MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007597 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015 TAGS: PREL IZ IR FR SUBJECT: MFA ON IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS: MORE OF THE SAME REF: A. PARIS 7496 ¶B. PARIS 7174 ¶C. PARIS 5220 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a November 4 discussion, MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran Antoine Sivan affirmed that the GoF will view the next Iraqi government as fully sovereign, but gave no indication that the GoF will increase its assistance to Iraq after December elections. Sivan expressed satisfaction with the Iraqi constitutional referendum results, but voiced concern over the constitution's division of authority between the central government and provinces. In response to poloff's urging greater GoF assistance to Iraq's next government, he repeated familiar GoF arguments against sending personnel into Iraq and cited Iraqi uresponsiveness to the GoF offer to train Iraqi police in France. Sivan confirmed general acceptance of the draft Iraq UNSCR text proposed by the U.S., though he said the GoF would seek amendments linking the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqis to an eventual departure of foreign troops, as well as a six-month time-frame for review of the MNF-1 mandate. Sivan's comments on Iran are reported septel. End summary. ¶2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan, during a November 4 meeting with poloff, expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the October 15 constitutional referendum in Iraq, which he said gave Iraqi Sunnis the chance to correct their earlier error of boycotting Iraq's political process. Sivan agreed that the shift in Sunni attitudes towards the political process was an important, positive development. At the same time, Sivan said the GoF remained concerned by the constitution's content, which he described as a fragile compromise which did not settle many of the fundamental dilemmas facing Iraq, including the division of natural resources, the role of Islam, and the relationship between the central government and the provinces. Sivan focused on the latter point in particular, and expressed concern that the new constitution had essentially "robbed Peter to pay Paul," and created a central government which would be a "political dwarf" in relation to to the regions, thereby exacerbating sectarianism. Poloff questioned Sivan's pessimism, and pointed to the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi population which had approved the constitution, as well as its unprecedented human rights advances and protections for minorities, including the Sunni community. Sivan responded that what counted most for the GoF was the fact that the new constitution could be amended, which would help allow all those who reject violence to participate in the political process. ¶3. (C) Poloff commented that Sivan's concerns over the competence of Iraq's central government were all the more reason for the GoF to contribute more to Iraqi capacity building and help realize our shared goal of a stable and democratic Iraq. Although Sivan affirmed that the GoF would view Iraq's next government as fully sovereign, he gave no indication that December elections would herald increased GoF assistance to Iraq. In response to poloff's urging the GoF to look for ways to increase assistance to Iraq, Sivan reviewed the GoF's modest assistance efforts for Iraq thus far, including the activities of the French cultural center in Baghdad, which has a 2005 budget of about 2.5 million euros (an increase of 300 percent over 2004),and French participation in the EU "JUSTLEX" program, under which 40 Iraqi police officers underwent one-month training in France in summer 2005. On the long-stalled French bilateral offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police in France, Sivan blamed the Iraqi government for the impasse, and said the GoF was waiting for the ITG to send a senior-level MOI delegation to follow-up on a July visit by Iraqi MOI officers (ref c). Sivan claimed that all the GoF needed to launch the training program were a list of participants and confirmation of areas of interest from the ITG. Asked by poloff to what degree the GoF might modify its training proposal to better meet Iraqi needs, Sivan offered little response. He noted GoF redlines against sending troops into Iraq remained unchanged, and that the GoF was unwilling to send any humanitarian or NGO personnel to Iraq as long as the security situation remained difficult. He summed up that the GoF did not want "any new hostages." ¶4. (C) On the draft Iraq UNSCR under discussion in New York (ref a),Sivan said the GoF had no fundamental problems with the U.S. proposed text. He suggested that the GoF would focus on two points in negotiations of the draft text: seek preambular language alluding to a linkage between an eventual departure of foreign troops from Iraq and the gradual transfer of security authority to the Iraq government, and advocate a six-month, vice the proposed eight-month, review of the mandate of the MNF-1. ¶5. (C) Comment: The GoF continues to be generous in offering opinions on Iraq but much less so in providing significant, concrete support for Iraq's government. We will continue to press the GoF to increase its support for our shared goal of a stable, democratic Iraq, particularly after December elections. Unfortunately, it appears that the prospect of an elected, permanent government in Iraq, while finally meeting GoF criteria of a fully sovereign government, has not yet prodded France to contemplate increasing its meager engagement in Iraq. End comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton