ECUADOR: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 QUITO 002866 SIPDIS S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS MARR CASC ASEC EC SUBJECT: ECUADOR: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM REF: SECSTATE 193439 ¶1. Embassy Quito's contribution to the 2005 Country Report on Terrorism report follows, keyed to questions in Reftel (paras 7-10). Embassy POC is PolOff Jarahn Hillsman, 593-2-256-2890 ext 4471, unclass email Hillsmanjd@state.gov, classified email Hillsmanjd@state.sgov.gov, fax 593-2-254-0712. ¶2. (SBU) General Assessment: Overview: The GOE does not provide financial support, training, or sanctuary to international terrorist groups. Ecuador's primary contribution to the Global War on Terrorism continues to be its campaign to prevent the spread of narcoterrorism in Ecuador. The GOE,s historical neglect of the 400-mile northern border with Colombia, the lack of licit employment opportunities in the border area, and its proximity to rebel-held Colombian territory had made this zone ripe for narcoterrorist influence and recruitment. However, high-level GOE support for greater engagement in the north is evident in the GOE,s recent troop shifts to the border region, its sustained effort to combat FARC presence in Ecuador, military-to-military cooperation between Ecuador and Colombia, and its willingness to work with USAID and other donors to create licit economic opportunities along the northern border. Even more aggressive engagement will be needed to counter the narcoterrorist threat as Colombian government forces succeed in their efforts against the FARC and illegal armed groups. Military CT Efforts: Since the irregular change in government in April 2005, the GOE has increased its security posture along the northern border. The Ecuadorian military claims to have increased troop deployment from 8,000 (in 2004) to between 9,000 and 10,000. The Ministry of Defense has also increased patrolling and operations units along the border, and plans to mobilize new units in Imbabura province. Beginning January 2006, the MOD will initiate the Petroleum Infrastructure Security Force to protect oil refineries, pipelines, and white gas centers from terrorist attack, allowing northern border units to better focus their efforts in the region. An increase in the purchasing of U.S. military equipment for use along the northern border, and the Ecuadorian Army,s Special Operations Group,s increased counterterrorist activities have also been evident. There are positive indications that military-to-military communication between Ecuador and Colombia is improving at all levels. The GOE,s stepped-up patrol efforts along the northern border bore fruit in September when the Ecuadorian military discovered and destroyed a suspected FARC refuge camp in the province of Sucumbios. A drug processing plant was also discovered and destroyed by patrol units. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian military remains resource-challenged. USG assistance and effort continues to be vital to buttressing GOE forces and spurring them to conduct more frequent and wide-ranging patrols. However, Article 98 sanctions continue to restrict GOE access to a full range of USG funding resources. Law Enforcement CT Efforts: The GOE arrested and rendered to Colombia Senior FARC leaders in 2005. In September, for example, Marcial Compana, a key FARC financial facilitator, was captured by Ecuadorian authorities and promptly surrendered to Colombia. The GOE also cracked down on clandestine FARC combat injury clinics operating in Ecuador. In February, Ecuadorian police forces raided a clinic in Quito, capturing 16 individuals of Ecuadorian and Colombian nationality. A key FARC commander and four sympathizers were captured in July at a different clinic in Quito. In each instance, the GOE swiftly delivered the Colombians to the GOC. The GOE also advanced on the counter-narcotics front, seizing 34 metric tons of cocaine (a ten-fold increase over 2004), 270 kilograms of heroin, and 174 kilograms of cannabis (January-October 2005). Security forces located and destroyed over 36,000 cultivated coca plants in 2005, significantly more than found in 2004. GOE units also secured major white gas trafficking lines out of the Sucumbios Province, seizing over 116,000 liters during 2005. The staffing of the Counternarcotics Directorate (DNA) of the National Police was increased from 1305 to 1385 officers in ¶2005. The DNA, with USG financial assistance, also opened new bases and stations in the Esmeraldas and Imbabura provinces. USG-supported DNA infrastructure projects are in construction or design phases in the northern border provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios. U.S. Coast Guard officials conducted courtesy inspections of Ecuador's four international ports in February 2005 to determine if they met International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) requirements. The USCG found the GOE facilities to be on schedule for meeting international standards. Alien smuggling continues to be a serious problem in Ecuador, with Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) among the cargo. In response, the GOE operates a dedicated anti-smuggling police unit, COAC, funded in part by the USG. Cooperation is excellent, with COAC working with DHS officials to identify, investigate, and remove SIAs. The GOE has expressed high-level interest in expanding COAC,s reach, proposing to open special units in Guayaquil and Cuenca. The GOE is seeking national funds to support this effort, while also requesting USG support. Legislative CT Efforts: Congress passed a landmark anti-money laundering law in October, a major step against money laundering and terrorism financing. The new law criminalizes the laundering of illicit funds from any source and penalizes the undeclared entry of more than $10,000 in cash. The law calls for the creation of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) under the Superintendency of Banks. Implementing regulations are currently being developed by the GOE. The Embassy is working with the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and the GOE to support the creation of the FIU. Ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism remains pending before the Ecuadorian Congress. In August 2005, following the sinking of an overloaded migrant ship near the Galapagos and the subsequent drowning of an estimated 104 intending immigrants, the Ecuadorian Congress began debating whether to increase sentences for alien smugglers convicted of causing the death of migrants. A proposal that would increase penalties against smugglers and broaden the net to allow for the arrest of more accomplices, is currently stalled, pending redrafting. Judicial CT Efforts: There were no noteworthy counterterrorism actions by Ecuador's judicial system in ¶2005. Judicial institutions remain weak and corrupt. While military and police have made numerous arrests, prosecutions in general are impeded by the dysfunctional judicial system, which until recently lacked a functioning Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court has been vacant since November 2004. Financial CT Efforts: The GOE Superintendency of Banks has cooperated with the USG by instructing financial institutions to report transactions involving known terrorists, as designated by the United States or by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. However, no terrorist financial assets have been identified to date in Ecuador. Embassy Security: Between November 2004 and November 2005, over 30 anti-American demonstrations occurred in Quito, many near the Embassy compound. The Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) have cooperated fully in defending the mission, never hesitating to deploy additional units in response to perceived or real threats. Two pamphlet bombs were detonated in close proximity to the compound on November 16-)the Popular Combatants Group (GCP) is believed to be behind both incidents. During the same period, protesters spray painted anti-American propaganda on the outer wall of the Ambassador's residence. ¶3. (SBU) Sanctuary (Safe Haven) Assessment: The GOE does not provide sanctuary for any known terrorist group. That said, Ecuador's far north -- the provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi, and Sucumbios ) abuts Colombian departments Narino and Putumayo, narcoterrorist strongholds. While Ecuador's military has increased troop deployments to the frontier in recent years, the police presence, although increasing, remains scant, and municipal and provincial governments offer few services. Ecuadorian military leaders in border units believe the FARC and ELN hold sway in up to three-quarters of Ecuador's border hamlets, their narcodollars buying townspeople's silence or compliance. GOE police and military claim the FARC and possibly the ELN have significant numbers of Ecuadorians in their employ. These narcoterrorist organizations regularly use Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, and re-supply. The GOE closely tracks suspicious Middle Easterners and regularly shares information on SIAs with the USG. We have as yet seen no evidence that suggests Al-Qaida or other Islamic terrorist groups are currently operating or present in Ecuador. Owing to lax border controls, it is conceivable that Al-Qaida and others could target Ecuador for recruitment, fundraising, or even establishment of training facilities. The Islamic community in Ecuador numbers 3,500--three mosques exist nationwide. ¶4. (SBU) Information on Terrorist Groups: GOE Police suspect several Ecuadorian groups of domestic subversion and probable involvement in terrorism. Prime among the groups they follow is the "Popular Combatants Group," known by its Spanish acronym "GCP." The GCP is reportedly an armed faction of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador. Its members, mainly students, are trained in the use of firearms and the production and activation of low-yield pamphlet bombs. The GCP has taken responsibility for exploding these devices, as well as calling in false bomb threats, nationwide. Police claim its membership totals approximately 200. The GCP claimed responsibility for a small bomb that was detonated outside a Citibank branch office in Guayaquil in June. The GCP is believed to have detonated the two pamphlet bombs close to the Embassy and another at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Guayaquil in November. The Revolutionary Militias of The People (MRP) is another armed faction of the Ecuadorian Communist Party. In 2002 and 2003, the MRP claimed responsibility for exploding bombs at U.S.-associated businesses, such as a McDonalds restaurant in Guayaquil and an American Airlines office in Quito. Police estimate its strength at approximately 75 individuals, mainly university students. There is no recent activity to report. The Communist Party itself is a concern to police due to its ability to organize and promote unrest nationwide. It is said to have connections with Colombian narcoterrorist groups. The Alfarista Liberation Army (ELA) serves as an umbrella group for a number of small, violent leftist organizations which operate in Ecuador. It was created in 2001, and is a combination of former Carajo Group Free Montoneros Party ("Montoneros Patria Libre"),and Red Sun ("Sol Rojo") members. Over the last twenty years, ELA membership has grown to over 200 members, mostly comprised of young rural revolutionaries and clerics from Pichincha, Imbabura, and Esmeraldas. The group is reported to have connections to the FARC and ELN in Colombia, and with armed groups in Venezuela, from whom they receive training in arms, revolutionary intelligence and counterintelligence, urban warfare, explosives, and tactical practices. The ELA espouses an anti-United States message, directing particular criticism at the U.S. Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in Manta. The ELA has claimed responsibility for a variety of pamphlet bombings, such as the 2003 attack on the British Consulate in Guayaquil and 2003 bombings at Quito's Hilton Hotel and a McDonalds, both near the Embassy. More recently, the ELA is believed to be targeting key Ecuadorian figures for kidnapping, as they lack sufficient arms to hit harder targets. The GOE is closely monitoring the activities of the ELA, but does not consider the group a major threat to its security. ¶5. (SBU) Information on Foreign Government Cooperation: Despite an irregular change of government in April 2005, GOE CT policy has not changed significantly in 2005. The GOE remains cooperative, but limited resources available to Ecuadorian law enforcement and military forces hamper CT performance. U.S.-supported units perform well, however. At the political level, isolationist sentiments remain strong, sometimes hindering the GOE from taking a proactive counter-terrorist stance. Ecuadorian leaders take a political risk by favoring increased security cooperation with Colombia, and the GOE has publicly refused to accept any GOE involvement in Colombia's internal conflict or classify the FARC as a terrorist organization. However, the Palacio government has taken decisive action against FARC interests in Ecuador and communication and bilateral relations between the GOE and GOC are currently on the upswing. The GOE has not criticized U.S. policy in Iraq, but unpopularity of the U.S. campaign in Iraq here may limit the GOE's willingness to publicly support democratic progress there. JEWELL