A CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 008373 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015 TAGS: PREL PHUM ASEC EAID TO GH IV FR UNSC SUBJECT: A CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER REF: BEIJING 19704 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas ons 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa Cell" at the Elysee Palace that advises the French President, described the 12/2-12/4 Africa-France Summit in Bamako as a strategic, historic project, encouraged a high-level USG presence for the January meeting of the International Working Group on Cote d'Ivoire, reported that a Central African nation, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, may take over the AU presidency in 2006, and urged the USG to offer some minimal assistance to CAR. In a follow-up phone call, Bonnecorse's deputy conveyed the French understanding that the AU had overturned a decision taken at the Africa-France Summit to force a vote in New York on the AU proposal for Security Council reform. End Summary. -------------- Africa-France Summit -------------- ¶2. (C) In a 6 December courtesy call by Africa Watcher, Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa Cell" at the Elysee Palace that advises French President Chirac, downplayed the lack of direct deliverables from the Africa-France Summit. He termed the summit "a work in continuity," without surprises, consonant with the overall long-term French strategy of empowering Africans so that France could assume a less prominent tutelary role. Bonnecorse was dismissive of French media criticism regarding Chirac's congratulatory message to Gabon President Bongo during the summit on his "brilliant" reelection, remarking that the Chirac was just being polite. ¶3. (C) Like UK PM Blair, Chirac sought to draw attention to the need for development for Africa, hence the Bamako appeal for the Russian G-8 presidency to retain an African focus at the 2006 St. Petersburg summit, Bonnecorse commented. There was a risk for Africa of severe marginalization and of joining economic "globalization only through the back door," e.g. through illicit international trafficking like prostitution and arms deals. Bonnecorse observed that France and the U.S. do not share common views on how to augment development aid. Free-market ("liberal") economies tended to diminish their foreign assistance over time, he argued, hence the need for creative financing initiatives. When Africa Watcher commented on the unfavorable reception by the USG and others to Chirac's proposed one-to-forty euro development tax on international airline tickets, Bonnecorse remarked defensively that governmental participation would be voluntary. He suggested, however, that a tobacco tax might fare better. -------------- Cote d'Ivoire: How We Can Help -------------- ¶4. (C) Bonnecorse hoped the USG would continue to be helpful in addressing the Cote d'Ivoire crisis. In particular, he hoped that i) the USG should dispatch a high level representative to the next meeting of the International Working Group in Abidjan, which he thought would take place 10 January 2006; ii) that the USG and France would agree on a sanctions list; iii) that the USG would support short-term troop transfers, if needed, from UNMIL to UNOCI. ¶5. (C) The naming of a PM opened a new phase for Cote d'Ivoire that, Bonnecorse hoped, would culminate in elections within ten months. If Gbagbo emerged the victor in free and fair elections, then France, like others, would work with him; however, his departure from power would be preferable. A Soro presidency was also not desirable. In the immediate term, it was imperative to bolster newly named PM Konan Banny and augment his authority. On paper the presidency in Cote d'Ivoire takes precedence and "governs all," Bonnecorse regretted. He suggested it may ultimately be necessary to rewrite the national constitution, possibly through the direct influence of the UNSC. -------------- -------------- African Union Presidency: Congo-Brazzaville in the Wings? -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked for his take on who would succeed Nigeria as AU President, Bonnecorse replied he understood there was "absolutely" no chance that Sudan would take over at the 2006 Khartoum AU Summit. Indeed, he claimed there was a tacit understanding that the presidency should now devolve to a Francophone state after the prolonged Nigerian tenure. Bonnecorse expected a Central African nation, a CEMAC member, would soon emerge, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, to take the helm of the AU for a one-year term. In 2007 he predicted the AU would honor Ghana with the AU presidency to mark the final year of President Kufuor's mandate and the 60th anniversary of Ghana's independence. -------------- --- AU and UNSC Reform: North Africans Stall Action -------------- --- ¶7. (C) Bonnecorse admitted he was unaware of any AU decision taken at Bamako to push for a vote on its UNGA resolution on SC reform (reftel). Subsequently, his office called twice with supplementary information confirming the report. Jacques de Labriolle, Bonnecorse's deputy at the Elysee and a former Fellow-of-Hope in Washington, first indicated on 7 December that, yes, the AU working committee on SC reform had indeed decided, 6 against 5, on a vote in New York. But on 8 December Labriolle called back to report that the AU committee decision had since been overruled at ministerial level. Algeria and Egypt, leading the opposition, had insisted that there be either consensus or at least a two-thirds majority before any decision. Labriolle did not know if this would entail a later vote in the committee or by the AU in its entirety. -------------- Somalia: Deep Pessimism -------------- ¶8. (C) While officially France heralded Somalia's attendance at the Africa-France Summit as a watershed, a return to the fold after more than a decade's absence, Bonnecorse admitted he found Transitional Federal Government PM Ghedi unimpressive and unable to answer the simplest questions. Bonnecorse, who was the French representative to Operation Restore Hope from 1992-1993 as well as ambassador to Kenya from 1990-1993, said he was deeply pessimistic about Somalia's future. The most that could be hoped for, he thought, was the unification of Mogadishu. Somaliland was a brighter story, he volunteered, but it would never link up to a greater Somalia. -------------- Togo: Elections in June or July -------------- ¶9. (C) Bonnecorse anticipated parliamentary elections would go forward in Togo in June or July 2006. With Togolese opposition already certain that elections would be rigged, maximum transparency was necessary. Such parliamentary elections were a first step, not a panacea, and would only realign power "a l'africaine," by which he explained that parliament would have a voice, but Faure would still hold 95% of the cards. -------------- Central African Republic: Engagement Needed -------------- ¶10. (C) Bonnecorse made a plea for USG assistance to the CAR. Even a little would go a long way, he urged. CAR was desperately poor, though it does have potential mineral wealth; indeed, the diamond trade was spawning an illicit arms traffic. France was addressing the same plea to the Japanese. Without greater international engagement, CAR risked becoming a playing field of the Chinese, whose only real rival would be Libya, Bonnecorse claimed. -------------- Comment: A Kinder, Gentler Africa Cell? -------------- ¶11. (C) Comment: The Elysee Africa Cell has a historic notoriety. Bonnecorse would appear a modest and subdued successor to predecessors like Jacques Foccart and Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the architects of a "Francafrique" linked to the genius of Total and the genocidaires of Rwanda. Ambassador to Morocco from 1995-2001 -- a job described at the Quai as the consummate "position of trust" -- Bonnecorse has been Chirac's personal Africa adviser since 2002. While the Quai d'Orsay handles day-to-day business, the Africa Cell, however discreetly, still appears to keep the whiphand on situations, such as Cote d'Ivoire, of direct relevance to French prestige or Chirac's image and network of contacts. End Comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton