FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001534 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA REF: A. QUITO 1478 ¶B. QUITO 1480 Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: News of the FARC's lethal attacks in southern Putumayo June 25 spawned a counterproductive but oh-so-Ecuadorian response from politicians in Quito. Rather than condemning the narcoterrorists and acknowledging that border security requires bilateral cooperation, Palacio administration officials blamed Plan Patriota for endangering Ecuadorian lives. High-level GoE officials threaten to impose a visa regime on Colombian nationals, reacting to allegations that one FARC offensive originated in Ecuador. Their policies earned kudos from media and elites, grateful Palacio's team has refocused on protecting Ecuadorian sovereignty (physical security be damned). On the ground, the GoE military reacted reasonably to the upswing in violence, dispatching troops to block FARC retreats south; their willingness to engage the enemy is untested, however. A short-term outcome from the Putumayo clashes is that Ecuador-Colombia relations, backsliding since Palacio assumed power, likely will worsen. Post's action plan to reverse the trend depends heavily on improving bilateral communications, military and civilian. END SUMMARY. -------------- FARC Not a Spent Force -------------- ¶2. (C) Embassy Bogota counterparts reveal the FARC's 48th and 32nd Fronts initiated 12 simultaneous attacks in Putumayo June 25 near the frontier hamlet of Teteye. Twenty-one Colombian troops perished in action, the highest single-day death toll recorded during the Uribe administration. Ecuadorian press reported the firefights June 26, offering basic facts (gleaned from Colombian media) but little commentary. The tone changed the following day, however, with reporting turning almost pro-FARC. "Things got worse," Quito's El Comercio wrote, quoting a community leader in San Miguel, "when Colombian aircraft entered Ecuadorian territory in order to attack the guerrillas from an improved position." Another local official told media that Colombian refugees were pouring over the frontier, an assertion that Embassy contacts within the International Organization for Migration (IOM) refuted. -------------- Anti-Colombia Sentiment Strong Here -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The timing could not have been worse. Last week saw Quito's pre-eminent sovereignty protectors -- Minister of Government Mauricio Gandara and Foreign Minister Antonio Parra -- engaged in serious Colombia bashing. The mercurial and staunchly anti-Plan Colombia Gandara argued that, in the north, Ecuador bordered not Colombia but the FARC. GoC forces were rare sights along the frontier, leaving its care solely to the Ecuadorian military. At the same time he disparaged Colombian neglect, he rejected suggestions for greater bilateral cooperation. "It is impossible to share all information," Gandara claimed, referring to a proposed info-sharing agreement between national police forces. And cross-border operations, with or without permission, were verboten; there would be no more Simon Trinidad-like captures. ¶4. (SBU) Parra's commentary hewed closely to Gandara's in its anti-Colombia bent. Between assuring Ecuador the GoE would never sign Article 98 and insisting Ecuador's relations with Venezuela remained top-notch, the Foreign Ministry managed to bash GoC aerial coca eradication, Colombia's growing bilateral trade surplus, and increasing southbound refugee flows. Ecuador no longer would be a weak negotiating partner to its northern neighbor, Parra concluded. -------------- Attacks Fan Flames Further -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Putumayo offensive and President Uribe reportedly stating the FARC had abused the territory of a neighboring, friendly nation in staging it, spurred even stronger GoE diatribe. Gandara's office June 27 issued a press bulletin in which Ecuador lamented the growing numbers of Colombians entering Ecuador, fleeing FARC-GoC confrontations. Referring subsequently to a Colombian mayor's claim that some rebels retreated to Ecuador after concluding their operations, the missive noted the GoE had not discarded implementing a visa requirement for Colombian nationals. Media here, generally nationalistic and rarely thinking long-term, praised the visa initiative, although they did give coverage to Colombian Foreign Minister Carolina Barco blasting it. ¶6. (C) Ecuadorian military reacted swiftly to the rumored FARC incursion. Joint Forces chief Admiral Manuel Zapater overflew the border June 27, focusing on zones of reported conflict. Media report greater patrolling in central Sucumbios province. Ecuadorian military contacts claim the 24th Special Forces battalion is elaborating a plan to block FARC elements from crossing south into Ecuador as they retreat from a GoC counter-attack. And we understand that brigade commanders in the north have requested Quito approval to re-initiate across-the-board military contacts with Colombian counterparts. -------------- Improvement Seems a Way Off -------------- ¶7. (C) While we applaud the military's initiative, we wonder if much is just for show. Despite active patrolling, for example, we are unaware of any armed confrontations between GoE forces and FARC since mid-2002, if not earlier. Ecuadorian military have uncovered numerous narcoterrorist camps in recent years, but all were vacated, some only hours before (cooking fires still warm, rice in pots, etc.), pointing to tipoffs. The high command likely would undergo withering Congressional and media criticism were Ecuadorian forces to take casualties, prompting a re-look at their border force posture. Similarly, their desires for bilateral meetings at the brigade, HQ, and ministerial levels, while praiseworthy, likely won't fly in the Gandara/Parra-dominated political environment. We therefore believe that Colombia-Ecuador relations will worsen before they improve, if left alone... -------------- Getting Them Back to the Table -------------- ¶8. (C) Ecuador President Alfredo Palacio inherited the office after Quito protesters -- the famed "forajidos" -- deposed predecessor Lucio Gutierrez. While the then-president's "dictatorial" domestic decisions fueled their ire, left-leaning opportunists capitalized, planting anti-U.S., anti-Colombia planks into the "street's" platform. Palacio thus was obliged to alter GoE foreign policy, breaking the mythical Washington-Bogota-Quito axis. While he has since walked back early, gringo-bashing comments, we cannot see security cooperation returning to year-ago levels. ¶9. (C) We cannot remain passive and watch the Ecuador-Colombia spat escalate into outright hostility, however (especially since Chavez considers Ecuador a potential recruit for his Bolivarian army). Loathe to call our brainstorming an action plan -- the health of EC-CO relations depends on the countries involved, after all, not us -- we nevertheless consider the following measures useful to bridge the growing gap. First, considering productive the Ecuadorian tactical commanders' request for all-ranks meetings with Colombian counterparts, DAO and Milgroup personnel will support the measure wholeheartedly, to include requesting a concurrent lobbying effort (toward GoC military) by Embassy Bogota peers. ¶10. (C) We also will utilize upcoming VIP visits. A slew of Codels and Staffdels arrive in early July, three visiting both Ecuador and Colombia. Featuring high in our briefings will be the decaying EC-CO relationship, and our desires they raise with their GoE interlocutors the need to reverse the trend. Last, while we believe the Palacio Administration, not Uribe's, merits "credit" for the relations hiccup, we would hope Colombia takes the high ground and reaches out. We were aghast, for example, when FM Parra informed the Ambassador last month he had yet to contact Barco. Yet she had not phoned him either, we surmised. We thus request Department and Embassy Bogota support in lobbying Colombia to extend an olive branch (press reported June 29 that Uribe phoned Palacio June 27; according to a WHA/AND readout of GoC MOD Uribe's recent meeting with WHA A/S Noriega, it was the presidents' first conversation). Kenney