CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY: STILL HERE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 001575 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ SUBJECT: CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY: STILL HERE AND INCREASINGLY A PROBLEM REF: A. PRAGUE 348 ¶B. PRAGUE 1447 ¶C. PRAGUE 1514 Classified By: Political-Economic Chief Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d ¶1. Summary: (C) Czech Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek has recently turned to the Communist Party (KSCM) for parliamentary support on key legislation. This, along with the speculation that next June's general election might lead to a minority Social Democrat-led government that relied on the Communists on a more regular basis, has generated considerable public debate, with much of this directed at Paroubek himself. By reaching out to the Communists for ad hoc support, the Prime Minister is tactically reducing the leverage of his unsteady coalition partner, the Christian Democrats, while increasing support for him and his Social Democrats among left-of-center voters. We see this as a tactical move consistent with Paroubek's reputation as an opportunist rather than a fellow traveler; Paroubek's goal in the longer term appears to be survivial of the CSSD, staking a position as the best alternative for left-wing voters who may be increasingly attracted to a KSCM under its new leader. Regardless of the Prime Minister's intentions, the fact is that the Communist Party remains a player on the Czech political scene, and is likely to be a greater force on the national level looking ahead to both the 2006 and 2010 elections. Whether formal or informal, a KSCM role in a future government would have negative consequences for the US. The Ambassador will raise our concerns with the Prime Minister during an upcoming lunch. End summary. OUT OF THE POLITICAL WILDERNESS, ONE STEP AT A TIME ¶2. (C) The KSCM, or Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, hasn't undergone the type of reforms that most of its Eastern European counterparts did in the post Soviet era. There are still, for example, many elements in the party that show no regrets about the past. The long-time Chairman of the party, Miroslav Grebenicek, stepped down in September and was replaced October 1 by his deputy, Vojtech Filip, who is also one of five vice-chairs of parliament's lower house. Many see the Grebenicek resignation, after more than 12 years at the party's helm, as one element in the party's efforts at gradual legitimization. This process includes the more open cooperation recently seen at the national level (refs B & C, and below),and the possibility of some informal role in the government that is formed after next June's general elections (ref C and below),as well as readiness to be a formal part of the government elected in 2010. Poloff met recently with Jiri Dolejs, one of the Communist Party Deputy Chairs and generally considered among the most moderate of party leaders. Dolejs stated that the party wasn't expecting to have a chance to enter the government until 2010. But, he said, "the party has to be ready in case of quicker developments." Grebenicek,s resignation, though significant, should not, however, be seen as unexpected shift in the party's direction. At the party's national conference last May, Grebenicek had won a narrow victory over Filip and was given the chairmanship position on condition that he would eventually step down in favor of Filip. ¶3. (C) On most policy issues, Filip is unlikely to deviate from positions held by Grebenicek. Dolejs confirmed this for Poloff on October 6. Filip, for example, believes that border guards who shot Czechs trying to escape to the west were, in his words, "heroes." But Filip is younger, smarter, and more personable than Grebenicek, and his rhetoric is less harsh. Filip, who is a lawyer, uses more nuanced language that hints at, but doesn't deliver, compromises. For example, during the January debate on extending the deployment of Czech troops training police in Iraq, Grebenicek harshly complained that the UN had not approved the invasion and that the WMD arguments used to justify the war were ungrounded. Filip, on the other hand, said that if the Czechs want to train Iraqis, they could consider doing so in the Czech Republic, and added that the government's position on Iraq was not mirrored in public opinion polls. In the end, both voted against the extension, as did all KSCM deputies. ¶4. (C) We cannot yet rule out policy shifts under Filip, of course. One observer recently suggested to us that Filip could be preparing to rename the party, dropping the word "Communist," which would certainly lead to a shift in public perception, if not actual policies. Even absent a shift in policy, we do not underestimate the importance of Filip's more congenial personality. Public opinion polls conducted since Filip took over show an increase in KSCM support, with party approval ratings up one or two percentage points (depending on the poll) to around 15%. KSCM ACTIVE AT LOCAL LEVEL; PRESENCE FELT NATIONALLY, DESPITE "BOHUMIN" ¶5. (C) The KSCM currently has approximately 94,000 members, compared to 1.4 million party members in 1989. The average age of party members is 68 and a decline in numbers is inevitable as the old guard dies out; some think it will level off at about 50,000. (But this decline should be seen in context: the ruling Social Democrats has only 16,000 formal members and ODS 24,000.) Much of the Czech political mainstream hoped that the KSCM would disappear if the party was isolated during the 1990s. From CSSD's perspective, their attempt at isolation was defined in the so-called "Bohumin Resolution," approved at a CSSD party congress in the town of Bohumin in 1995; that resolution actually confirmed a resolution passed at a CSSD congress in 1993 in the town of Hradec Kralove. The 1993 resolution stated "CSSD rejects extremist parties on both the left and the right. Our experience with 40 years of communist rule leads us to the decision not to cooperate with KSCM and not to form any coalition with that party...We will actively ward off any attempts to restore a totalitarian communist regime in this country, therefore, any type of cooperation with KSCM is out of consideration." This has kept the Communists out of cabinet positions. But it has not prevented parliamentary cooperation on an ad hoc basis, nor considerable cooperation at the local level. Three of the country's thirteen largest cities now have Communist mayors, as do more than 300 smaller towns. There are more than four thousand city council members from KSCM, who regularly cooperate with members of other parties, including CSSD, at the municipal level. ¶6. (C) The KSCM is the third largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, with 41 of the 200 seats. Parliament runs software on its website that allows readers to plot correlations between the votes of parties. During the most recent election period, which began in July 2002, the opposition Communist Party voted more often with the ruling CSSD than it did with the other opposition party, ODS. The voting patterns of CSSD and KSCM noticeably converged this summer when several bills on social issues were considered, while simultaneously, the patterns of coalition partners Freedom Union (US-DEU) and Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) voting begin to diverge from CSSD. Two particular issues have brought this trend into sharper focus: the new labor bill, and the idea of a commission to investigate allegations of corruption in the selloff of shares in the state-run firm Unipetrol. In both cases, coalition member KDU-CSL took public positions strongly critical of its coalition partner CSSD, while the opposition communists provided quiet support (ref B). More recently, on November 1 KSCM and CSSD voted together to block an ODS bill to extend by several years the period during which successful claimants for restitution could have their property returned to them (as opposed to receiving financial compensation). ¶7. (C) While there are no shortage of public and private efforts to vilify the KSCM -- including frequent attempts to outlaw the party and a very visible line of T-shirts and neckties that use a common English vulgarity to express the wearer's feeling about the KSCM -- there are numerous examples to the contrary. All Czech media outlets include leaders of the Communist party in talks shows and newscasts.As the third largest party in Parliament, KSCM members are included in all official delegations and hold leadership positions. And, when necessary, they have been courted by mainstream parties -- most famously, during the confidential parliamentary voting to select a president in 2003, KSCM is widely believed to have provided the numbers necessary to elect ODS founder Klaus in the third round of voting. PAROUBEK ENTERS NEW TERRITORY ¶8. (C) While there is no doubt that the past ten years have seen considerable erosion from the CSSD pledge at Bohumin "not to cooperate" with KSCM, PM Paroubek,s readiness to work with the Communists on bills of importance to the CSSD,s electorate, and his refusal to rule out informal cooperation with the party if a minority CSSD government is formed after the 2006 election, mark a clear break with the past. Paroubek continues to insist that neither he nor CSSD are violating the Bohumin decision as he (and, admittedly, many other observers) interprets it today: CSSD will not consider any "formal" cooperation with the KSCM, i.e., forming a coalition government with the party, until the Communists have adequately reformed. At a November 3 speech to the AmCham, Paroubek identified the three conditions for possible CSSD cooperation with with KSCM (which he insisted was not likely for another 5-10 years) as (a) renouncing the crimes that their predecessor party committed during 1948-1989, (b) acceptance of Czech membership in NATO, the primacy of transatlantic relations in Czech foreign policy, and the role of the EU, and (c) acceptance of a realistic economic program, namely the CR's EU convergence program. ¶9. (C) The question being actively debated here is what a minority CSSD government -- which Paroubek has said he would prefer next year over a CSSD-ODS grand coalition (ref C) -- would mean in practice. Paroubek himself does not speak of a minority government with KSCM support: he complained about a widely-reported Reuters story on October 26 that implied he had used this wording (in fact, a careful reading of the article indicates Paroubek was only repeated his well-known preference for a minority government over a grand coalition). But as Reuters staff told us in their defense, they only drew the logical conclusion that a minority government means CSSD and KSCM working together on certain issues. In his AmCham address, Paroubek described his vision of a minority government as one with about 2/3 of the cabinet seats held by CSSD members, and 1/3 by "talented experts" -- and he specifically listed incoming Health Minister David Rath and former EU Commissioner Pavel Telicka as the sort of experts he has in mind. During the AmCham address Paroubek pointedly did not discuss the question of where he would look for votes, but previously has admitted he would work with all parties, including KSCM on social issues, and ODS and KDU-CSL on foreign and security questions. KSCM Vice Chair Dolejs confirmed this in our recently meeting, stating that "nothing has been written down, but there is a general agreement" that a CSSD minority government would consult with KSCM on issues such as welfare, labor, pensions and health care, where the views of the two parties often coincide, but that foreign policy would be left to CSSD, since this is an area in which the two parties have such opposing views. Dolejs said the only request the Communists are likely to make in the area of foreign policy is to give a greater role to the UN. COMMENT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR US? ¶10. (C) In terms of the scenarios following the June 2006 election, it is worth pointing out that the political landscape could change considerably between now and then, and CSSD is not assured of being in the position of forming the next government. Further, as discussed ref C, other post-election scenarios are possible, and none of the promises made pre-election will be worth much once the returns are in and actual negotiations begin on the future government. Finally, President Klaus, who has made clear that he is not afraid to press his constitutional authority when it comes to appointing a government, could prevent a minority government from forming. ¶11. (C) That said, Paroubek,s new approach to cooperation with the KSCM, even if it is based only on political calculations, already represents a break with the past. While it may have been inevitable that the party would begin to play a more open role on the national stage, given the KSCM,s consistent levels of public support, it is nonetheless troubling for the U.S. CSSD-KSCM cooperation on social and economic policies, with the problematic Labor Code (to be analyzed further septel) being a clear example, will prevent implementation of structural reforms that are necessary to boost the CR,s long-term growth prospects. On foreign policy, we are reasonably confident that for the remainder of this government's life, the strongly transatlantic policies represented by FM Svoboda and DefMin Kuehnl will continue -- although we need to both watch for possible erosion of support for them within the divided government and find ways to support them ourselves, like the recent well-received visit of Kuehnl to Washington. ¶12. (C) Looking ahead, we are not confident that a post-election minority CSSD government would prove reliable. There is no guarantee that, as Paroubek expects, ODS and KDU-CSL would support CSSD on foreign policy measures; if, as is likely, CSSD would turn to KSCM for support in the initial vote of confidence, we can expect that deals would be cut involving the minority government's foreign policy priorities. We could see not just greater emphasis on the UN, but reduced Czech commitment in Iraq, and a significantly less robust Czech role in promoting democracy in Cuba, Belarus and North Korea (the recent DPRK delegation visit to the CR, sponsored by KSCM Chair Filip, provided a vivid example of the difficulties the GOCR already has dealing with the KSCM on foreign policy issues). ¶13. (C) In short, Paroubek,s dalliance with KSCM is already posing problems, and they could get worse. Our next step is to make sure Paroubek is aware of the downside. Paroubek,s decisions are all based on a calculation of costs and benefits; his performance in office has shown that he is not guided by the sort of principles that made it easier for us to work with former Prime Ministers Spidla and Gross (and that made us more sanguine earlier this year about the impact that a minority government under Gross might have on U.S. interests, ref A). Continued strong polling numbers tell Paroubek that there is not a real downside to his cooperation with KSCM. In a lunch meeting now scheduled for November 17, Ambassador Cabaniss will make sure Paroubek is aware of USG concerns and takes the cost of damage to his and the CR,s international reputation into consideration. ¶14. (C) Looking ahead we face two challenges. Longer term, KSCM is a force to be reckoned with. While demographics may reduce the party's support, the process of legitimization will only continue, possibly even accelerating under their new leader, regardless of whether Paroubek is calling the shots next year. Second and more immediate, facing elections and possible KSCM reform efforts (like renaming the party), CSSD is going to appeal ever more strongly to its core left wing voters. This will require ever more vigilence to make certain that the GOCR pursues stable and responsible economic and foreign policies. CABANISS