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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05PORTAUPRINCE688 2005-03-15 13:28:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

HAITI'S NORTHERN EX-MILITARY TURN OVER WEAPONS;

Tags:   PREL PGOV HA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000688 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV HA
SUBJECT: HAITI'S NORTHERN EX-MILITARY TURN OVER WEAPONS;
SOME TO ENTER NATIONAL POLICE

REF: A. TRIBBLE-NICHOLS 3/08/05 EMAIL

B. PAP 466

C. 04 PAP 1910

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for Reasons: 1.4 (b&d)



1. (SBU) Summary: On March 13, more than 300 members of
Haiti's demobilized military in Cap-Haitien turned over seven
weapons and boarded buses to the capital. Interim Prime
Minister Latortue called the event a significant step forward
in implementing the September 18 agreement (ref B) and said
the ex-soldiers would all have access to the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. Latortue said
that integration into the HNP would be a possibility for
some, but they had to understand that not everyone would make
it into the police. The Interim Government of Haiti (IGOH)
has both a golden opportunity, and a tremendous challenge, to
see DDR get off to a good start. End Summary.



2. (U) At a ceremony Sunday March 13 attended by Interim
Haitian Prime Minister Gerard Latortue and SRSG Valdes, over
300 members of Haiti's demobilized military turned over seven
weapons in what the IGOH called a "symbolic disarmament"
before boarding buses to the capital to enter a disarmament
and reintegration program. According to MINUSTAH's DDR chief
Desmond Molloy, the seven dilapidated weapons included six
M-14's and 1 sub-machine gun.



3. (U) PM Latortue gave a speech to the ex-FADH calling the
event a significant step forward in implementing the
September 18 agreement (ref C) in which the IGOH promised to
establish the Managing Office for Demobilized Soldiers to
resolve outstanding ex-military issues and the ex-FADH
promised to abandon public buildings (Note: the ex-FADH were
occupying the former prison. End Note). Latortue said the
ex-soldiers would all have access to the IGOH- and
international community-led disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) process. Latortue said that integration
into the HNP would be a possibility for some of the
ex-soldiers, but they had to understand that not all of them
would make it. Ex-soldiers not qualified for the HNP could
be hired into other public administration positions (e.g.,
customs, border patrol, etc.)



4. (SBU) Sunday's handover ceremony was quickly put
together following a visit Latortue made to Cap-Haitien on
March 7. Latortue had toured the airport and took the
opportunity to meet with the Cap-Haitien ex-FADH commander,
former sergeant Emmanuel Michel Dieusel (aka Manno). Manno's
group had issued a statement last month (ref B) separating
his group from armed gangs headed by Ravix Remissainthe and
Gren Sonnen. Within the statement, he said "we are ready to
adhere to anyone's orders...designated by the government." It
was during this meeting that Manno reportedly told the PM his
group was prepared to demobilize.



5. (SBU) Following the ceremony, a total of approximately
325 men were put onto buses and brought to Port-au-Prince
where they were installed at the Magistrate's School. (Note:
This location also currently houses the 49 men who had taken
over and later surrendered from Aristide's Tabarre residence
in December. An additional 30 men are also at the
Magistrate's School after abandoning Petit-Goave. End Note).
DDR chief Molloy told us that the total was supposed to be
280, but that number grew by the end of Sunday.
Approximately 25 men were excluded from the bus trip since
the IGOH determined them to be "faux FAdH," i.e., armed
combatants who were never members of the Haitian military.
Manno told Molloy these men would return to Gonaives, but
Molloy insisted they remain in Cap-Haitien and begin the DDR
process there.



6. (C) In preparatory discussions with MINUSTAH staff, some
of the ex-soldiers in Cap-Haitien said they had been told by
the PM's nephew and security advisor Youri Latortue and the
PM's political advisor Paul Magloire that they would be
admitted into the HNP. This raised a red-flag for us and the
rest of the international community and was a subject of the
Core Group meeting March 12. The PM made clear this was not
the case. DDR Chief Molloy was pleased with the PM's
message, particularly his public acknowledgment that the HNP
was not an automatic option for the ex-FADH.



7. (C) DDR Chief Molloy told us that the ex-military from
Cap-Haitien are not yet under the purview of MINUSTAH's DDR
program; rather they are under the auspices of the Managing
Office for Demobilized Military (Note: according to Molloy,
the Managing Office told him they were only informed by the
PM's office March 11 of the plan to bus demobilized soldiers
to Port-au-Prince. End Note). Nonetheless, Molloy faces the
challenge of quickly housing several hundred ex-soldiers
within the capital and jump-starting a DDR process that has
little infrastructure in place. Molloy expects the two
separate groups to undergo different DDR programs (e.g., the
Tabarre group would need a 30-day program; the Cap-Haitien
group might need a 15-day program). Molloy said he was
against the ex-military being brought to Port-au-Prince
(Note: DCM also voiced USG opposition to the move at the
March 12 Core Group meeting. End Note.) arguing that it would
have been easier to facilitate integration counseling in
Cap-Haitien since MINUSTAH does not have a facility ready for
them in Port-au-Prince.



8. (SBU) Another problematic issue is funding. Molloy told
us March 9 that he has approximately $1.2 million available
and that he was prepared to run separate sites concurrently.
He said it would cost approximately $300,000 for a two-month
DDR program capable of hosting 60 people. Although Molloy
intended to use different programs for different groups, he
said he would "have a severe cash flow problem within 8-10
weeks." He asked us about the $3 million the USG had
allocated of FY05 ESF for disarmament (ref A); we noted it
was still awaiting final approval in Washington. Molloy has
requested an additional $2 million from the UN, but funding
is "several months out." Molloy is seeking funding from
Norway and Sweden and hoped to secure additional funding next
month at a small arms conference in Geneva.



9. (SBU) During the past two weeks, UNOPS has been working
to relocate both the Managing Office and the approximately 80
individuals from the Magistrate's School to a former military
camp in the Carrefour neighborhood outside of Port-au-Prince.
PolOff observed the proposed site March 3 and saw little
more than a piece of land with a broken down wall surrounding
it. UNOPS would have to provide tents and/or other facilities
to make the desired location habitable, but expects to have
it up and ready within two to three weeks. It is not clear
if the now 400 ex-military would all be sent to the Carrefour
site.



10. (C) Comment: The symbolism of the ex-military
disarming and leaving Haiti's second largest city represents
a significant breakthrough. However, several challenges
remain. The IGOH now has approximately 800 ex-military
concentrated in the capital, most of whom will not be
integrated into the HNP. Further, there is little
infrastructure to house them as they go through
reintegration, nor has a DDR mandate been signed by the
government (although a commission has been named). The IGOH
has a golden opportunity, as does the international
community, to see DDR get off to a good start. There is solid
coordination amongst the Core Group with the IGOH to see this
process succeed. We continue to stress the need to link any
future indemnity payments to the DDR process and argue that
any ex-FADH going into the HNP meet the same entry
requirements as a civilian. If the IGOH can capitalize on
this initial group of disarmed combatants and reintegrate
them into society with a job (temporarily), it might be
easier for them to convince other armed groups that they
would be rewarded for laying down their arms, too. End
comment.

FOLEY