DAS MARK PEKALA FINDS COMMITTED ALLIES IN PRAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 001688 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS TO DAS MARK PEKALA, EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM EUN CU PGOV EZ SUBJECT: DAS MARK PEKALA FINDS COMMITTED ALLIES IN PRAGUE REF: PRAGUE 1601 Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Action requests in paragraphs 25 and 26. ¶2. (C) Summary. DAS Mark Pekala traveled to Prague November 30-December 1 to meet with Czechs actively working to promote democracy and human rights in Cuba, Belarus, and elsewhere; and to discuss Czech policy priorities on neighboring countries, including Russia and in Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. The Czechs confirmed their commitment to improved transatlantic relations, support for the new U.S. focus on transformational diplomacy, and shared U.S.-Czech policy goals on countries in the region. Other topics discussed included Czech views on (1) flaws in EU policy on the Moldova/Transnistria conflict, (2) PM Jiri Paroubek's increasingly bold flirtation with the Communists ("playing with fire"),(3) supporting the opposition in Belarus (important to legitimize Milinkievich),and (4) the political cost of the visa waiver impasse (Czechs ask, is there anything the U.S. can give the Czechs in the short-term?). End summary. ¶3. (SBU) During his visit, DAS Pekala met with Martin Povejsil, MFA Political Director; Jaromir Plisek, MFA Director General, Territorial Section I (including Russia and Eastern Europe); Gabriela Dlouha, MFA Coordinator of the Transition Promotion Unit; Jiri Pehe, political scientist, consultant to PM Jiri Paroubek, and Director of New York University in Prague; Helena Bambasova, MFA Director General, Territorial Section II (including the Americas); Edita Hrda, MFA Director of the Department of Americas; and others representing NGOs, think-tanks, business, and educational institutions (see paragraph 10). DAS Pekala was also interviewed by CT24, a 24-hour television news channel, and Mlada Fronta Dnes, a respected center right newspaper. The subject of DAS Pekala,s meetings included transatlantic relations, democracy promotion, Russia and Eastern Europe, Czech internal politics and Communists, visa waiver, and other issues (including a Czech-proposed meeting between FM Cyril Svoboda and Secretary Rice in Washington in early 2006). -------------- Transatlantic Relations -------------- ¶4. (SBU) DAS Pekala explained that for most of the twentieth century, U.S.-European relations were focused on Europe itself. In the twenty-first century, however, the focus has shifted outward. The organizing principle of the current transatlantic relationship is transformational diplomacy. Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking ways to work with its EU allies to promote democracy and human rights elsewhere. He asked the Czechs how the U.S. can better coordinate with the EU to achieve their common goals. ¶5. (C) Plisek said the Czechs strive for common dialogue between the U.S. and the EU, and support the new focus on transformational diplomacy because it is consistent with the traditional Czech focus on human rights and good governance. The Czechs recently discussed transatlantic priorities internally, and concluded that U.S.-EU cooperation would be more successful if they jointly identified a limited number of high-priority issues on which to focus. The Czechs have not concluded their short list of proposed issues, but the following Czech foreign policy priorities provide a clue: according to Povejsil, their primary focus is on neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. Additional priorities include Cuba and the Middle East. ¶6. (C) When asked if the U.S.-EU relationship could be restructured to facilitate greater involvement of the new member states in EU policy-making, Povejsil said without elaboration that discussions between the U.S. and EU should be "more political." While he repeated his previous assessment that the smaller and newer member states would be better served by U.S.-EU dialogues with all 25 members (rather than in the U.S.-Troika format),he admitted this presented organizational challenges. Still, he urged the U.S. to find a way to involve all EU members in policy discussions because new members find it difficult to introduce topics of interest into transatlantic discussions. Hrda concurred that all members should be present at Troika meetings, even if PRAGUE 00001688 002 OF 005 they cannot contribute. -------------- Democracy Promotion -------------- ¶7. (C) On democracy promotion, Bambasova echoed Povejsil,s suggestion that the U.S. and the EU should develop a list of countries on which to focus joint efforts. The Czechs are still finalizing their list, but Bambasova and Hrda expect the list will include Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, and Moldova, in addition to Belarus and Cuba. Povejsil also provided insight on how the Czechs promote their democracy initiatives within the EU. He said the Czechs typically focus on coordinating their efforts with older EU members (he mentioned Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany) because newer members tend to be weak. He conceded, however, that common experience makes it easier for new members to work together on some issues. ¶8. (C) DCM encouraged Bambasova and Hrda to continue efforts to engage EU partners on difficult policy issues like Cuba. He said the Czechs are doing fine on substance, but wondered whether they would benefit from U.S. assistance on technical issues or strategic approaches to the EU. Hrda conceded the Czechs have had technical problems dealing with the EU. DCM offered any assistance the U.S. can provide along these lines, whether from Washington, Embassy Prague, or the U.S. mission to the EU. ¶9. (C) Plisek mentioned the Czechs have encountered an unexpected problem when they assist countries like Belarus: there are no "pools of experts" that can implement plans proposed by NGOs. He explained that people with transition experience have moved on to form businesses or take positions in government and are not available for short-term consulting assignments in countries that need them. ¶10. (U) DAS Pekala's meetings were followed by a working dinner with Czechs actively engaged in democracy promotion. Guests were Gabriela Dlouha, Czech MFA Transition Promotion Unit Coordinator; Kristyna Prunerova, People in Need staffer; Jan Bubenik, former MEP and Cuba activist; Oldrich Cerny, Executive Director of Forum 2000 (a think-tank),and former DG of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service; and Vaclav Bartuska, professor at New York University in Prague, and former Director of the Havel Library. The discussion focused on Czech efforts in Cuba and Belarus (to be transmitted septel),and efforts to promote ethical business practices in the Czech Republic. -------------- Russia and Eastern Europe -------------- ¶11. (C) Russia remains an important foreign policy priority for both the GOCR and the EU. Plisek assured DAS Pekala that the Czechs are not anti-Russian. The Czechs believe a common EU policy toward Russia is essential because a unified EU position, coordinated with the U.S. where possible, is the only thing that Russia takes seriously. On Russia's draft NGO law, the Czechs share U.S. concerns. Plisek thought that Tony Blair, in his official capacity as president of EU, should send a letter to Putin expressing concern and emphasizing that passage of the law would undermine Russia,s relations with the EU. ¶12. (C) Turning to Ukraine, Povejsil cited that country as an example of successful U.S.-EU cooperation. The Czechs believe recent events in Ukraine signal expansion of its pro-West orientation. Czech FM Cyril Svoboda was scheduled to visit Ukraine December 5, 2005 on a mission to determine how the Czechs can facilitate further democratic reform. ¶13. (C) After his visit to Ukraine, FM Svoboda plans to visit Moldova, where the Czechs are opening a new Embassy. Plisek said Moldova may have the most western orientation of the Eastern European countries, but warned that the Transnistria problem is dangerous. According to Plisek, the EU wants to avoid confrontation with Russia on the issue. Also, the Transnistrian President, Igor Smirnov, has created a "modern" facade that hides human rights abuses. Plisek stated that the EU approach to Moldova is flawed because it essentially treats Vladimir Voronin, the duly elected president of the Moldovan state, and Smirnov, the leader of the Transnistrian PRAGUE 00001688 003 OF 005 breakaway "republic," as equals who ought to negotiate a solution. The GOCR sees one cause of the problem as an "imbalance of democratic standards" in the two regions, and will aim its bilateral assistance at improving the level of democracy and civil society on both sides of the Dniester River. ¶14. (C) On Belarus, Povejsil said EU enlargement is the reason for EU's new focus on Belarus; that is, the new EU members have raised the profile of this issue within the EU. Belarus remains a primary focus for Czech democracy promotion efforts (see reftel). As a result of these efforts, the Lukashenko regime harasses the Czechs. The Czech Embassy is under constant surveillance and Czech diplomats have been expelled. Cooperation with the V4 in Belarus has been useful, however, as the Czechs now operate assistance efforts out of the Visegrad House. ¶15. (C) On the upcoming election in Belarus, Povejsil predicted the election result is "likely to be the one that we fear." (Lukashenko claims he will get 74% of the vote.) Nevertheless, Plisek said the U.S. and the EU could help by taking steps to legitimize the opposition. Along these lines, the Czechs were among the first to publicly support Aleksandr Milinkievich, the commonly elected opposition candidate. Pehe had just visited opposition leaders in Belarus with former Ambassador Sasha Vondra and Czech NGO, People in Need. (He found Milinkievich impressive and focused.) The Czechs urged the U.S. and the EU to listen to the opposition, and provide as much requested assistance as possible. ¶16. (C) Putin will most likely support Lukashenko. Plisek said the U.S. and the EU must somehow make the case that it is in Russia's interest to have democratic neighbors. The Russian presidency of both the G-8 and the Council of Europe present opportunities to achieve this goal. -------------- Internal Politics and Communists -------------- ¶17. (C) During DAS Pekala's visit, an Iranian parliamentary delegation visited Prague at the invitation of the Communist party (KSCM). The delegation met with MFA Deputy Minister Jaroslav Basta December 2, and later, albeit briefly, with PM Jiri Paroubek at the Parliament. In the subsequent meeting with Bambasova and Hrda, DAS Pekala and DCM emphasized that non-proliferation is among the U.S.'s strongest priorities, and that the United States is concerned by recent visits by the DPRK and Iran. Bambasova said the MFA was also surprised by the Iranian visit, and did not support the meetings. She explained that Paroubek is an opportunist who will do anything to be re-elected. She concluded that Paroubek is "playing with fire." (Septel will provide details of the Iranian visit.) ¶18. (C) Pehe provided some context on the Communist issue during his breakfast with DAS Pekala and POLEC Counselor. Pehe agreed working with KSCM is distasteful and problematic, not least because of its impact on foreign policy, e.g., the recent visits of the North Korean and Iranian delegations. Pehe also agreed close cooperation between Paroubek's Social Democrats and KSCM could lead to decreased emphasis on democracy promotion. However, he said the Communists do not pose a threat to democracy in the Czech Republic (discussed further in septel). Moreover, Paroubek himself is aware of the damage to Czech reputation that working openly with Communists would bring. Therefore, Paroubek says privately that a CSSD-ODS grand coalition is the most likely result of the election. That said, Pehe cautioned that Paroubek would work with Communists as necessary, most importantly to ensure Klaus is not re-elected as President, and also to keep ODS in line (as he is doing now to keep a tight leash on KDU). In any case, Pehe said he is convinced that it is too late to outlaw KSCM or ignore them. According to Pehe, the greater concern is rising nationalism in Central Europe, as witnessed by the recent Polish election and developments in Slovakia and Hungary. -------------- Visa Waiver -------------- ¶19. (C) DAS Pekala raised the visa waiver issue with Bambasova. He said he understands the issue is emotional and PRAGUE 00001688 004 OF 005 political (and significant),but emphasized the U.S. views the visa issue as primarily one of guaranteeing the security of U.S. borders. He urged the Czechs to do everything possible to make coordinated progress on the Visa Waiver Road Map. Bambasova confirmed that the GOCR is committed to the Road Map and is working in good faith in the BCWG. She also said it is obvious the Embassy is taking steps to make the visa application process more comfortable. However, she warned that the security issue angle does not play well with ordinary Czechs, and the visa waiver impasse is being used by Czech politicians to push their domestic agendas. She asked whether there is anything that can be offered to the Czech people in the short-term while the GOCR is pursuing the Road Map. She also noted that the EU is now involved in the issue. -------------- Other Issues -------------- ¶20. (C) Turning to the Balkans, the Czechs confirmed that promoting stability in the region is an important policy priority for the Czechs. DAS Pekala said the EU and the U.S. should closely consult on policy in the region to ensure that what is done and said is productive. Plisek agreed. He said the Czechs have previously worked successfully with V4 allies, and are using that model to coordinate efforts in the Balkans. He noted that the Czechs are disappointed that distinguished countrymen like Sasha Vondra have not been selected to serve as special envoys in places like Moldova or the Balkans. He proposed something like affirmative action designed to help promote Czechs to positions of leadership in the EU. ¶21. (C) On new governments in Germany and Poland, Plisek said the Czechs are optimistic (and a little curious) about both countries. He also said that among the larger EU partners, Germany may be more sensitive to the concerns of Central Europeans. Accordingly, Germany may be willing to help new member states coordinate and push their positions in the EU. ¶22. (C) On military issues, the Czech Parliament will vote in December on the troop mandates in Iraq and the Balkans. Plisek expected the mandate for Iraq to pass, but was concerned the Balkans may not get all the support requested. On Bosnia specifically, while the request will likely be approved, Plisek thought it would help if Ambassador Cabaniss speaks to ODS MP Peter Necas (the shadow Defense Minister). On the VERA passive surveillance detection system, DAS Pekala apologized for the U.S. delay, and said the U.S. has undertaken to do better in the future. Povejsil confirmed the Czechs cannot wait months for an answer. Finally, on the China arms embargo, Povejsil said that the Czechs continue to support the embargo, but they cannot block it alone. DAS Pekala offered to provide support, such as consultations with U.S. officials, if that could prove helpful. ¶23. (C) On the proposed Svoboda meeting with Secretary Rice, Pekala said he would support such a visit, subject to the Secretary,s schedule. He thought a principal purpose of the SIPDIS meeting, among others, could be to discuss the Czech,s democracy promotion efforts in Belarus, Cuba and elsewhere. ¶24. (C) Lastly, on RFE, Bambasova said it is obvious that the move to the new building will take place much later than expected. She recommended waiting to make any public statement about the delay until the building construction project is well underway. However, she thought the Ambassador could discuss the delay with the Finance Minister in the short-term if he desired. ¶25. (C) Based on DAS Pekala's meetings, the following are suggestions for further Department consideration: (1) The Czechs have asked the U.S. to look for ways to include all 25 EU member states in the transatlantic dialogue. They pointed to efforts at NATO as a successful model; (2) The Czechs have suggested that Tony Blair write a letter to Putin condemning the NGO law; and (3) the Czechs have asked whether the U.S. can offer anything to the Czechs to improve the visa waiver situation. ¶26. (C) Comment. The Czech Republic is a small country with a strong desire to make a difference in places like Cuba, Belarus, and the Balkans. This desire should be nurtured because it is entirely consistent with the U.S. focus on transformational diplomacy. Ways the U.S. can support the PRAGUE 00001688 005 OF 005 Czechs include (1) help them improve their strategic approach in the EU (possibly by helping them align their efforts with Germany, or providing strategy sessions with U.S. diplomats (and other partners) at the U.S. mission to the EU),(2) grant the requested Washington meeting between FM Svoboda and the Secretary (and have the Secretary encourage the Czechs to continue democracy promotion efforts),(3) support the candidacy of the Czech Republic for a seat on the UN Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term (the election takes place at the ECOSOC meeting in April 2006. The four candidates are the Czech Republic, Russia, Lithuania, and Poland); (4) continue to support the candidacy of prominent Czechs, such as former Ambassador to the U.S. Sasha Vondra, for positions of leadership in the EU; and (5) provide financial support to Czech NGO People in Need, the Czech MFA,s NGO partner, in Czech democracy promotion efforts in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. ¶27. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Mark Pekala. CABANISS