MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007597

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL IZ IR FR
SUBJECT: MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME

REF: A. PARIS 7496


B. PARIS 7174

C. PARIS 5220

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a November 4 discussion, MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran Antoine Sivan affirmed that the
GoF will view the next Iraqi government as fully sovereign,
but gave no indication that the GoF will increase its
assistance to Iraq after December elections. Sivan expressed
satisfaction with the Iraqi constitutional referendum
results, but voiced concern over the constitution's division
of authority between the central government and provinces.
In response to poloff's urging greater GoF assistance to
Iraq's next government, he repeated familiar GoF arguments
against sending personnel into Iraq and cited Iraqi
uresponsiveness to the GoF offer to train Iraqi police in
France. Sivan confirmed general acceptance of the draft Iraq
UNSCR text proposed by the U.S., though he said the GoF would
seek amendments linking the transfer of security
responsibilities to Iraqis to an eventual departure of
foreign troops, as well as a six-month time-frame for review
of the MNF-1 mandate. Sivan's comments on Iran are reported
septel. End summary.


2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs
Antoine Sivan, during a November 4 meeting with poloff,
expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the October 15
constitutional referendum in Iraq, which he said gave Iraqi
Sunnis the chance to correct their earlier error of
boycotting Iraq's political process. Sivan agreed that the
shift in Sunni attitudes towards the political process was an
important, positive development. At the same time, Sivan
said the GoF remained concerned by the constitution's
content, which he described as a fragile compromise which did
not settle many of the fundamental dilemmas facing Iraq,
including the division of natural resources, the role of
Islam, and the relationship between the central government
and the provinces. Sivan focused on the latter point in
particular, and expressed concern that the new constitution
had essentially "robbed Peter to pay Paul," and created a
central government which would be a "political dwarf" in
relation to to the regions, thereby exacerbating
sectarianism. Poloff questioned Sivan's pessimism, and
pointed to the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population
which had approved the constitution, as well as its
unprecedented human rights advances and protections for
minorities, including the Sunni community. Sivan responded
that what counted most for the GoF was the fact that the new
constitution could be amended, which would help allow all
those who reject violence to participate in the political
process.


3. (C) Poloff commented that Sivan's concerns over the
competence of Iraq's central government were all the more
reason for the GoF to contribute more to Iraqi capacity
building and help realize our shared goal of a stable and
democratic Iraq. Although Sivan affirmed that the GoF would
view Iraq's next government as fully sovereign, he gave no
indication that December elections would herald increased GoF
assistance to Iraq. In response to poloff's urging the GoF
to look for ways to increase assistance to Iraq, Sivan
reviewed the GoF's modest assistance efforts for Iraq thus
far, including the activities of the French cultural center
in Baghdad, which has a 2005 budget of about 2.5 million
euros (an increase of 300 percent over 2004),and French
participation in the EU "JUSTLEX" program, under which 40
Iraqi police officers underwent one-month training in France
in summer 2005. On the long-stalled French bilateral offer
to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police in France, Sivan blamed the
Iraqi government for the impasse, and said the GoF was
waiting for the ITG to send a senior-level MOI delegation to
follow-up on a July visit by Iraqi MOI officers (ref c).
Sivan claimed that all the GoF needed to launch the training
program were a list of participants and confirmation of areas
of interest from the ITG. Asked by poloff to what degree the
GoF might modify its training proposal to better meet Iraqi
needs, Sivan offered little response. He noted GoF redlines
against sending troops into Iraq remained unchanged, and that
the GoF was unwilling to send any humanitarian or NGO
personnel to Iraq as long as the security situation remained
difficult. He summed up that the GoF did not want "any new
hostages."


4. (C) On the draft Iraq UNSCR under discussion in New York
(ref a),Sivan said the GoF had no fundamental problems with
the U.S. proposed text. He suggested that the GoF would
focus on two points in negotiations of the draft text: seek
preambular language alluding to a linkage between an eventual
departure of foreign troops from Iraq and the gradual
transfer of security authority to the Iraq government, and
advocate a six-month, vice the proposed eight-month, review
of the mandate of the MNF-1.


5. (C) Comment: The GoF continues to be generous in offering
opinions on Iraq but much less so in providing significant,
concrete support for Iraq's government. We will continue to
press the GoF to increase its support for our shared goal of
a stable, democratic Iraq, particularly after December
elections. Unfortunately, it appears that the prospect of an
elected, permanent government in Iraq, while finally meeting
GoF criteria of a fully sovereign government, has not yet
prodded France to contemplate increasing its meager
engagement in Iraq. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton