DPRK DELEGATION VISIT TO CZECH REPUBLIC INCLUDES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001515 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015 TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC KN EZ SUBJECT: DPRK DELEGATION VISIT TO CZECH REPUBLIC INCLUDES STOP AT CZECH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REF: A. PRAGUE 1426 ¶B. STATE 186144 Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d ¶1. (U) Action Request in para 9. ¶2. (S) Summary: The DPRK parliamentary delegation visited the nuclear power plant at Temelin during their 17-22 October visit to the Czech Republic. Czech officials indicate they received a "standard VIP tour" of the facility; according to the company official who led the tour, the DPRK del did not have background on energy issues and expressed interest in the possibility of the Czechs exporting a nuclear reactor, as well as the Czech experience with combining "eastern" and "western" nuclear technology. The Speaker of Parliament, who was not able to prevent the visit that was organized by the Communist Party Vice Speaker, claims he was able to limit the visit to "non-sensitive" areas, and added that he delivered a strong message to the delegation in support of the six party talks. The MFA is concerned about the trend set by this visit, as the Parliament failed to work with the GOCR on a sensitive foreign policy issue. The Czechs recently signed an "Action Plan" with the DPRK to guide specific cooperation steps. They would welcome in-depth consultations with USG experts on North Korea -- a suggestion post strongly supports. ¶3. (SBU) As previewed ref A, a DPRK parliamentary del visited the Czech Republic 17-22 October. The delegation was led by Kang Nung Su, vice Speaker of the DPRK Parliament, and included Ri Sam Ro, Director of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament, Kim Yong Jae, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Parliamentary Deputy, Ri Chol Royng, Deputy Dept Director, Finance Ministry, Kim Chon Se, Staff of MFA Europe Dept, DPRK Ambassador in Prague Pyong Gap Ri, and First Secretary Ho Song Chol. The visit was at the invitation of Vojtech Filip, Vice Speaker of Parliament and Chairman of the Czech Communist Party. ¶4. (C) According to the final schedule obtained by the MFA and provided to Pol-Econ Chief on 21 October, the DPRK del met primarily with parliamentary officials, mainly from the Communist and Social Democrat parties. According to the readout provided to the MFA, the Vice Chairman of the Senate (Jiri Liska) was the only representative of the center-right ODS to see the group, and also was the only one to raise the issue of human rights (which received no response). The group saw Martin Tlapa, Vice Minister of Trade and Industry, and presented a draft economic cooperation agreement, which was a surprise to the Czech side. They met morning of 21 October with a group of Czech heavy industry firms. The MFA readout of that visit noted that the delegation inquired about a type of equipment used in nuclear facilities, which MFA officials were quick to point out the GOCR would never license for export to the DPRK. ¶5. (C) The delegation visited the Czech nuclear power facility at Temelin on 20 October. Officials at the MFA and the Prime Minister's office, as well as Speaker of Parliament Lubomir Zaoralek, were well aware of USG views urging the Czechs to cancel this stop (ref B). MFA staff report that (former) Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kolar raised this several times with Zaoralek. Ambassador passed a strong message to Zaoralek reminding him of our concerns. Zaoralek's staff replied that the Speaker was able to limit the visit to only "non-sensitive" areas of the facility, but "for political reasons" was not able to force Vice Speaker Filip to cancel the visit completely. MFA staff also indicate that Zaoralek did not, as he intended, tell the DPRK del that he expected them to permit Czech officials to visit the facility at Yongbyon. This was allegedly because a Czech press report on 18 October had claimed that Zaoralek intended to "trick" the North Koreans into agreeing to a visit to Yongbyon. ¶6. (S) According to Zaoralek's staff, MFA staff, and Milan Musak, External Relations Manager of the Czech power company CEZ that operates Temelin and the individual who conducted the 20 October tour, the four-hour visit to Temelin was a "standard VIP tour." Government officials claimed that it was essentially a stop at the visitors' center. Musak, who has arranged previous visits for USG officials, told us that the main difference from what a USG visitor would have seen was that the North Koreans were shown a simulated control room rather than the real control room. The tour included the standard PowerPoint presentation, a visit to the turbines, tour of the "crisis center," and a lunch. Musak noted that there were a large number of "state security" agents present to provide additional security. Musak was struck by the fact that the delegation did not seem at all experienced in energy matters, and particularly nuclear power. He was also struck by two questions they asked: whether the Czech Republic would be able to export a complete nuclear reactor or facility, and the experience of CEZ in melding "eastern" (Soviet era) technology with "western" (US/European) technology. ¶7. (C) According to his staff, Speaker Zaoralek gave the North Koreans a strong statement that future Czech-DPRK cooperation rested on progress with the six-party talks. MFA staff said the North Koreans' response was a clear statement that they would not give up their nuclear program before they received a light water reactor. They termed the provision of the LWR, under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a necessary sign of US "sincerity" in the six party talks. They also stated that, given the experience of the Iraq war, they were not able to accept USG assurances that it is not preparing to attack North Korea. ¶8. (C) MFA Director for Asian Affairs, Jan Fury, in discussion on 21 October, told Pol-Econ Chief that handling of this visit -- with the Parliament essentially calling the shots on a visit with a very sensitive delegation, and the MFA unable to play a significant role (although Fury stressed that the MFA was able to turn off the meetings Filip requested for the group with PM Paroubek and DPM Skromach) -- raised serious concerns for the MFA. Fury was also concerned that Filip has tentatively accepted an invitation to visit Pyongyang next year, provided he is able to put together a business delegation to accompany. Fury recalled that the GOCR has been carefully building its relations with the DPRK, including the recent opening of an embassy, whose staff will be expanded this year. A Parliamentary visit led by Speaker Zaoralek to the DPRK earlier this year was an important step. A DPRK MFA delegation visited Prague last month, signing a very general agreement on 12 September governing future cooperation (see below, para 10). One action item the GOCR is pursuing is a visit to the CR next year by a North Korean children's group, which the Czechs see as a way of exposing young North Koreans to "the real world." (The DPRK Parliamentary del this week indicated that final government approval for the children's' visit was still pending.) ¶9. (C) Comment and action request: Fury said the Czechs want to consult more closely with USG officials on the growing Czech-DPRK relationship -- an interest he had noted during previous meetings, but reinforced given the unwelcome momentum introduced by Filip's intervention. Embassy strongly supports this effort, and urges EAP and other offices to consider the feasibility of consultations with the GOCR, either in Prague or Washington. End action request. ¶10. (C) The GOCR and DPRK government signed an "Action Plan" on 12 September that is to guide activities the two countries will carry out over the coming two years. Jan Fury signed the document on behalf of the Czech MFA, Kim Chun Guk, Director European Department, signed for the DPRK MFA. Jan Fury said that the document did not commit the Czech Republic to carry out any specific initiative, but rather provided a framework for future discussions. He noted with some ironythat the DPRK representative stated that the Czech Republic was the closest friend the DPRK had in Europe. The document consists of a three parts, a statement of intent to further deepen the present trend in the development of bilateral cooperation, a section outlining three general subjects for the promotion of cooperation, and a section listing 16 specific operative issues. The general subject are the promotion of cooperation between educational, scientific, mass media, sports and other institutions; universities; and economic and trade relations. The 16 operative issues cover a wide range issues including the promotion of regular contacts between the MFAs and other ministries; promotion of language instructions; cooperation on the selection of DPRK students for study in the Czech Republic; and a variety of initiatives of a cultural, social, political, trade and investment nature. MUNTER