CZECHS PROVIDE RECIPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001601 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 TAGS: PREL EAID PHUM KDEM PGOV BO EZ EUN SUBJECT: CZECHS PROVIDE RECIPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS REF: A. STATE 188900 ¶B. PRAGUE 1399 Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Czechs have been working for years to promote democracy in Belarus. Thus, talking to the Czechs about Belarus is like preaching to the choir. The Czech MFA, in the words of their Transition Promotion Unit Coordinator, supports U.S. policy toward Belarus without hesitation. She also gave her unvarnished assessment of the political situation in Belarus (guarded optimism that a transition will take place); described Czech support of Belarusian opposition leader, Alesandr Milinkievich (unconditional); and summarized the Czech approach to promoting democracy in Belarus (a formula based on experience). In short, the Czechs are ready, willing, and able to support U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Belarus. End summary. -------------- Czechs support U.S. policy on Belarus -------------- ¶2. (C) Poloff met recently with Czech MFA officials Gabriela Dlouha, Transition Promotion Unit Coordinator, and Ivana Kuranianova, Department of Southwestern and Eastern Europe, to discuss Czech efforts to promote democratic transition in Belarus, and to deliver ref A talking points. Dlouha said the Czechs strongly support the U.S. policy, and she endorsed each point articulated in the talking points. Note, however, that while Dlouha agreed Russia is an important player, she was pessimistic that Russia can be persuaded to turn its back on the Lukashenko regime. In her view, Russia is not interested in regime change because any turn toward the west means losing importance in the region. -------------- Election in Belarus: cause for optimism -------------- ¶3. (C) Dlouha predicted that Lukashenko will try to steal the election, and thinks Russia and some western countries are nave on this point. However, the election would be close even without fraud. She estimated that 45-50% of the voters actually support Lukashenko, citing social stability and the country's good economy as reason for their support. ¶4. (C) Nevertheless, she also saw reasons for guarded optimism that the opposition could win the election. First, the very fact that the three major opposition groups elected one common candidate, Alesandr Milinkievich, is a major success. Second, Milinkievich could win the election on his own merits. He has measurable support, and the Czechs think he is qualified to lead (Dlouha noted he is an economist and a good manager). Moreover, Milinkievich says he can bring people to the streets if there is fraud. (Unlike Ukraine, however, Dlouha predicted violence if such an event occurs.) Third, the political conditions in Belarus are more favorable for transition then the conditions in Czechoslovakia before 1989: Belarus has a formal opposition party with a presidential candidate, a shadow government, and an established political system. ¶5. (U) To increase the chances for a successful transition, the Czechs have launched pro-democracy initiatives in Belarus that read like a how-to manual: (1) promote free elections by strongly supporting the opposition and taking a tough stand against the dictatorship; (2) promote free press; and (3) rebuild civil society by training Belarusian democracy advocates. -------------- -------------- Promoting Free Elections, Step 1: Support the Opposition -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) The Czechs were among the first to publicly support the opposition. In the days following the election of Milinkievich as the elected common opposition candidate, Czech PM Jiri Paroubek announced unconditional support for him. Former Czech president Vaclav Havel immediately invited Milinkievich to visit Prague to meet with Czech FM Cyril Svoboda. The former Czech Ambassador to the U.S., Alexandr Vondra, will travel to Belarus in November to meet with him. The Czechs also encouraged the EU to recognize Milinkievich. ¶7. (U) In addition, the opposition requires financial support. Therefore, the Czechs have urged the EU to change its funding requirements to permit EU funds to go directly to civil society rather than through Belarusian NGOs (controlled by the GOB). The Czechs have also urged the EU to invite Milinkievich to come to Brussels to explain what he needs in the way of EU support. ¶8. (C) An important aspect of supporting the opposition is denouncing the regime. The Czechs therefore supported the U.S. proposal that the EU should call on Lukashenko not to run again for the presidency. The Czechs submitted the proposal to the EU working group in advance of the Nov 7 GAERC. However, according to Petr Kaiser, Director of the Czech MFA's CFSP Department, the Czechs were the only supporters of the proposal. Although the proposal failed to pass, the EU did ultimately issue strong statements against the GOB after the GAERC. The Czechs have also urged the EU to impose political sanctions on members of the Lukashenko regime (but not to impose economic sanctions). -------------- Step 2: Promote Independent Media Channels -------------- ¶9. (C) Dlouha said the success of Milinkievich,s campaign depends on whether he can get his message to the voters. Unfortunately, the government-controlled media is closed to the opposition. Therefore, Milinkievich is conducting an old-fashioned, door-to-door campaign. Dlouha said this approach will be effective because the opposition can reach "every day" people this way. She added that the Belarus pro-democracy radio project (financially supported by the Czechs, Poles, EU, and USAID, ref B) will play a critical role in the election by supporting opposition outreach efforts. Because timing is crucial, the Czechs aim to have radio programming on the air by the end of 2005. At a conference in Prague on Oct 10 attended by Poloff, Milinkievich expressed gratitude for the radio project, and added that the opposition "desperately" needs paper to distribute campaign fliers and samostat newspapers. -------------- Step 3: Rebuild Civil Society -------------- ¶10. (U) Drawing on their own peaceful transition from communism to democracy, the Czechs recognize the need to educate civil society to prepare it to govern. Accordingly, the Czechs have launched a number of initiatives that provide educational, financial and political support to Belarusian democracy advocates. For example: --- The Czechs provide seminars and study trips for Belarusians involved in democratic reform (e.g., journalists, lawyers, local politicians, educators, economists, etc.). Lectures take place in the Czech Republic, and address human rights, defense, education, good governance, institution building, etc. --- Scholarships in the Czech Republic for persecuted students who are forced out of Belarusian colleges because of their views. --- Financial assistance for victims of political repression. --- Election monitoring. ¶11. (SBU) Comment. Democracy promotion in Belarus is a priority for both the Czech Republic and the U.S. This creates considerable opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. will find in the Czechs a committed partner -- one that can provide needed support, expertise, and inspiration for U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Belarus, Cuba, and other non-democratic states. CABANISS