MINUSTAH SCALING DOWN OPERATIONS IN STILL VOLATILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001460

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: MINUSTAH SCALING DOWN OPERATIONS IN STILL VOLATILE
CITE SOLEIL

REF: PAP 1353

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH military leaders provided Core Group
members an update of the situation in Cite Soleil on May 20.
The presentation was notably void of achievement and
indicated force rotations would oblige MINUSTAH to scale back
their footprint in the zone at a time when the area has
become the anarchic core of Port-au-Prince criminality. UN
representatives also reported on the Neptune situation and
proposals for the renewal of MINUSTAH's mandate. End summary.


Overview of MINUSTAH Operations in Cite Soleil
-------------- -


2. (C) MINUSTAH military Deputy Commander Lugani presented a
summary of MINUSTAH operations in Cite Soleil where anarchy
seems only to have increased since MINUSTAH returned in force
last March. Lugani admitted that "Operation Liberte" in
December 2004 had reached but failed to maintain its
objective to re-take the two police stations in the slum and
re-establish state authority there. As a result, gang
violence continued and the humanitarian situation
deteriorated. In response, MINUSTAH began "Operation Raised
Sun" on March 31, establishing 3-4 permanent, static
checkpoints and 8-10 roving checkpoints surrounding the
neighborhood. They also blocked other principal entry points
into Cite Soleil from Route Nationale #1 with containers.
Beginning the week of May 23, however, MINUSTAH was switching
to "Operation Bay Espwa" ("Give Hope"),consisting of a
significantly reduced number of three checkpoints, fewer
troops, a total blockade of a section of Route Nationale #1
and more humanitarian missions.


3. (C) MINUSTAH military officials repeatedly insisted that
the new operation was based on the decision of the HNP to
block Route Nationale #1 in an effort to reduce carjackings
in the area and elsewhere. The HNP said that gangs were using
armed children to hijack cars along this road and then
escaping with the vehicles into the small streets leading
directly into Cite Soleil. By blocking a stretch of road that
has been the site of numerous carjackings and is the main
conduit into and out of Cite Soleil, the HNP (and MINUSTAH)
claim they can put a stop not only to carjackings along that
particularly dangerous corridor, but throughout the city as
well by preventing car thieves from driving their spoils back
into the narrow Cite Soleil alleyways where most stolen
vehicles have thus far been taken. CIVPOL and HNP units
(rather than MINUSTAH military troops as before) are
stationed at checkpoints on both ends. Lugani said that since
the road was blocked, the number of incidents in the area had
fallen from roughly 20 per day to only 1-2 per day.


4. (C) Lugani's list of MINUSTAH accomplishments thus far in
Cite Soleil was paltry: 1) a permanent MINUSTAH presence in
the area, and 2) the establishment of checkpoints. He
acknowledged somewhat belatedly that one reason for the
switch to a lower-stance in Operation Bay Espwa was that
MINUSTAH was in the process of rotating most of its troops
and therefore had to pull back from the previous footprint
there. After six weeks, MINUSTAH's to do list was much longer
than the accomplishments: 1) gain more intelligence, 2)
increase patrols inside Cite Soleil, 3) control Route
Nationale #1, 4) improve cooperation with the HNP, and 5)
begin civic affairs activities, including the establishment
of a registration center in Cite Soleil.


5. (C) Ambassador Foley reminded Lugani that the original
objective of the mission was to root out the gangs based in
Cite Soleil who posed a threat to the elections process. He
asked Lugani what the plan was for returning to that initial
aim. Lugani said that the troop rotation would be complete by
early June and MINUSTAH would again scale up with a new
operation, with even greater assistance from the HNP. But he
added that the terrain in Cite Soleil was difficult no matter
how many troops are involved since they possessed only two
(Peruvian) armored vehicles capable of navigating the narrow
passageways of the district. (Comment: Apparently MINUSTAH
remains unwilling to conduct operations on foot. End
comment).


6. (C) Ambassador Foley also reminded Lugani about the
importance of communication and transport links within the
port and warehouse district where, for example, the Embassy's
GSO Warehouse had become practically inaccessible, and where
much commerce was conducted. Lugani reported that MINUSTAH
had received several letters from businesses associated with
the Terminal Varreau and the warehouse district asking for
greater MINUSTAH security and claiming that insecurity (and
now the complete blockade of the main transport artery, Route
Nationale #1) was preventing employees from conducting their
work (septel). He said MINUSTAH had met with roughly 40
concerned business leaders to discuss the issue on May 18 and
was continuing to work with the group and study ways to
ensure better security in the area. He said the most
challenging issue was maintaining safe access to Terminal de
Varreau.


7. (C) Lugani finished by briefly describing "Operation
Mariela" in Bel Air, in which MINUSTAH troops (who
temporarily lost control of the zone following the February
28 pro-Lavalas protest) re-took control of the area
(uncovering several stashes of HNP uniforms, marijuana and
9mm guns) and re-established street cleaning and medical aid
programs. He added that the joint CIVPOL-HNP anti-kidnapping
cell was up and running, and that "reported" kidnappings had
declined from 14 in April to 3 in May. The cell had concluded
that none of the kidnappings it had investigated had any
political motive involved. He said that a group of HNP
officers that had been arrested for allegedly participating
in several kidnappings remained under investigation by the
HNP and that CIVPOL was monitoring the investigation.

Human Rights Report on Neptune, Chamblain
--------------


8. (C) MINUSTAH Human Rights Representative Thierry Fagart
told the Core Group that the IGOH was pressuring the justice
system to move more quickly on the Neptune case. He said the
judge in the La Scierie case had begun to interview witnesses
(ex. Jocelyn Pierre and Calixte Delatour, Police Chief and
Justice Minister respectively at the time of the La Scierie
events),and that President Alexandre had told justice
officials on May 19 that they must resolve the situation. At
the same time, Fagart warned the Core Group that there was
good reason to believe that Louis Jodel Chamblain might be
freed even sooner following the May 3 decision by the Supreme
Court to annul part of the Raboteau case (reftel). (Note: The
Chief Judge of Port-au-Prince heard Chamblain's appeal on May
19 and ordered that Chamblain remain in prison. End note). In
what Valdes labeled "the understatement of the year," Fagart
concluded that it was evident that the justice system was
under the influence of "some bad characters." Valdes added
that there were rumors suggesting that Neptune and Chamblain
might be freed at the same time, in order (in theory) to help
the IGOH to minimize recrimination on both sides. (Note:
Valdes joined Ambassador Foley and visiting Ambassador Andrew
Young for a visit to Neptune on May 21. Neptune agreed to
cooperate and as of the morning of May 25, Neptune arrived in
St. Marc via MINUSTAH escort to answer questions before the
judge. End note).

MINUSTAH Mandate Renewal
--------------


9. (U) Valdes updated the Core Group on proposals to renew
MINUSTAH's mandate. He said he had already submitted a
document to the Security Council (SC) on the situation in
Haiti and that he was traveling on May 23 to New York to talk
to donor countries and discuss mandate renewal with SC
members. He said he expected the SC to request increasing the
number of MINUSTAH troops by 800 and CIVPOL by 275 in advance
of elections. He also said he was hoping for a one-year
renewal in order to leave no doubt regarding the mandate
during the elections.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The situation in Cite Soleil demands more attention
from MINUSTAH rather than less, and while the troop rotations
are unavoidable, we fear that MINUSTAH still has no coherent
plan for securing the important industrial zone, not to
mention achieve its original objective of rooting out the
gangs deep inside the slum who pose a threat to the
transition process. We have already pressed MINUSTAH strongly
regarding our dissatisfaction with the scope and efficacy of
their tactical strategy in and around Cite Soleil. However,
the hope that an increase in troop levels and the prospect of
a more agile and equipped HNP presence may eventually achieve
results remains just that - a hope, one which flies in the
face of MINUSTAH's record of passivity and avoidance. End
comment.

FOLEY