ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE

S E C R E T PRAGUE 001146 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER VM SUBJECT: ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE PROGRESS REF: A. STATE 140227 ¶B. PRAGUE 106 ¶C. PRAGUE 1104 ¶D. STATE 131474 ¶E. PRAGUE 892 ¶F. 04 PRAGUE 1064 Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (g) 1) (S/NF) Summary: The Czech MFA continues to withhold its agreement to the transfer of an ASDD-01 passive surveillance system to Vietnam. MFA contacts acknowledge defense cooperation between China and Vietnam could in theory lead to exchange of military material. It appears the MFA's opposition will not be effective in the long run, due to counter arguments with the GOCR that proliferation of ASDD-01 technology from Vietnam to China is a technical impossibility. End summary. 2) (S/NF) Pol-Mil off August 2 delivered Ref A points (on U.S. opposition to a Czech sale of an ASDD-01 to Vietnam) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Common Foreign and Security Policy Petr Kaiser (strictly protect). As intelligence information about military cooperation between China and Vietnam was not authorized for release to the Czechs, Pol-Mil Off provided information gleaned from Google. Kaiser acknowledged his suspicion that the political relationship between China and Vietnam did not preclude the potential for proliferation of military equipment. He mentioned a similar concern had been expressed in EU discussions about the China arms embargo. 3) (S/NF) Kaiser said the MFA, despite deadlines for action, continued to withhold its consent to the transfer. Chinese-Vietnamese relations are within the Czech MFA's area of expertise in the licensing process. However Kaiser also predicted the MFA would be unable to hold up the deal indefinitely because of arguments by technical experts within the Ministry of Defense that the ASDD-01 system had adequate protections against proliferation. He said the MFA did not have the technical expertise to question the validity of strong assertions by experts in favor of the deal. 4) (S/NF) Comment: We (the USG) have been unable to develop a list of foreign policy reasons applicable to Vietnam that the Czech MFA could use to oppose a transfer. Proponents and opponents of the deal are now divided by a question of fact, rather than policy. MFA concerns are being undermined by assertions within the GOCR that proliferation to China is almost certainly a technical impossibility (limited technical details were reported Ref B). Neither Embassy Prague nor the Czech MFA has the technical expertise to effectively raise doubt about such arguments. We will be asking the USAF-led VERA-E evaluation team currently visiting the Czech Republic for a debrief. While we hope the team will have been able to learn something about ERA's counterproliferation measures, this is merely a small step in the right direction. Unless we are willing to develop and deliver technical arguments about anti-proliferation safeguards, it is very likely that an ASDD-01 will go to Vietnam. The other alternative is to raise the level at which U.S. objections are delivered. Combining these two tactics, Post again suggests that as part of bilateral U.S.-Czech pol-mil talks tentatively scheduled for the Fall, we should schedule consultations between U.S. technical and policy experts and their Czech counterparts. CABANISS