DARFUR TURMOIL DARKENING THE OUTLOOK FOR CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU CD FR
SUBJECT: DARFUR TURMOIL DARKENING THE OUTLOOK FOR CHAD

REF: A. STATE 190682 B. NDJAMENA 1546

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) France is not currently advocating a Chadian
conference on Darfur, Africa A/S Equivalent Bruno Joubert
declared during an October 17 meeting with Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan.

SIPDIS
Joubert informed Africa Watcher that the Quai d'Orsay was
still reserving judgment, although the French ambassador in
N'djamena was championing the conference as a means to
reinforce President Deby's increasingly shaky position.
Joubert remarked that the spillover of the Darfur conflict
into Chad was becoming more than Deby could handle, as seen
by increasing Zarghawa desertions in Eastern Chad. The
precariousness of Deby's situation was partly linked to his
own situation, including his health, but Joubert added he was
also "deeply suspicious of the game the Sudanese are playing."


2. (C) A Chadian conference would correspond to Deby's
perceived need to engage personally on Darfur, Joubert
stated. Deby was thinking in terms of reviving the call in
the April 2004 agreement for rebel cantonment, though Joubert
was not sure how this could work. Deby was also talking
about somehow incorporating Janjaweed leaders into a
conference. Joubert was amenable to the U.S. proposal for a
November Nairobi workshop. He had thought the U.S. was open
also to the option of a Mini Minawi organized event,
prompting Africa Watcher to note our concern that such an
initiative might further fuel rebel divisions (Ref A).


3. (C) Joubert commented to DASD Whelan that he had reached
the conclusion -- in the course of the last two weeks -- that
the Sudanese no longer wanted peace in Darfur. Instead,
Khartoum is "buying time" and "back to old tactics," like
stoking differences among rebel commanders. Perhaps relieved
by Garang's death and fortified by SPLM troop withdrawals,
Khartoum was also going slow on CPA implementation, prompting
doubts about its commitment, Joubert judged. He repeatedly
lamented the lack of ready international leverage on
Khartoum, apart from resort to the ICC. He asked Whelan
whether the U.S. was pulling its punches because of the need
for CPA implementation.


4. (C) Recent violence in Darfur was now posing a challenge
to the credibility of the African Union (AU) and it was vital
to counter any perception of AU failure, Whelan remarked. A
political settlement on Darfur within the near future did not
appear a realistic prospect, short of a huge diplomatic
breakthrough. Joubert, for his part, wondered whether AMIS
could last another 12 months, given both the stress on donors
and the structural and capacity problems of the AU itself.
Expansion to 7,000 had "mortally broken" AMIS, he said. EU
funding would continue for another 5-6 months at most.


5. (C) Joubert said DPKO U/SYG Guehenno had told him at a
10/17 lunch that the UN had no expectation of beginning a
Darfur operation before mid-2006, at best. Guehenno fingered
key obstacles to UN deployment as i) lack of an AU exit
strategy, and, ii) the need for an Abuja success. Moreover,
UNMIS itself was heavy going. To commit the UN to another
major operation, likely 12,000 more troops, would have
significant cost implications, too, for both the USG and
France, Joubert noted. Guehenno called for new "software,
not hardware" in addressing the problem, meaning that Abuja
headway and rebel cohesion could count for more than
international troop increases.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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