- Unlike his Havana Idol, No National Hero... -------------- ¶3. (U) Ecuador and Venezuela would appear natural allies. Only southeastern Colombia separates them physically. History ties them together, as both formed part of Gran Colombia, the short-lived megastate arising upon independence from Spain in the early 1800s. Each produces petroleum, although Venezuela's reserves dwarf Ecuador's. And both feature ruling classes dominated by European-origin citizens, mestizo and mulatto masses, and marginalized indigenous and Afro-origen underclasses. ¶4. (U) Yet despite such similarities, country links are few. Limited expat communities exist in each, for example. Few direct flights connect Quito and Caracas. While former Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) employees in 2004 provided advice to PetroEcuador executives on increasing production and profits in state-owned fields, they were in fact "ex-"perts earlier purged from the Venezuelan parastatal, and the initiative soon stalled. Trade between the two nations is relatively small and tilts favorably to Venezuela. And cultural and academic contacts are limited. ¶5. (SBU) Hugo Chavez and Lucio Gutierrez were decorated soldiers later imprisoned for coup leadership. Both rededicated themselves to acquiring their respective presidencies constitutionally, and both achieved success. Yet they are far from friendly. Perhaps cognizant that a chummy relationship would alarm Washington, Gutierrez has attempted to keep his Caracas counterpart at arm's length. Chavez attended Gutierrez's January 2003 inauguration, for example, but was deprived of a useful photo-op. Eighteen months later, when Quito hosted the OAS General Assembly, the Venezuelan embarrassed his host by leading large, "fuera Lucio" rallies not far from the assembly site. Relations have since chilled further, thanks to Chavez's shenanigans surrounding their now-aborted Caracas summit (Ref B). ¶6. (U) Nor do media here cut Chavez much slack. While reporting his antics and anti-American diatribe factually, the Venezuelan colonel rarely receives positive front or editorial page coverage. Both print and broadcast outlets damn his efforts to emasculate Venezuelan media. And when Gutierrez takes turns they consider dictatorial, commentators often tar him as "Chavez-lite." -------------- But Not Lying Down, Either -------------- ¶7. (C) Regardless, Chavez considers Ecuador a fertile export market for his Bolivarian revolution. He is encouraged by genuine Ecuadorian admiration for Fidel Castro and the goodwill the Cuban regime's doctors, teachers, and coaches have earned, especially amidst highlands indigenous communities. It's no secret Chavez bankrolls Uncle Fidel's activities hemisphere-wide. Yet there are indications the Venezuelan wants more than silent partner status in Ecuador. ¶8. (S) Venezuelan destabilization-related activities have spiked in Ecuador since September 2004. Perhaps an indication that Chavez has prioritized Ecuador, Oscar Navas, the GoV's ambassador in Quito, is a former Venezuelan Army colonel and Hugo confidant. Embassy sources report increased contacts between GoV, Cuban, FARC, homegrown terrorist, and far-left political groups, a dangerous mosaic. While not yet a coherent whole, the nascent subversion campaign bears watching. -------------- A Two-Front Order of Battle -------------- ¶9. (S) Broadly, GoV efforts take two forms: bolstering far-left, anti-U.S. political forces, and developing terrorists' capabilities in Ecuador. Regarding the former, sources state that Venezuelan money and logistics back much of the anti-Free Trade Agreement opposition in Ecuador. A key actor in the GoV effort is Venezuelan DCM Gustavo Bastardo. Bastardo works closely with many Ecuadorian leftist groups in recruiting converts to the Bolivarian cause. ¶10. (S) The last twelve months have witnessed a low-level wave of political violence in Quito, impacting mainly Gutierrez's opposition but affecting government and allies' officials as well. Unknown assailants fired shots at the homes and businesses of outspoken administration critics. Gunmen opened fire on a Congressional deputy as he drove home from work. And ski-masked thugs at Quito's Central University (UCE) roughed-up former VP and current Gutierrez opponent Leon Roldos. Ecuadorian police have made little headway investigating the seemingly unrelated crimes (Ref C). However, reliable Embassy contacts claim UCE radicals are behind the violence campaign; our sources are but one piece of evidence short of linking it to GoV henchmen (the Chavez goal being to foment instability by provoking a drastic reaction from the Ecuadorian opposition). ¶11. (S) Even more ominous, the Embassy believes that GoV money has financed guerrilla training in Venezuela for Ecuadorian radicals. Prior Quito reporting has detailed former Administration official (and Gutierrez brother-in-law) Napoleon Villa's efforts to establish Bolivarian Circle-like groups in Ecuador (Villa has mostly faded from the political scene, thankfully). Another former Gutierrez insider, disgraced and disgruntled ex-Minister Patricio Acosta, publicly has admitted to attending FARC meetings, with Gutierrez, prior to the 2002 presidential campaign. Acosta is a regular traveler to Caracas. -------------- Tasking Specifics -------------- ¶12. (C) GoE visa/immigration requirements for Venezuelan passport holders: Venezuelans neither receive special migration benefits nor face additional requirements. For entry into Ecuador, for example, they need only to present a passport (with at least six months' validity) and a return ticket. -- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned bilateral border security agreements between the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. -- The Embassy is unaware of any pre-existing or planned bilateral information/intelligence sharing agreements between the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. -- Mil-Mil cooperation between GoV and GoE forces is scant. At the highest levels -- the joint commander and service chiefs, for example -- Ecuadorians view ominously the overt politicization of the Venezuelan military, believing it grossly unprofessional and potentially destabilizing to the region. Venezuelan attaches serve here, but they are not particularly active or high-profile. There have been no recent bilateral military exercises between the militaries, and we are unaware of any planned bump-up in GoV military assistance. ¶13. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Caracas. KENNEY =======================CABLE ENDS============================