MFA CAUTIOUS ON UNSCR 1644, SYRIA/LEBANON NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008544

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER SY LE FR
SUBJECT: MFA CAUTIOUS ON UNSCR 1644, SYRIA/LEBANON NEXT
STEPS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA DAS-equivalent for Syria/Lebanon Herve
Besancenot welcomed the UNSC's unanimous adoption of UNSCR
1644, but expressed concern that international efforts to
pressure Syria are losing momentum while the SARG is
increasingly emboldened that it can wait out the U.S. and
France over the next few years. Besancenot affirmed that the
Council should be ready to seek targeted sanctions on senior
Syrian officials as soon as UNIIIC finds Syria in
non-compliance with UNSCR 1636, but speculated that the
expected Belgian successor to Mehlis would take time before
making bold moves. Besancenot described the Saudi position
on pressuring Syria as wavering, while Egypt remains firm.
He also described Lebanese PM Siniora as in a weak position,
and stressed the need to avoid a Hizballah/Amal withdrawal
from the GOL. End summary.

SYRIA PLAYING FOR TIME
--------------


2. (C) During a December 17 discussion with poloff, MFA
DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot commended
unanimous UNSC adoption of UNSCR 1644 as a good outcome. At
the same time, he expressed concern that the compromises
necessary to achieve consensus on 1644 and pending departure
of UNIIIC Chief Mehlis had bolstered the impression that
international efforts on UNSCR 1559 and 1595/1636 were losing
momentum. As a result, the SARG was increasingly emboldened
in its efforts to "play for time" and wait out the U.S. and
France for the next few years. In Besancenot's view, the
Syrians viewed Chirac as having personally "driven" the
Syria/Lebanon file, and were well aware that the French
president has been weakened domestically and would be gone
from the scene after the 2007 presidential elections. He
opined that the Syrians had made a similar calculation
vis-a-vis the U.S., which Damascus viewed as bogged down in
Iraq and unprepared to make a military strike against Syria,
again making the "playing for time" option possible.
Meanwhile, the UNIIIC investigation could take until 2006 or
2007 until it reached conclusive results.


3. (C) Besancenot agreed with poloff on the importance of
insisting on Syrian cooperation with UNIIIC and not letting
the SARG "play for time." He opined that UNIIIC would
inevitably find Syria in non-compliance, over SARG red-lines
on questioning Syrian Military Intelligence Chief Asif
Shawkat or Mahir al Asad, and agreed that the Council should
be ready to impose sanctions, without pre-empting UNIIIC. In
Besancenot's view, sanctions should target senior SARG
officials, through measures such as travel restrictions or
assets freezes, without punishing the Syrian population at
large. Besancenot questioned, however, how long it might
take UNIIIC to make a finding of non-compliance; he
speculated that Mehlis' likely successor, a Belgian
magistrate (NFI),would likely seek time to settle in before
launching bold moves, such as calling for further arrests or
finding Syria in non-compliance.

SAUDI SUGGESTS CHOOSING STABILITY OVER TRUTH; EGYPT STAYS FIRM
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Besancenot suggesting growing pessimism on the Saudi
side on Syria/Lebanon developments. He cited a discouraging
conversation which French Ambassador in Beirut Emie had just
had with his Saudi counterpart, who was pessimistic and
suggested that the U.S. and France might need to make
compromises with Damascus. Besancenot said the Saudi
Ambassador concluded that the international community might
have to choose between the "truth" and "stability" --
meaning, we all know that Hariri could not have been killed
without Bashar Al-Asad's knowledge, but there is no
alternative in Syria to Bashar. (In an aside, Besancenot
expressed personal agreement with the view that there is no
alternative to Bashar, and noted that he had met with
representatives of the Syria Reform Party (RPS),including
Amcit Farid Ghadry, last October. Besancenot said he found
the RPS representatives disconnected from Syria and unable to
articulate a coherent political program.) In contrast to
Saudi Arabia, Besancenot described Egypt's position towards
Syria as quite firm, and said Mubarak was very tough with
Shara during the latter's recent visit to Cairo. When asked
by Shara what Syria needed to do, Besancenot said Mubarak
responded bluntly that Syria needed to do one thing:
cooperate.


5. (C) Besancenot added that prior to the Tueni
assassination, the GoF had been encouraging Sa'ad Hariri to
return to Lebanon, while the Saudis had been advising him to
stay put. In the GoF view, Sa'ad could not stay out of
Lebanon forever, but in the wake of the Tueni assassination,
now was not the time to return. Meanwhile, the French
embassy in Beirut had reinforced its already tight security
considerably in the days since Tueni's murder.

SINIORA/HIZBALLAH
--------------


6. (C) Besancenot described PM Siniora as being in a very
weak position, and cautioned against pressuring him too much
in the wake of the Hizballah/Amal's suspension of
participation in the GOL. Besancenot stressed the need to
avoid a Hizballah/Amal formal withdrawal from the GOL, which
could have dangerous consequences. He conceded that, after a
brief period of moving in the direction of burnishing its
Lebanese nationalist credentials, Hizballah had swung back in
the direction of serving its Syrian and Iranian masters,
perhaps reflecting the hardening positions in Tehran and
Damascus. On the issue of Hizballah disarmament, Besancenot
clarified that the GoF was not advocating inaction, and
insisted that the GoF continued to urge Siniora to take
measures which could help advance implementation of UNSCR
1559, including via his public statements.


7. (C) Comment: Besancenot's comments are consistent with
long-standing MFA caution on Syria/Lebanon, and the tendency
here to see the glass as "half-empty" when it comes to
sustaining international pressure on Damascus. Though
Besancenot seemed to overestimate the SARG's ability to wait
out the international community and underplay the SARG's
declining credibility in the wake of the latest Mehlis report
and Tueni assassination, he was reassuringly firm when it
came to the topic of pursuing sanctions in response to Syrian
non-compliance with UNIIIC. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann