CZECHS QUESTIONING TURKISH ACCESSION, BUT LIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001243 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015 TAGS: PREL TU EZ EUN SUBJECT: CZECHS QUESTIONING TURKISH ACCESSION, BUT LIKELY TO SUPPORT REF: A. STATE 150087 ¶B. 2004 PRAGUE 1666 Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d ¶1. (C) Summary: Czech public and official position on Turkey's EU accession has softened noticeable from late last year, when the GOCR came out clearly in favor. A petition opposing Turkish accession received 12,000 signatures last month; the Foreign Minister this week published an editorial saying the EU needs to chose integration over enlargement. MFA officials state that the GOCR position in the upcoming Gymnich and in future debate will depend in part on the EC's assessment of the legality of the recent Turkish government statement against recognition of Cyprus. However, despite the public and private misgivings from the MFA, staff there admit that the numbers do not add up for an EU vote to modify last December's decision. The UK Embassy is confident the Czechs will maintain formal, albeit lukewarm, support for the talks. End summary. ¶2. (C) Last year, former PM Stanislav Gross took a clear position in favor of Turkish accession, overcoming the natural reluctance of Christian Democratic FM Cyril Svoboda (ref B). In speeches and in a published editorial, Gross pledged Czech support for accession on terms similar to those applied to the Czech Republic. However, Gross was careful to remain within the EU mainstream and the Czechs never took an active role in the internal EU debate. ¶3. (C) With the EU mainstream having shifted following the constitutional referenda defeats, the Czech position has also shifted. PM Paroubek has not yet spoken out on the question of Turkish accession talks. This has offered the MFA free rein in shaping the internal debate. Thus it was Svoboda who first published an editorial, in the August 23 edition of Pravo entitled "Integration of the Union, not enlargement." He frames the debate over enlargement solely in the context of the twin referenda defeats and the imperative of the EU to immediately address the complaints that led the French and Dutch voters to say no. He warns against a "helter-skelter enlargement," that enlargement "beyond those countries that belong to Europe" is not on the agenda, and that "empty and cheap promises" will end up reducing the EU's ability to absorb new entries. His comments are not explicitly directly against Turkey, but the context is clear. ¶4. (C) Svoboda's published comments tracked with those of MFA Director for EU Coordination Tomas Ulicny, who told Pol-Econ Counselor on August 19 that the GOCR position on launching negotiations October 3 had to reflect the "new reality" in Europe and the Czech Republic following the referenda defeats. As evidence of the latter, he lifted a three-inch thick binder that allegedly contained 12,000 signatures from Czechs opposed to Turkish accession (the petition was open over a two-week period following a July 29 demonstration on Wenceslas Square against EU accession, organized by Czech MEP Josef Zieleniec as part of the "Voice for Europe" campaign). ¶5. (C) Discussing the landscape of EU members on Turkish accession, Ulicny termed the UK, Spain and Italy the only firm supporters, with Germany, France, the Netherlands and "the Nordics" firm opponents. He said the Czechs are now in the "ambiguous" category. In the end he admitted that a qualified majority in favor of changing the December decision was probably impossible, but he continued with a strong argument against accession. While Ulicny readily accepted the strategic importance of opening the Turkish negotiations as agreed last December, he immediately dismissed the USG position by stating this ignores the "cost" of Turkish accession, "which the Czechs and other Europeans will be paying, not the U.S." ¶6. (C) Ulicny said that in the end the GOCR position would be determined by the question of whether the recent Turkish declaration refusing to recognize Cyprus was found to be against the acquis. Ulicny said MFA lawyers had determined it is not, but that the MFA prefers to wait for a ruling by Commission lawyers, which he expects will come in the days prior to the September 1-2 Gymnich. ¶7. (C) Ulicny reported that Turkish MFA U/S Sensoy would visit Prague on August 25 for a single meeting with Czech MFA Deputy Minister Muller. (Note: Embassy will follow-up with Ulicny and the Turkish embassy after this visit). ¶8. (C) Ulicny's boss, Europe Director General Hana Mottlova, told Charge August 24 that a change in the Czechs' formal position on accession talks was unlikely given the UK Presidency's firm position. She added that she was surprised by the FM's editorial the previous day. ¶9. (C) UK Embassy DCM reports HMG is confident the discussion at the Gymnich will not alter the status quo, and further that they see little likelihood that the Czechs will end up opposing the start of accession talks on schedule. ¶10. (C) Comment: The FM's published comments and the passions of one of his senior staff against Turkish accession were both a significant departure from past debate on the topic. It is not clear how much this reflects a true shift in public opinion post-referenda, as opposed to absence of a firm position in favor of accession from the Prime Minister. While our bottom-line assessment is that, in the end, the GOCR is not likely to actively oppose launching talks in October, the level of support is notably softer here than it was last year. We will need to continue to engage the Czechs, and focus on the Prime Minister himself. MUNTER