Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PORTAUPRINCE1564
2005-06-06 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001564 

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER
MINUSTAH

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001564 SIPDIS WHA/CAR WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA DSERCC E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH SUBJECT: HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER MINUSTAH Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The performance of many MINUSTAH troops has been feeble. We hope that the ongoing troop rotation will bring a more robust response to the worsening instability. The Jordanian contingent has been one of the most ineffective forces here. Embassy requests that the Department raise concerns about the meager performance of the Jordanian battalion with the government of Jordan. The Peruvians, on the other hand, have won a reputation for strong performance. We understand, however that a proposed reinforcement of the Peruvian troops in Haiti has been stalled by an outstanding payment from the UN on Peru's original MINUSTAH deployment. Embassy requests that the Department check on the status of the payment with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. End Summary. Peruvians can Help -------------- ¶2. (U) The Peruvian MINUSTAH unit, a reserve force currently stationed in the southern city of Jacmel but which has seen duty in Cite Soleil, is one of the best-trained and most effective military units in Haiti. With reinforcement and redeployment to Port-au-Prince, the Peruvians could significantly improve security in the capital. ¶3. (C) In a visit to Haiti last week, the Peruvian Defense Minister said that Peru is prepared to send an additional 200 troops and move the resulting battalion of 400 to Port-au-Prince. According to the MINUSTAH chief of staff, the Peruvians would likely be positioned in or near the critical Sonapi industrial zone to bolster the less effective Jordanian and Brazilian units already operating around Cite Soleil. The Peruvian Defense Minister said that once the political process in Peru is started, it will take 60-90 days for the new contingent and their equipment to be on the ground and ready. However, the UN has reportedly not yet paid Peru for the first contingent, and Peru does not have the money to send additional troops without receiving payment for the first group. Therefore, while the Peruvian Chief of Operations in Haiti said that he has begun to prepare the troops in Jacmel to move to the capital, their redeployment could be delayed until the UN pays Peru for its first troop deployment. ¶4. (U) Post requests that the Department raise this issue with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York and urge the UN to address this issue rapidly in order to open the way for additional Peruvian troops, and a redeployment to Port-au-Prince. Jordanian Performance is Poor -------------- ¶5. (C) The Jordanian military contingent, which has been working in Cite Soleil for the duration of its deployment is widely considered to be one of the least effective in Haiti. According to a U.S.-MINUSTAH military liaison, the Jordanians are not trained to the same standard as the best groups in the MINUSTAH force. They are not assertive and rarely leave their armored vehicles; we have received numerous accounts of crimes committed within sight of Jordanian checkpoints that fail to elicit a Jordanian response. Small unit leaders in the Jordanian force cannot make decisions on the ground without referring back to the Jordanian Commander, which makes the Jordanians unable to react quickly in the volatile Port-au-Prince environment. The former Jordanian force commander was ineffective and risk-averse. In the last week, MINUSTAH reduced the Jordanians' area of responsibility, forcing other thinly stretched contingents to pick up their slack. ¶6. (C) However, the replacement Jordanian force commander has recently arrived in Haiti, and could help solve at least some of the Jordanian force's shortcomings. MINUSTAH Force Commander Heleno reportedly gave the Jordanians two weeks to improve its performance or he would ask for the contingent's withdrawal from Haiti. Embassy Port-au-Prince requests that the Department raise this concern with the Government of Jordan and stress the need for a more active and assertive approach by the Jordanian military contingent. FOLEY

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