QUEBEC IMMIGRATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 QUEBEC 000046

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/11/2015
TAGS: SOCI SMIG PGOV PREL EFIN ECON CA MO AG TS
SUBJECT: QUEBEC IMMIGRATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS?

REF: A. 03 MONTREAL 453


B. 01 QUEBEC 111

C. 97 MONTREAL 1775

D. 94 MONTREAL 976

CLASSIFIED BY: jstrudwick, conoff, Quebec City, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(U) SUMMARY: Quebec views its semi-autonomous immigration
policy as a key instrument in maintaining its economy and in
preserving its francophone identity. But the province finds it
hard to attract the kind of immigrants it wants and to retain
those that it gets. Over just the past six years the Maghreb
has become the deepest pool for the emigrant francophones that
Quebec has traditionally sought to attract. But North Africans
are prominent among the groups that have proven difficult to
integrate into the Quebec labor market, and events since 9/11
have posed added challenges to their social integration even in
this highly tolerant society.

2.(C) With Law 53, passed last summer, the Charest Government
ostensibly broke over 15 years of bipartisan immigration policy
by enabling Quebec to use geographic origin as one of the
criteria in selecting immigrants, and, if needed, to suspend the
processing of applications. Though never publicly stated, the
measure was aimed primarily at the massive number of
applications from Morocco and Algeria, which have created an
enormous backlog and threaten to dominate future immigrant
inflow. The opposition Parti Quebecois opposed Law 53 as
discriminatory, and it is yet to be seen whether the Liberal
Government will actually use the new tools it offers. The
immigration issue in Quebec is usually on the back-burner, but
when brought forward it uncovers not political choices, but
rather contradictions in the values held by society as a whole.
End Summary.

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Finding Future Quebeckers
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3.(U) Immigration is one of the few areas under concurrent
Federal and Provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution Act
of 1867, but Quebec is the only province to have seriously
developed its capacity to influence the size and composition of
its immigrant flow. The Federal Government sets national
immigration objectives, establishes criteria for Family
Unification immigrants and Refugees, handles admissions at
Ports-of-Entry, and applies statutory immigrant visa criteria
relating to criminality, security, and health. Ottawa consults
with the provinces on most immigration policy and enters into
agreements with them. But Ottawa's accord with Quebec is by far
the most extensive. Under its most recent iteration (1991)
Quebec sets its own immigration levels, establishes the
financial criteria for sponsors, and runs the settlement and
integration programs (partially funded by Ottawa). No immigrant
can be settled in Quebec without a Quebec Certificate of
Selection (CSQ).

4.(U) Quebec's most important tool has been its role in
selecting "independent immigrants." Unlike Family Unification
migrants and Refugees (which are the subject of ongoing
Ottawa-Quebec negotiations to insure that these
Federally-selected individuals can secure a CSQ),the selection
of independent immigrants is a purely Quebec responsibility.
These are the individuals that are the key to Quebec's
immigration objectives. Quebec wants to select them on the
basis of their anticipated economic and social contribution and
adaptability to the province. And Quebec wants to increase both
their numbers and their proportion of the province's total
immigrant intake. For much of the 1990s these independent
immigrants made up only about 40% of the inflow; in recent years
their share has been deliberately increased to around 60%. The
key tool in the screening/selection process is a qualifications
assessment which awards a range of points for adaptability,
experience (especially time already in Quebec),languages
(especially French),age, spouse's characteristics, training,
employment, and children. While Quebec immigration officials
technically can use their judgment, most of the points are
determined by resumes and credentials.

5.(U) There has been a consensus in Quebec on the need for
immigration since the latter 1980s. Despite continuance of a
high unemployment rate that had hitherto tended to restrict
immigration, it came to be recognized that the sharp fall in the
birth rate since the 1960s poses significant problems for the
province's economy and social systems, as well as for the
survival of Quebec's distinct identity in a more populous Canada
and North America. Quebec also hoped that targeted immigration
would increase the overall skills, education, and capital of its
population. In practice, it hasn't yet worked out that way.
Quebec finds it hard to attract the kind of immigrants it wants
and to retain those that it gets. The GOQ prioritizes investors
and entrepreneurs, but gets far fewer applications than it wants
(only about 10% of annual intake). Most immigrants are
"workers" but Quebec finds itself capping its intake, because it
does not want to admit more immigrants than it has employment
vacancies. Immigrants with university and professionals degrees
(which are admitted as "workers") have met resistance from
Quebec associations and employers, and there are also legitimate
concerns about the value of some foreign diplomas.

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Structural Conundrums
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6.(U) Quebec's immigration ambitions are also afflicted by a
number of vicious circles. Immigration is often a spark to
economic growth, but Quebec is economically less dynamic than
some other provinces and consequently less attractive for
Canada-bound migrants. Like comparable regions in rust-belt
America, Quebec has found few replacements for old manufacturing
and raw material extraction industries. Further, the province
will soon be facing one of the more difficult demographic crises
among Western societies, as its economically active population
reaches retirement age, while the younger generations from four
decades of low birth rates won't be numerous enough to pay the
taxes and sustain consumption. Immigration alone won't solve
this problem, as Quebec would have to double its current annual
intake (to 80,000) just to stabilize the population. As
Immigration Deputy Minister Raymonde Saint-Germain told us,
Quebec's job market, housing stock, and social integration
programs cannot handle that kind of volume even if the desired
immigrants could be identified.

7.(U) The importance of the French language also poses problems
for Quebec's immigrant flow. Over half of Quebec's immigrants
are non-francophones in a province where French skills are vital
to social integration and economic success. This is especially
true outside of the Montreal region where jobs are going
unfilled. Non-francophone immigrants also require significant
public expenditures for language training and to provide family
income while the training is going on. Moreover, it is not
unusual for non-francophone immigrants, after an initial year or
so in Quebec, to move to an English-speaking province.
Consequently, French skills are strongly weighted in the
qualifications assessment, francophone applicant pools are
attractive recruiting targets, and francophone applicants have a
decided advantage.

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Maghrebian Immigration
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8.(U) For most of the 1990s, a stagnant economy, budget worries,
and preoccupations about integration kept immigration levels
flat. But as the decade closed, things began to change, and in
just the past few years immigration has sharply increased.

(U) ANNUAL IMMIGRANTS TO QUEBEC (in thousands)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
27.2 29.8 27.7 26.5 29.2 32.5

2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005*
37.5 36.6 40.4 43.5 46.5 *estimates

9.(C) The intensification of civil conflict in Algeria in the
late-1990s led to an increasing exodus of its more skilled and
educated population. Word of the Quebec option spread, both
among private individuals as well as lawyers and immigration
agents. International social and economic conditions being what
they are, the francophone populations of Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia became the most fertile ground for would-be immigrants
to Quebec. Unlike francophone black Africans (who could not
always meet the skills qualifications) and francophone Europeans
(few of whom wished to emigrate),there are significant numbers
of Maghrebians who can score selection points for language,
skills, education, children, and who also are seeking a new
place to live. Applications increased sharply after 1999, and
by 2003 over 70% of them were coming from North Africa, a volume
which exceeded the overall Quebec immigration target.

10.(C) Civil servants who received these applications noted the
growth of the Maghrebian share of applicants. They also were
aware of significantly higher rates of unemployment and welfare
support among Maghrebians (and black Africans),and found that
in many cases, these applicants' French skills and school
diplomas were over-rated. The Maghrebian increases also raised
the prospect that their large families would likely come to
dominate the future flow of Family Unification immigrants (about
20-25% of the total Quebec intake). Finally, after 9/11,
security concerns made immigration officials more cautious in
approving applications from the Islamic world. To balance this
flow, the Ministry stepped up recruitment efforts in Eastern
Europe, East Asia, and, especially, Latin America, whose kindred
languages promised more successful Francisation among a skilled
immigrant pool, but modest success in these regions was dwarfed
by the flood of applications from North Africa.

11.(C) In 2002, the Immigration Ministry moved the processing of
Maghrebian applications (including the large number of pending
files) from Paris to Montreal. Soon after the election of the
Charest Government in April 2003, press reports began noting the
slow processing times. And by the end of the year the Ministry
faced a scandal when it was revealed that it had been processing
approximately the same number of applications for each of the
four major regions: Africa, Europe, Latin America, East Asia.
The result was an enormous backlog of Maghrebians while the
other queues were cleared.

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Immigration Reform
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12.(C) In 2004 the PLQ government sought to tackle the
immigration challenge head-on with a new Action Plan for
2005-2007 and new legislation, Law 53. The Action Plan stressed
the challenge of rapidly and successfully integrating needed
immigrants, and proposed a broad range of measures aimed to
address those problems. More succinctly, but no less directly,
the Plan highlighted equity, integrity, efficiency, and
transparency in processing, and the need to maintain diversity
in the immigration inflow. Law 53 itself was a brief,
eight-page document consisting of short passages modifying
existing legislation. It reinforced the penalties for false
documents, and gave the government powers to recognize and
supervise immigration consultants. But the heart of Law 53 were
its provisions to allow the government to do legally what it had
been trying to do informally over the previous few years:
suspend processing of pending immigration applications and set
immigration targets according to geographic areas. Quebec, in
effect, gave itself the tools to establish a quota (though the
word is never used) for the Maghreb, and to channel its torrent
of applications into a reservoir that might never be fully
drained.

13.(C) Law 53 was promptly decried by both immigrant-rights
groups and the opposition Parti Quebecois. Both attacked the
law as discriminatory, and the PQ demanded to know how the
immigration levels would be set and divided. But the law passed
and the only question now is whether the Charest government will
use the new tools provided by Law 53 to reduce the flow of
immigration from the Maghreb. In October, the Under-Secretary
for Immigration and her team went off to Morocco for ten days to
assuage concerns and explain criteria and procedures. In a
January conversation, then-Minister Courchene told us that she
wanted to clear the backlog and increase the number of
immigrants. And in a recent conversation with the CG, Deputy
Minister Saint-Germain said that the GOQ will have to implement
a processing schedule that is more transparent and predictable
for the (fees-paying) applicant.

14.(C) At this point, neither privately nor publicly is there
talk of suspending processing. The 2005 Immigration Plan, the
first promulgated under Law 53 indicating geographic targets,
anticipates no major change in the distribution of immigrants
admitted. Indeed, it projects a rise in Maghrebians selected:
28% of the total, as compared with 18% in preceding years.
(Given the backlog, even 28% is but a small percentage of
applicants from that region. Media reports in mid-2004 indicated
some 20,000 pending dossiers, the vast majority from
Maghrebians.) The Plan numbers suggest that the GOQ recognizes
it will have to proceed slowly and carefully in implementing its
new quota system. And there is no sign of a decline of interest
from North Africa.


(U) GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS
(as percentages of Total Admitted)

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03* '05*

America, Cent & South 13 13 15 15 18 12
Europe, N/W/S 17 16 13 11 11 16
Europe, East 9 8 9 14 12 14
Asia, East & SE 18 16 17 13 14 13
Asia, South 11 11 9 9 7
Africa, North 14 16 20 20 18 28
Africa, Other 8 8 7 7 7 1
Middle East 5 5 5 5 7 6

Total Immigration (,000) 29 32 38 38 40
37

*2003 figures are estimates, 2005 figures are Selection Targets

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Comment
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15.(C) As in many Western societies, the immigration issue in
Quebec is usually on the back-burner, but when brought forward
it uncovers not political choices, but rather contradictions in
the values held by society as a whole. The GOQ historically,
and the current PLQ government, has generally taken a firm line
on social integration. Three weeks ago, in a parliamentary
forum (and in a subsequent letter to the press),International
Affairs Minister (and one-time Immigration Minister)
Gagnon-Tremblay noted the GOQ's opposition to the creation of
Islamic family courts in Quebec, underlined the democratic and
laic nature of Quebec society, and went on to remark that
"immigrants who want to change our values can go elsewhere."
But at the same time, Quebecers accept the need for immigration,
recognize the difficulty in attracting immigrants, and place a
high value on social tolerance. Any measures that can be
interpreted as racialist or profiling make prominent targets.
After Gagnon-Tremblay's remarks, journalists promptly confronted
newly-appointed Immigration Minister Lise Theriault, who
reminded them of Quebec's (non-ideological) immigration
selection criteria and rhetorically asked, "On what basis can
one know if a candidate is a radical islamicist?" A comparable
situation exists on the security front. While the GOQ publicly
emphasizes that Federal (not provincial) officials are
responsible for immigrant security checks, senior Quebec
immigration officials told us that they quietly forward the
dossiers of applicants with suspected terrorist or criminal ties
to the RCMP or the provincial police. END COMMENT.





FRIEDMAN