U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000670 SIPDIS PASS NRC; DOE FOR A/DPTY U/S FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AOKI; DOS FOR NP/NE COMELLA; NSC FOR HARWARD; NRC FOR FAULKNER/KANE/SHEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 TAGS: ENRG FR KNNP MNUC PREL SUBJECT: U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR COUNTER-TERRORISM, JANUARY 24 - 27, 2005 REF: A. 04 PARIS 7833 ¶B. 04 PARIS 5464 Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 B, D ¶1. (U) Summary: Following up on high-level discussions held in July 2004 (see ref B),U.S. and French delegations held three days of meetings in Paris on physical security measures for nuclear facilities and materials, agreeing on a path forward to coordinate and accelerate future bilateral cooperation in this area. The meetings were supplemented by a visit to the MELOX fuel fabrication plant and a nuclear reactor for briefings on the security measures currently in place at those facilities. The French team was led by Didier Lallemand, Senior Official for Defense in the Ministry of Industry (Haut Fonctionnaire de Defense - HDF),who has regulatory authority for security at all French nuclear sites. It included active participants from all of the French agencies with nuclear security and safety responsibilities, as well as representatives of the state-owned nuclear fuel cycle and electrical power generation industries. The U.S. delegation was made up of DOE, NRC, NSC, State, and Embassy Paris officials. ¶2. (U) In opening remarks and side conversations, Lallemand emphasized the importance the French government attached to the creation of an active bilateral channel for cooperation on nuclear security. He said that France and the U.S. shared a common view of the terrorist threat, and in his view, had parallel approaches to security. He added that there was now high-level support for closer cooperation with the U.S., noting that he had been invited to participate in preparations for the upcoming visit of Secretary Rice, and that the results of our meeting would be briefed to the Prime Minister and the office of the President. It was apparent that a number of difficult bureaucratic and policy issues have been resolved on the French side, and there is now a strong desire to seek a closer and more cooperative relationship with the U.S. in the area of nuclear security, including the exchange of classified and other sensitive information. ¶3. (U) Both delegations provided briefings on the organization of nuclear security and physical protection ;within their governments, and on the implementation of security at fuel cycle facilities, defense nuclear laboratories and production plants, and nuclear power plants. End Summary -------------- Threat Assessment -------------- ¶4. (C) During their presentations, the French made clear that their threat assessment now focuses on the risk of attack by a well-armed terrorist commando, as well as other forms of suicide attack, such as an aircraft strike on a reactor. They said that the regulatory agencies have adopted a design basis threat based on a team composed of a specified number of armed attackers (One of their speakers disclosed - perhaps without authorization - that their planning is based on a team of six to seven attackers.) They are also moving to a denial-of-task philosophy for their protective posture, to be achieved by a combination of on-site security forces, physical barriers, and response forces. The reluctance of the electric utility (Electricite de France - EdF) to arm the protective forces at reactors is now a major issue for the governmental authorities, who are about to force action through new regulation. Armed security officers are already present at fuel cycle facilities operated by COGEMA and at Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat a l,Energie Atomique - CEA) defense nuclear sites, and are supported by both local and national gendarmerie response forces. CEA has developed an analytical methodology to evaluate the performance of physical security measures, using computer software to calculate the delays introduced by barriers, protective forces, and other elements of the security scheme across all available attack routes. An important difference between U.S. and French approaches is the greater visibility of our armed protective forces - the French acknowledged that there is a deterrent benefit to stationing well-equipped security officers at the outer perimeter of facilities, but said that this posed public acceptance problems for them. ¶5. (C) In a side discussion, Lallemand expressed interest in continuing to exchange threat assessments through intelligence channels, and in making sure that key intelligence judgments were also shared with those agencies that have operational security responsibilities. -------------- Exercises -------------- ¶6. (U) The U.S. repeatedly emphasized the importance of force-on-force exercises to evaluate the performance of security forces and other elements of the security system. The French described their current system of exercises, which includes events at the national, local, and facility level. Lallemand indicated that the French were interested in having an exchange of observers at security force exercises at nuclear facilities in our two countries. We agreed that this would be a very constructive step, and committed to look at schedules to identify an appropriate near-term time for such a visit to the U.S., to include exercises at both NRC-regulated and DOE sites. -------------- Transportation -------------- ¶7. (U) Both delegations made presentations on the security measures employed for shipments of Category I nuclear materials, and we were taken to see the control center operated by IRSN for real-time monitoring of shipments. The French described the capabilities of their vehicles and the qualification process for their drivers, and said they have recently reinforced the police escort that accompanies nuclear material shipments. -------------- Research and Development -------------- ¶8. (U) The two delegations described current R&D programs to support physical protection, and identified a number of areas where additional technical exchanges could be beneficial. (See para 17, below.) -------------- -------------- Visits to MELOX and the Tricastin Nuclear Power Plant -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The U.S. team visited the MELOX mixed oxide fuel fabrication plant at Marcoule and an operating nuclear reactor. At both facilities we were shown security control rooms and received briefings on the deployment and training of the guard force. MELOX, which is a commercial operation of the COGEMA nuclear fuel cycle company, has its own organic armed security detail, which can be reinforced by a much larger force from the surrounding CEA-managed Marcoule site. The Tricastin reactor site does not have armed guards, but relies on hardening of its control rooms and a response from the local Gendarmerie for security. There is a Gendarmerie presence on-site, however, whenever fresh MOX fuel is being received or introduced into the reactor. The reactor is quite close to a public road, and there are concerns about the potential vulnerability of the facility to a vehicle bomb. -------------- -------------- Regulatory base for Regulation of Radioactive Sources -------------- -------------- ¶10. (U) The U.S. team met with safety regulators at the DGSN (Directorate Generale pour la Surete Nucleaire),who in addition to providing safety oversight for nuclear facilities, maintain controls over the use of radioactive sources. They told us they are seeking additional legal authority to vet source users; in some instances they have refused licenses to applicants where they believed there to be a security issue, but are not certain this would withstand legal challenge. -------------- Bilateral Agreements -------------- ¶11. (U) As preparation for this meeting, the French researched existing bilateral agreements to identify authorities for nuclear security-related cooperation, including a legal basis to share classified information. They believe there is a sufficiently inclusive set of agreements between various French agencies and both DOE and NRC to permit near-term implementation of the cooperation we have been discussing, but would like the U.S. to consider whether a higher-level government-to-government agreement would be useful as a means of simplifying and extending the existing arrangements to ensure that all relelvant agencies can participate in the joint activities. As an immediate step, they would like to amend the current agreement between the HFD and NRC to allow it to also cover exchanges with DGSN, (Direction Generale de la Surete Nucleaire),the nuclear safety regulator, and the CEA and to expand the scope of possible subjects to be discussed. The U.S. delegation agreed to consider these proposals and to review the agreements currently in force. -------------- Next Steps for Bilateral Cooperation -------------- ¶12. (U) The two delegations agreed on the need to move quickly to develop and expand technical cooperation, including through visits to U.S. facilities, while maintaining periodic contact at the senior level. We are looking to hold the next senior-level meeting in the U.S. sometime in the September-October time frame. Lallemand suggested that this should be a smaller group of about four or five on each side, charged with steering our cooperation rather than a large interagency setting to provide briefings. This would also be a venue to discuss more sensitive issues, including an exchange of threat assessments, the parameters of cooperation to address aircraft strikes on reactors, and issues involving third countries. -------------- Belgium -------------- ¶13. (S) On the margins of the meeting, Aoki raised with Lallemand U.S. concerns about physical security implementation in Belgium, citing a recent Belgian press article disclosing a May, 2004 letter on the subject by Secretary Powell to Foreign Minister Michel. Lallemand said SIPDIS that the French have little or no bilateral contact on physical protection issues with their Belgian counterparts, and that the dialogue that takes place occurs either through a recently-established informal group of European nuclear safety regulators or at the IAEA. He emphasized that France does not want to encourage other European countries or EU institutions to intervene in French domestic decision-making on nuclear security or safety matters, and has therefore avoided pressing its neighbors on these matters. Nonetheless, France understood that the U.S. had serious concerns about security implementation in Belgium, and would consider what it could do. Lallemand asked if we could provide any details about the cause for our concerns; Aoki responded that a U.S. team had recently visited Belgian facilities, but that we were constrained by confidentiality commitments from divulging our observations. Lallemand said he understood, but would still be interested in any information we could provide on a classified basis. ¶14. (U) A record of meeting drafted by the French delegation and agreed by the U.S. team and an annex listing priority areas for future collaboration are provided at para 17, below. The French will also collect the presentations made by both sides at the meetings and distribute them as a classified document. -------------- Delegation Lists -------------- ¶15. (U) French participants were: Didier Lallemand, HFD, Ministry of Industry Grard Charneau, HFD Eric Plaisant, HFD Frdric Joseph, HFD Corentin Le Doare, DGNSR, Ministry of Industry Jacques Aguilar, DGNSR Hugues de Longevialle, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Henry-Jacques Neau, AREVA Caroline Jorant, Areva Pierre Sirot, Cogema Jrome Sartre, Cogema Pascal Jaunet, Cogema Michel Briere, IRSN Jean Jalouneix, IRSN Bruno Autusson, IRSN Jean-Louis Petitclerc, IRSN Herv Bernard, CEA Didier Kechemair, CEA Pascal Durieux, EDF Bernard Boube, SGDN Bernard Janvier, SGDN Alain Munier, SGDN Philippe Joyer, SGDN ¶16. (U) U.S. participants were: Steven Aoki, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Counterterrorism, DOE William Kane, Deputy Executive Director, NRC Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations, DOE/NNSA Robert Harward, NSC Joseph Shea, NRC Donald Solich, DOE Patricia Comella, State NP/NE Howard Faulkner, NRC Robert Dry, Science Counselor, Embassy Paris -------------- Summary Record -------------- ¶17. (U) The following was agreed to by the two delegations to reflect the discussions held. Begin Text of Summary Record: In order to maintain continuity and strengthen the exchanges concerning the security of nuclear material, sites, and transportation, DOE and NRC on the one hand, and HFD from the Ministry in charge of industry and the French organizations concerned on the other intend to meet twice a year (once in each country),in order to review the implementation of cooperation between the two Parties, to maintain an open informal discussion, and to exchange information. These exchanges will be based on strict reciprocity. The next meeting could take place in the US, during the fall in 2005. It is being understood that these meetings will be brief and with delegations adjusted to the topics. Available current security Agreements mentioned during discussions will be reassessed by each Party. In particular, the opportunity to extend the scope of the 1984 Agreement between US NRC and the Ministry in charge of industry by associating CEA and DGSNR, as was decided in 2004 for IRSN will be studied. The question of a new cooperation Agreement between DOE and the Ministry in charge of industry (HFD) will be studied, based on the 1977 intergovernmental Agreement, and with which American entities and French organizations concerned (IRSN, CEA, DGSNR) would be associated. Information exchanges will comply with the level of protection required by the State providing them, in conformity with applicable Agreements, and this within strict compliance with the protection of sensitive information, business confidentiality, industrial secrecy, and intellectual property. The two Parties have identified potential topics listed in Annex to the present summary record which, subject to further examination, could be the object of exchanges and cooperation efforts. ANNEX Design Basis Threat -- Methodology used for creation and the validation of the design basis threat for nuclear facilities and materials -- Implementation of DBT at nuclear sites - Impact on security posture -- Modelling and assessment of security force performance -- Methodology for treatment of internal threat -- Sharing of responsibilities between government and nuclear operators in prevention of acts of terrorism Exercises -- Discussion on philosophy, planning and objectives of exercises -- Design and implementation of exercise program -- Exchange of observers for exercises at sites handling cat. I Research and development -- Exchange of information on physical protection research and development priorities and program plans -- Demonstration of tools for physical protection applications, including advanced concepts for threat identification and access denial Security of Facilities from External Attack -- Exchange of methodologies for assessment of containment and structure performance against e.g. aircraft strikes, high energy attacks, other threats of interest -- Design and evaluation of transport containers to take account of terrorists threats -- Assessment of the consequences of illegal intended acts against transportation Emergency Response Procedures -- Continuation or acceleration of existing exchanges on responses to a terrorist event involving nuclear or radioactive material -- Exchange of observers for exercises Control of Radiological Sources and other Radioactive Materials -- Legal and regulatory implementation of controls and security measures on radioactive materials Basis for cooperation -- Both sides will assess the currently available bilateral agreements to determine whether a sufficient basis exists for the desired level of cooperation, including the exchange of sensitive and classified information. For the longer term, we will consider drafting a new government-to-government agreement. Leach